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1 Overview and Purpose of Study
1.1 Background of the Research
The concept of mediation as a means of conflict resolution has rapidly
spread around the world. It is used to solve civil and administrative
disputes, but is also increasingly considered a significant way of dealing
with crime, as an alternative or an addition to traditional criminal
proceedings.
The growing attention for victim offender mediation and its benefits has
instigated the call for principles and rules governing the practice of penal
mediation. This has led to the development of international protocols that
promote and facilitate the institutionalisation and use of victim offender
mediation. Article 10 of the EU Framework Decision on the Standing of
Victims in Criminal Proceedings1 exhorts member states to promote
mediation in criminal cases for offences which they consider appropriate for
this sort of measure. In addition, the Council of Europe2 and the United
Nations3 have both issued a set of principles for victim offender mediation.
Although the added value of victim offender mediation is widely
acknowledged, as is the need for clear and uniform guidelines, mediation in
criminal cases lacks a statutory basis in many countries. The main emphasis
has been on the advantages of victim offender mediation vis à vis the
criminal justice system and on how to maximise these advantages without
violating the interests of victims and offenders. While this is an important
aspect of promoting the use of victim offender mediation, attention should
also be paid to positioning the procedure within the legal system. In order to
realise the potential of victim offender mediation to deal with crime through
the establishment of a dialogue between victims and offenders, the
procedural requirements and implications of the process should also be
considered. Due to its focus, penal mediation plays a role within the legal
system and can interact with criminal and civil law. As a result, the design of
the mediation procedure should not only concentrate on safeguarding the
benefits of the process, but also on its coexistence next to these legal areas of
the law.
One of the main procedural requirements that is generally considered to be
necessary for a proper functioning of mediation is the principle of
confidentiality. This principle is included in the Council of Europe
1 Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001, 2001/220/JHA (OJ 2001 L 82/1).
2 Recommendation R (99)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Matters Adopted by the
Committee of Ministers (15 September 1999).
3 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters, 1 26 July 2002, Res/2002/12.
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Recommendation4 and the United Nations Basic Principles5 mentioned
above. According to these international protocols, all those involved in
mediation (the victim, the offender, the mediator, and trusted third parties)
are expected to keep quiet about the things said and done during the
mediation process. Although it is beyond doubt that victim offender
mediation benefits from a ban on indiscriminate disclosure of its contents,
the question arises whether exceptions should be made to this rule.
Observing secrecy unconditionally implies that victims and offenders are
not allowed to discuss the process they have been involved in with, for
example, their family and friends, and that the contents of a mediation
cannot be disclosed in court, although such information may conceivably be
relevant in the light of subsequent judicial proceedings.
The wording of the principle of confidentiality in the international
protocols illustrates how the topic of victim offender mediation was
addressed in the past. The focus was mainly on improving the quality of the
mediation procedure itself. Little attention was paid to the legal concepts
victim offender mediation may interact with and to problems that may rise
in this respect. Mediation confidentiality is particularly susceptible to
problems, because the current interpretation of the confidentiality principle
does not take into account how the resulting ban on disclosure may affect
victims and offenders. The consequences of the principle of confidentiality
for the mediation participants have hardly been recognised, while these are
very likely to occur in areas where they can have a strong impact on the
participants’ lives; according to the advocated scope of the principle of
confidentiality, mediation participants cannot talk to their social
environment about the mediation, nor are they allowed to submit mediation
information in criminal or civil court.
As victim offender mediation aims at enabling victims and offenders to
come to terms with each other and the crime that has happened, the point of
departure should at the very least be that mediation does not add to their
distress; drawbacks of the confidentiality principle should be avoided.
Consequently, frictions between victim offender mediation and related
systems, such as criminal and civil law, should be resolved in order to be
able to position penal mediation on a solid and practicable footing.
The research presented in this book examined the desired scope of the
confidentiality of victim offender mediation, with the ultimate aim of
contributing to a wider applicability of penal mediation, allowing more
victims and offenders to reap its benefits.
4 Paragraph 2 of the Recommendation.
5 Paragraph 14 of the Basic Principles.
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1.2 Research Question and Objectives
The background to the research described in the previous section can be
captured in the following research question:
Should exceptions be made to the strict confidentiality regimen which emanates from the
basic principles governing the process of victim offender mediation, and, if so, to what extent
and on what grounds?
The principle of confidentiality is considered one of the main standards of
victim offender mediation. Its current interpretation may cause frictions that
may necessitate disregarding the confidentiality rule in some situations. This
research aims at identifying these possible exceptions in order to determine
the preferable extent of mediation secrecy. A necessary element of this is to
examine the grounds on which legitimate exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality could and should be made. If and where appropriate,
guidelines will be developed to determine the scope of these possible
exceptions.
1.3 Research Approach
Participation in mediation has significant benefits for victims and offenders.
It offers them an opportunity to share their experiences and to reach an
agreement. Since a free exchange of information is a substantial constituent,
it is generally acknowledged that victim offender mediation should take
place in a private setting. This allows the parties to talk about their cares and
concerns without restraints, and to reach an agreement that is based on their
true needs and interests. The confidential nature of victim offender
mediation is laid down in, inter alia, two international protocols (see Section
1.1). These international documents have the status of guidelines – they are
not legally binding. Nevertheless, they do express the perceived value of the
principle of confidentiality. The extent of mediation confidentiality, as it is
expressed and interpreted in these protocols, was therefore taken as the
starting point of this research: must all mediation information be subject to
secrecy, or can and should exceptions to this rule be made?
Thus far, the topic of confidentiality in victim offender mediation has
scarcely been explored. Although the need for confidentiality is recognised
nationally and internationally, domestic mediation programmes and
legislation generally do not address the issue in detail. As a result, little
literature is available. Where appropriate, the available literature was
therefore supplemented with relevant source material from related areas,
such as (criminal and civil) law, victimology, and psychology.
The research examined the desired scope of mediation confidentiality
from a legal point of view. Legal sources were therefore used to study the
areas of the law which victim offender mediation can interact with, namely
CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
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criminal and civil law. Their main features were considered in the light of
various international and national documents. However, victim offender
mediation, which incorporates legal and social aspects in a unique way,
cannot be studied without taking into account the large body of
victimological and psychological knowledge available. Empirically derived
insights from these areas were therefore taken into consideration as well.
The research made use of expert studies, offering comprehensive and
detailed findings on various relevant topics. They provided an answer to a
variety of pertinent questions, and furthermore helped to shed light on new
issues that were of special relevance in the context of this research. Based on
these legal, psychological, and victimological sources, the various steps (see
below) needed to answer the central research question were addressed.
In addition to the above mentioned source material, this research made
use of relevant examples of national law. The goal was to determine
generalisable examples for the situations concerned. Since a systematic
comparative approach was unfeasible, it was not endeavoured to compare a
few legal systems in detail. The countries to be discussed were selected for
their potential to illustrate the situation or the effects of a particular
suggestion in their legal systems. Consequently, in some cases, the
differences between families of law, such as civil law and common law, were
studied. Other issues required a more detailed approach and called for a
comparison between civil law countries with each other. For reasons of
accessibility and familiarity, a relatively large number of examples were
taken from the situation in the Netherlands, but only where Dutch
regulation offers general and broadly applicable examples. As a result of this
approach, the research was universal in character, and aimed at presenting
generalisable results.
The literature research, the chosen comparative approach, and the author’s
informed views served to develop various steps in formulating an answer to
the central question. Making an exception to the principle of confidentiality
implies that information from the mediation can be disclosed in particular
situations. The frictions that may result from unconditional adherence to the
principle of confidentiality can relate to the social environment of the
mediation participants and to their involvement in judicial proceedings. If
exceptions were formulated to resolve these frictions, the information
concerned could then be disclosed both to out of court recipients and in
court. Both settings require a different approach, and different factors
should be taken into consideration to assess the desired level of
confidentiality.
The research question of this study necessitated balancing interests, namely
those that are protected by the principle of confidentiality, and those that
may possibly be harmed by this rule. Therefore, a framework had to be
developed to weigh the interests involved. This framework had to
acknowledge the main features of the relevant systems and concepts. Not all
CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
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of these elements might be needed for the assessment of each friction, but to
answer the central question, all of them were necessary. The resulting
research framework consists of three main pillars: victim offender
mediation, criminal law, and civil law. The main characteristics of these
pillars constituted the basis of the framework and enabled balancing the
interests involved.
The assessment of the issue of out of court disclosure to third parties mainly
consisted of an examination of the psychological effects of prohibiting
victims and offenders to talk to others about what happened in mediation.
These implications of observing the principle of confidentiality had to be
weighed against the violation of the mediation essentials induced by a
breach of this rule. In this context, only the first pillar of the research
framework, regarding the features of victim offender mediation, was
relevant. For the friction regarding out of court disclosure, a distinction was
made between various categories of out of court recipients of the
information concerned. The specific characteristics of the different mediation
participants was paid attention to, as was their position in victim offender
mediation. A basic premise was the standard that participation in mediation
should at the very least not add to the participants’ distress. Additionally,
the consequences of making exceptions for the mediation procedure itself
were taken into consideration. On the basis of these criteria, the desired level
of confidentiality in out of court situations was established.
Exceptions resulting in disclosure in court imply that mediation information
can be submitted in judicial proceedings. As a result, the tenability of
observing or breaching the confidentiality rule not only had to be tested
against the characteristics of victim offender mediation, but also against the
main features of criminal and civil law. Consequently, the entire research
framework had to be taken into consideration.
The assumption that participation in victim offender mediation can have
significant benefits for both victims and offenders, and should never add to
their distress, implies that the applicability of the principle of confidentiality
should be reconsidered if it gives rise to situations that may undo the
advantages of participating, or that have additional drawbacks. The
potential frictions with the principle of confidentiality therefore had to be
examined. The ensuing situations might necessitate making an exception to
mediation confidentiality in order to remedy the harm caused by them.
Consequently, making exceptions should compensate the mediation
participants effectively and the assessment of the effectiveness of breaching
the principle of confidentiality was therefore a necessary step in determining
the advisable level of secrecy. Disclosure of mediation information can be
considered effective if the criminal or civil court can take that information
into account.
To determine whether this was the case, it is first of all necessary to regard
CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
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the compatibility of breaching the confidentiality rule with the essential
characteristics of victim offender mediation; making exceptions should not
subvert the mediation procedure itself without good reason. The
consequences of overruling the principle of confidentiality for other
mediation standards therefore had to be examined.
Secondly, was making exceptions consistent with the main features of
criminal and civil law? Making exceptions implies the use of the information
concerned in court in order to offer the mediation participants an effective
remedy for the harm caused by the conflicting interest. For that reason, it is
important that the characteristics of criminal and civil law are observed to
the extent necessary in order to safeguard the admissibility of mediation
information in judicial proceedings. The research framework enabled this
examination, facilitating the determination of the procedural position of the
mediation participants as well as their options to submit information in
court, which is a precondition for the court to be able to take mediation
information into consideration.
1.4 Structure of the Book
The book is divided into four parts. The first part contains an introduction to
victim offender mediation (Chapter Two) and a discussion of its main
procedural requirements (Chapter Three). At the end of the third chapter,
the potential frictions that may be caused by the principle of confidentiality
will be identified. Part Two will be devoted to the development of the
research framework mentioned above (Chapter Four). Part Three will
examine the frictions which may be caused by the principle of
confidentiality in more detail. Chapter Five will look at the desirability of
making an exception to non disclosure to out of court recipients. Chapters
Six and Seven will deal with the frictions regarding the advisability of
making exceptions to non disclosure in judicial proceedings. The procedural
positions of the mediation participants and their opportunities to present
information in court will be discussed in Chapter Eight. In Part Four
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2 Victim Offender Mediation
2.1 Introduction
Current victim offender mediation programmes range from informal
meetings to well regulated processes, yet all forms share the same key
elements. One of these is the focus on establishing communication between
victims and offenders, to help them deal with the consequences of crimes
that connect them. Victims and offenders are thus both actively involved,
and their interaction enables victims to express their needs and feelings to
the offender, and offenders to accept and act on their responsibilities
towards the victim.6 To facilitate this dialogue, the help of an impartial third
party, the mediator, is of vital importance.
Victim offender mediation is often linked to the concept of restorative
justice. Restorative justice primarily aims at redressing the harm caused by a
crime and thus highlights the relationship between victims and offenders,
whereas its counterpart, retributive justice, mainly focuses on punishing
perpetrators and hence on the position of offenders in relation to society.
Because of its emphasis on remedial action, restorative justice acknowledges
the victim as an important actor. As retributive justice traditionally
concentrates on establishing the offender’s criminal liability, it does not
recognise the victim as a party to criminal proceedings (despite such recent
initiatives as the victim impact statement).7
Mediation has been typified as an equivalent to, or as a modality of,
restorative justice.8 A distinction can and should be made between the ideas
behind restorative justice and how these ideas are put into practice. From an
operational point of view, restorative justice offers victims and offenders a
6 Among others, Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the
European Forum for Victim Services (now Victim Support Europe) (2004); M.S. Umbreit,
R.B. Coates & B. Vos, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and
Research’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, p. 279; and H. Zehr, ‘Commentary:
Restorative Justice: Beyond Victim Offender Mediation’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly
2004 1/2, p. 308.
7 In this respect, see also D. Roche, ‘Retribution and Restorative Justice’, in: G. Johnstone
& D.W. van Ness (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice, Cullompton: Willan Publishing
2007, pp. 75 90; and R.A. Duff, ‘Restoration and Retribution’, in: A. von Hirsch (ed.),
Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms?, Oxford: Hart
Publishing 2003, pp. 43 59.
8 See, for example, I. Aertsen, Slachtoffer daderbemiddeling. Een onderzoek naar de
ontwikkeling van een herstelgerichte strafrechtsbedeling, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven
2004, pp. 161 162; and H. Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 2002, pp. 43ff. Furthermore, L. Presser & C.A. Hamilton, ‘The
Micropolitics of Victim Offender Mediation’, Sociological Inquiry 2006 3, p. 316; Zehr
2004, p. 305; and W.R. Nugent, M. Williams & M.S. Umbreit, ‘Participation in Victim
Offender Mediation and the Prevalence of Subsequent Delinquent Behaviour: A Meta
Analysis’, Research on Social Work Practice 2004 6, p. 408.
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possibility to achieve reparation and restoration through participation.
Victim offender mediation can be considered a means to realise this, and as
such forms one of the core techniques of restorative justice. Restorative
justice should thus be regarded as a theoretical concept that is
operationalised through a variety of reparative approaches, one of which is
victim offender mediation.
The justification of using victim offender mediation as a means of dealing
with crime follows from the principle of subsidiarity and the notion of
ultimum remedium that dominate criminal law theory. The main objective of
criminal justice is to restore the legal order after a crime has been committed.
This legal order also extends to the rights of crime victims that have been
violated, and victim offender mediation can be considered a way to repair
such violations.
The principle of subsidiarity entails that a case should not be brought
before a criminal court if less far reaching instruments are available. The
idea of ultimum remedium expresses a similar thought, namely that a criminal
trial and the infliction of a punishment should be avoided if possible.9
Victim offender mediation offers such an alternative and more lenient
response to crime. It is less drastic and can divert cases from the criminal
justice system. If this is not an option – due to the seriousness or complexity
of the crimes concerned – mediation can still play a role in the course of
proceedings, and can, for example, influence the severity of the sentence to
be imposed. Furthermore, victim offender mediation seems to lead to a
decrease of recidivism and stimulates the reintegration and rehabilitation of
offenders.10 For that reason, starting a mediation even after an offender has
been convicted may still yield significant benefits.
The various forms of victim offender mediation can be divided into three
categories reflecting the timing of mediation: before, during, or after a
criminal trial.11 As this classification of the existing forms of victim offender
9 For a further explanation of the ultimum remedium principle in relation to victim
offender mediation and other restorative initiatives, see M.S. Groenhuijsen & N.J.M.
Kwakman, ‘Het slachtoffer in het vooronderzoek’, in: M.S. Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge
(eds.), Dwangmiddelen en rechtsmiddelen. Derde interimrapport onderzoeksproject
Strafvordering 2001, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, pp. 849 850 and 964ff. See also M. Löschnig
Gspandl, Die Wiedergutmachung im Österreichischen Strafrecht, Vienna: Verlag Österreich
1996, pp. 72 73.
10 Among others, see L.W. Sherman & H. Strang, Restorative Justice: The Evidence, London:
The Smith Institute 2007, pp. 68 71; H. Hayes, ‘Reoffending and Restorative Justice’, in:
Johnstone & Van Ness (eds.) 2007, pp. 426 444; W. Bradshaw, D. Roseborough & M.S.
Umbreit, ‘The Effect of Victim Offender Mediation on Juvenile Offender Recidivism: A
Meta Analysis’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2006 1, pp. 87 98; Umbreit, Coates & Vos
2004, pp. 292 294; Nugent, Williams & Umbreit 2004, p. 415; W.R. Nugent et al.,
‘Participation in Victim Offender Mediation and Reoffense: Successful Replications?’,
Research on Social Work Practice 2001 1, pp. 5 23; and G. Bazemore, ‘Restorative Justice
and Earned Redemption’, The American Behavioral Scientist 1998 6, pp. 768 813.
11 M.S. Groenhuijsen, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Legal and Procedural Safeguards.
Experiments and Legislation in Some European Jurisdictions’, in: The European Forum
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mediation has played a major role in this research, it will be discussed in
more detail in the following sections.
2.2 Victim Offender Mediation as a Diversionary Measure
From the notion of ultimum remedium and the principle of subsidiarity it
follows that victim offender mediation can divert a case from the criminal
justice system. Victim offender mediation and its outcome then replace the
criminal trial and the imposition of a sentence.12
The concept of diversion is characterised by a number of elements.13 First,
the main reason for diverting a case is that offenders are thought to be better
off when their cases are dealt with through mediation; diversion does, after
all, imply that no sentence will be imposed. Victim offender mediation can
also take away or diminish potential drawbacks of a trial for offenders, such
as intentionally causing distress, stigmatisation, and reintegration problems.
However, if offenders expect to benefit from having their cases brought to
court, they have the freedom to refuse to participate in victim offender
mediation.14
The second element of diversion concerns the moment of referring a case
to penal mediation. A successful mediation implies that no further legal
steps will be taken, and a case must therefore be referred to mediation before
it has been subjected to judicial assessment. This moment can be considered
the upper limit of diversion. However, as diversion aims at diminishing or
even preventing criminal intervention, cases will most likely be referred
during the pre trial phase. The moment when the facts of a case are more or
less clear and a suspect has been identified can thus be considered the lower
limit of diversion. This coheres with the fact that both the victim and the
offender should acknowledge the basic facts of a case before the start of a
mediation.15 In practice, clarity on the facts and the alleged involvement of a
suspect will often coincide. Depending on the characteristics of the case at
hand and on the features of the jurisdiction involved, the referral to
mediation can be made at either the police or the prosecutorial level.
Insofar as diversion implies that a successful mediation will lead to
termination of criminal proceedings, this modality of victim offender
for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice, Victim Offender Mediation in
Europe. Making Restorative Justice Work, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2000, pp. 71 72.
In addition, Sherman & Strang 2007, p. 32; D. Miers & J. Willemsens (eds.), Mapping
Restorative Justice, Leuven: European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and
Restorative Justice 2004, pp. 167 168; and D. Miers, An International Review of Restorative
Justice, London: Home Office 2001, pp. 81 82.
12 In this respect, see also Umbreit, Coates & Vos 2004, pp. 291 292.
13 Coornhert Liga, Rechtsomlegging, Utrecht: Ars Aequi Libri 1980, pp. 68ff.
14 On the voluntary nature of the offender’s participation in victim offender mediation, see
Chapter 3.2.2.
15 See also Chapter 3.2.1.
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mediation primarily deals with minor offences. Nevertheless, the offences
that are considered referable to victim offender mediation differ between the
national legal systems that recognise this kind of mediation as a
diversionary measure. A number of these systems will be discussed below.
Austria is one of the first European countries that experimented with victim
offender mediation, and probation service and victim support influenced the
development of a variety of programmes. Cases are mostly referred to
victim offender mediation by the public prosecutor, although in some cases
the decision is left to the judge.16 Legal provisions regarding victim offender
mediation can be found in the Austrian Juvenile Justice Act
(Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG) and the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozessordnung, StPO). The legal provisions regarding victim offender
mediation – or Tatausgleich – have been incorporated in the StPO.17 Referrals
to mediation are mainly founded on Arts. 198 et seq. StPO. Art. 198 StPO
categorises victim offender mediation as part of the ‘diversion package’, a
set of diversionary measures that can be offered to both juvenile and adult
offenders.18 Besides victim offender mediation, the diversionary measures
include, for example, community service, probation, and the payment of a
fine (Art. 198, para. 1, under 1 4 StPO).19 Victim offender mediation in
Austria has developed into a general service that applies to both juvenile
and adult offenders.20 As a result, organisational and methodological
differences between mediation in adult and juvenile cases have nearly
disappeared. However, the JGG still retains a few specific regulations for
minors. For example, juvenile offenders have easier access to victim offender
mediation (and to other divisionary measures) than adult perpetrators do.
According to Arts. 190 191 StPO, the public prosecutor can terminate a
case without taking any further action if there are insufficient grounds for
continued prosecution, or if the offence is not serious enough to merit
continuation.21 Specific conditions applying to juveniles can be found in
Arts. 4 and 6 JGG. If the public prosecution service assesses that the mere
dismissal of a case would be inappropriate, it can turn to the measures that
are included in the diversion package. The conditions for diversion have
been set out in Art. 198 StPO. In brief, they include the following
prerequisites: sufficient clarification of the facts, no serious culpability, no
16 C. Pelikan, ‘Victim Offender Mediation in Austria’, in: The European Forum for Victim
Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice 2000, p. 129.
17 M. Löschnig Gspandl, ‘Diversion in Austria: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2001 4, p. 281.
18 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 15.
19 See also Löschnig Gspandl 2001, pp. 282 and 285 286.
20 V. Hofinger & C. Pelikan, ‘Victim Offender Mediation with Juveniles in Austria’, in: A.
Mestitz & S. Ghetti (eds.), Victim Offender Mediation with Youth Offenders in Europe,
Dordrecht: Springer 2005, p. 160.
21 In addition, Art. 192 StPO discusses the prosecution of a crime if an offender allegedly
committed more than one offence.
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loss of life, a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment, and no need for
preventive action.22 It follows that the diversionary measures of Art. 198
StPO primarily apply to minor offences.
A precondition for offences to be considered suitable for mediation is that
they could potentially have caused direct harm to a person s legal interests
(Art. 204, para. 1 StPO). Furthermore, the following additional requirements
have to be met: the offender has to be willing to a) take responsibility for the
crime, b) make amends for its consequences, c) make efforts to repair the
damage caused by the crime, and d) reflect on the reasons for having
committed the crime (Art. 204 StPO).23 Also, the victim needs to consent to
take part in the mediation procedure. If the victim does not agree, the case
must be sent back to the public prosecutor, who decides on how to proceed.
The reasons for the victim’s refusal will be taken into consideration in this
respect, unless they are irrelevant to the case at hand. As a final condition,
the victim’s interests have to be taken into consideration as much as
possible.24 In the case of juvenile offenders, Art. 8 para. 3 JGG states that the
victim’s consent to victim offender mediation is not necessary; the offender’s
effort to provide compensation suffices.25
If the above mentioned conditions are met and a victim offender
mediation results in an agreement between the parties, the prosecution will
not be continued. The agreement usually addresses the settlement of the
damage suffered and the regulation of future contact between the victim and
the offender.26
Another country that uses victim offender mediation as a way of diverting
cases from the criminal justice system is Germany. Here too, the referral to
mediation is predominantly made by the public prosecutor.27 Victim
offender mediation – or Täter Opfer Ausgleich – can lead to the diversion of
cases involving adult as well as juvenile offenders. Provisions addressing
penal mediation are incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozessordnung, StPO), the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB), and the
Juvenile Justice Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG).
22 M. Löschnig Gspandl, ‘The Austrian Prosecution Service’, in: P.J.P. Tak (ed.), Tasks and
Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal
Publishers 2004, p. 38.
23 See M. Löschnig Gspandl & M. Kilchling, ‘Täter Opfer Ausgleich und Wiedergut
machung in Deutschland und Österreich’, in: H.J. Albrecht (ed.), Forschungen zu
Kriminalität und Kriminalitätskontrolle am Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und
internationales Strafrecht in Freiburg i. Br., Freiburg i. Br.: Max Planck Institut für
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht 1999, pp. 258 259.
24 Hofinger & Pelikan 2005, p. 163.
25 Löschnig Gspandl 2004, p. 39.
26 Pelikan 2000, pp. 140 141. Further regarding victim offender mediation in Austria, see
M. Kilchling & M. Löschnig Gspandl, ‘Legal and Practical Perspectives on
Victim/Offender Mediation in Austria and Germany’, International Review of Victimology
2000 4, pp. 305 332.
27 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, pp. 70 71.
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Both the StPO and the StGB regulate the victim offender mediation
process with adult offenders. In practice, the StPO provisions are applied
more often.28 Art. 155a StPO states that prosecutors and judges must
examine the possibilities of mediation options at all stages of the
proceedings and refer suitable cases to mediation. These referrals can be
made early on in the proceedings and may thus divert the case.
According to Art. 153a, para. 1 StPO, the prosecutor can decide not to take
a case to court if the degree of guilt is not an obstacle, and if meeting the
requirements imposed can adequately counterbalance the public interest in
the prosecution of the case. Para. 1, under 5 of Art. 153a StPO mentions
victim offender mediation as one of these requirements. To qualify for
participation in mediation, the offender should make every effort to reach an
agreement with the victim, and to compensate the damage suffered.
Moreover, Art. 153a StPO stipulates that the fulfilment of these requirements
will effectively terminate the prosecution.
Art. 46a StGB sets forth the conditions under which the court can decide
not to impose a punishment or to mitigate the sentence to be imposed in
recognition of a successful victim offender mediation. According to Art.
153b StPO, the prosecutor can decide not to bring action against the alleged
offender under similar circumstances. These are the same conditions as
those mentioned in Art. 153a, para. 1 StPO (Art. 46a, para. 1 StGB).
Additionally, the maximum penalty for the offence cannot exceed the limit
of one year’s imprisonment or a multiple of 360 of the day fine.29 As all fines
are thus included, and many offences carry a fine or a maximum prison
sentence of one year, 95 percent of sentences fall within this category.30 The
use of victim offender mediation, on the basis of Art. 46a, para. 1 StGB
therefore primarily concerns offences. The same goes for referrals based on
Art. 153a, para. 1, under 5 StPO, since the degree of guilt is named as one of
the factors that should be taken into account.31 Nevertheless, more serious
crimes can be referred to victim offender mediation as well, as the above
mentioned provisions initially apply to all offences.32
Victim offender mediation with juvenile offenders is mainly regulated in
the JGG.33 Since the JGG generally prevails over the StPO, the latter only
fulfils a complementary role in this respect.34
28 B. Bannenberg, ‘Victim Offender Mediation in Germany’, in: The European Forum for
Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice 2000, p. 255.
29 German fines are quoted in daily rates. The limit of 360 daily rates must not be
exceeded.
30 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, pp. 68 69; Bannenberg 2000, pp. 251ff; and Kilchling &
Löschnig Gspandl 2000, p. 310.
31 T. Trenszek, ‘Victim Offender Mediation in Germany: ADR under the Shadow of the
Criminal Law?’, Bond Law Review 2001 2, p. 3 4, through <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
journals/BondLRev/2001/16.html>.
32 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 69.
33 See Löschnig Gspandl & Kilchling 1999, p. 245.
34 M. Kilchling, ‘Victim Offender Mediation with Juvenile Offenders in Germany’, in:
Mestitz & Ghetti (eds.) 2005, p. 245.
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The JGG recognises different forms of victim offender mediation. It can be
enforced as an educational measure by the judge.35 The judge can also
impose disciplinary measures on a minor, such as the compensation of
damage or an apology to the victim.36 Mediation can also be ordered by a
judge, if the public prosecutor has expressed the intention to drop the case,
combined with an order for the offender to make an attempt at
reconciliation.37 The public prosecutor can also refer a case to mediation
before deciding on the dismissal of the case.38 Only this last form of
mediation can be considered diversion; as the other situations involve a
judicial decision, they cannot be labelled as such.
When a juvenile offender is involved, generally all types of offences
qualify for victim offender mediation. Art. 45, para. 2 JGG provides that the
public prosecutor can decide not to prosecute when a) an educational
measure has been initiated or carried out, b) the requirements of paragraph 3
have been met, and c) it is deemed unnecessary to continue the investigation
of the charge. The last part of paragraph 2 equates an educational measure
with victim offender mediation. The requirements mentioned under b)
demand a confession by the offender. Additionally, the prosecutor must
hold the opinion that victim offender mediation is the proper way of dealing
with the case at hand, while investigating the charge is not.39
Victim offender mediations, whether with adult or juvenile offenders,
usually end in a written agreement, which often include various items, such
as the compensation of damages (pecuniary or otherwise), and an apology
by the offender.40
2.3 Victim Offender Mediation as Part of Regular Court Proceedings
When diversion is not an option – for example due to the seriousness of the
case – victim offender mediation can also be part of regular court
proceedings41 and be of benefit to both the victim and the offender.
When mediation is used in addition to regular court proceedings, the
outcome or the course of the mediation process may influence the court’s
decision. This coheres with the notion of ultimum remedium and the principle
of subsidiarity; the choice that should accordingly be made for the least
radical intervention implies that mediation can be used to replace part of the
judicial decision. For example, the outcome of a mediation or the behaviour
35 Art. 10, para. 1, under 7 JGG.
36 Art. 15, para. 1, under 1 JGG and Art. 15, para. 1, under 2 JGG, respectively.
37 Art. 45, para. 3 JGG.
38 Art. 45, para. 2 JGG. See also Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 67.
39 Art. 45, para. 3 JGG.
40 Bannenberg 2000, p. 267.
41 Groenhuijsen 2000, pp. 71 72.
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of its participants during the session42 may lead to a mitigation of the
sentence. The agreement between the victim and the offender then functions
as a substitute for the part of the sentence that is not imposed; mediation can
thus be regarded as a less radical reaction to the crime at hand. Victim
offender mediation during court proceedings may also have other benefits
for the participants. It may have a positive effect on the coping process of the
victim and the offender, the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender,
and the recognition of the victim.
The lower and upper limits of the current modality of victim offender
mediation depend on the involvement of the judge. The moment that a case
is submitted to the court for its final assessment is the upper limit of the
possibility of diversion. This moment is automatically the lower limit of the
mediation modality being discussed here. Its upper limit is the moment that
the court has given its definitive ruling on the case; from that moment on,
the mediation and its outcome can no longer influence the judgement.
All types of offences qualify for a mediation process that is part of regular
court proceedings. Victim offender mediation has proven to be useful and
valuable, also in the case of serious crimes.43 Which offences are referred to
mediation in practice depends on the policy of the different jurisdictions.
However, in principle, both serious offences and misdemeanours may
qualify.
Belgium is an example of a country that uses victim offender mediation as
part of regular court proceedings. Various mediation programmes are used
throughout the country, both law based and project based. Victim offender
mediation in Belgium manifests itself during various stages of criminal
justice proceedings. This follows from Article 553, paragraph 1 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, WvSv), which reads that
all parties interested can request their case be referred to mediation at any
time during criminal proceedings as well as during the serving of the
sentence. Paragraph 2 states that the persons concerned should be informed
about the possibility to request a referral to mediation. Both adult and
juvenile offenders are eligible for mediation. The result of the mediation may
influence either the course or the outcome of the criminal trial.
A programme that mainly concentrates on adult perpetrators of serious
crimes is mediation for redress (herstelbemiddeling or médiation après
poursuite). One of the requirements of the experimental phase of the project
was that the public prosecutor had already decided to prosecute.44 After the
mediation for redress programme had been legally established in June 2005,
42 The question what information from a mediation may be used during subsequent
criminal proceedings will be addressed in the upcoming chapters.
43 Among others, see M.S. Umbreit et al., ‘Victims of Severe Violence in Mediated Dialogue
with Offender: The Impact of the First Multi site Study in the U.S.’, International Review
of Victimology 2006 1, pp. 27 48; and Nugent et al. 2001, pp. 6 7.
44 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 26.
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this requirement was officially abandoned, but, in practice, public
prosecutors still tend to refer cases to this type of victim offender mediation
after deciding to charge the offender.45 Because mediation in this context can
influence the court’s sentencing decision, the programme introduced and
promoted interaction between mediation and the criminal justice system.46
The use of mediation for redress is based on Arts. 553 et seq. WvSv.47 It is
carried out throughout Belgium. According to Arts. 163 and 195 WvSv, the
court can take the outcome of a mediation into account; Art. 163 WvSv
concerns the final judgement of the police court (politierechtbank or tribunal de
police) and Art. 195 WvSv that of the correctional court (correctionele rechtbank
or tribunal de première instance). Art. 555, para. 1 WvSv stipulates that the
mediation parties can agree to disclose certain information from the
mediation.48 If mediation information is subsequently revealed to the court,
the court should both confirm receipt and specify the use of this information
in its judgement.49 In conclusion, Belgian criminal courts can have regard to
information from a mediation when assessing a case.
Juvenile offenders too can take part in mediation during regular court
proceedings in Belgium. According to Article 52quinquies of the Youth
Protection Act (Wet betreffende de Jeugdbescherming, JBW), the juvenile court
can refer cases concerning juvenile offenders to mediation or family group
conferencing (herstelgericht groepsoverleg).50 If an agreement is reached and
carried out prior to the judgement of the juvenile court, the court should
take this into account.51 If the agreement is completed after the court has
pronounced judgement, it can revise its decision if so desired.52
In principle, all types of offences can be referred to the present form of
mediation in Belgium. This holds especially true for serious offences, as
Belgium also has mediation programmes that can lead to diversion from the
criminal justice system; these programmes mainly deal with
misdemeanours. The outcome of a mediation that is used as part of regular
court proceedings may vary from financial compensation to apologies by the
offender.
45 See also I. Aertsen, ‘The Intermediate Position of Restorative Justice: The Case of
Belgium’, in: I. Aertsen, T. Daems & L. Robert (eds.), Institutionalizing Restorative Justice,
Devon: Willan Publishing 2006, pp. 71 72.
46 I. Aertsen, ‘Victim offender mediation in Belgium’, in: The European Forum for Victim
Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice 2000, p. 159. See also Aertsen 2004, pp. 218ff.
47 C. van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht, strafprocesrecht & internationaal strafrecht, Ant
werp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2006, pp. 542ff.
48 This is an exception to the requirement of confidentiality laid down in the same
provision.
49 Arts. 163 and 195 WvSv.
50 See also A. Wolthuis, ‘Herstel in de Belgische jeugdwet’, Proces 2008 5, pp. 168 176; and
I. Vanfraechem, ‘Herstel en de Belgische jeugdwet’, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2007 3,
pp. 7 18.
51 Art. 37quinquies, para. 2 JBW.
52 Art. 37quinquies, para. 3 JBW.
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Poland has introduced the use of victim offender mediation in regular court
proceedings fairly recently. In 2003, the possibility to refer a case to
mediation at any stage of penal proceedings was added to the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Kodeks post powania karnego, KPK).53 As a result, victim
offender mediation both as a diversionary measure and during the criminal
proceedings have become possible too.54
During regular court proceedings, the court can refer adult offenders to
mediation (the state prosecutor can do so during preliminary proceedings).
According to Art. 23a, para. 1 KPK (in conjunction with Art. 489 KPK if the
prosecution is privately instigated), they may do so of their own accord or
with the consent of the parties. The prosecutor must take the outcome of the
mediation process into account in deciding on the submission of the case to
court. If the offender is charged, the result of a mediation can be taken into
consideration by the court. According to Article 53, paragraph 3 of the Penal
Code (Kodeks karny, KK), a positive outcome of the mediation can have a
mitigating effect on the court’s sentencing decision. The court can decide to
conditionally suspend the proceedings, or to pass sentence without trying
the case.55 However, the mediation outcome should not prescribe any
solution in a particular case.56 Furthermore, the severity of a sentence can be
adjusted through extraordinary mitigation. This can be done in cases
specified by law,57 especially if the victim and the accused have been
reconciled, if the damage has been repaired, or if the victim and the accused
have agreed on how this will be done.58 The concept of extraordinary
mitigation entails that a sentence can be mitigated, to the point that the
sentence imposed is lower than the minimum penalty for the offence
concerned. Extraordinary mitigation may be applied if the minimum
sentence is considered incommensurate with the case concerned.59
The Juvenile Justice Act (Ustawa o post powaniu w sprawach nieletnich,
UPSN) regulates victim offender mediation for juvenile offenders. Juvenile
offenders can be subjected to a measure that obliges them to apologise to the
victim and repair any damage caused.60 This obligation is one of the
educational and corrective measures that in the UPSN aim at encouraging
minors to accept their social and civic responsibilities.61 Referrals to
mediation on this basis must be made by the family judge and are generally
53 Art. 23a KPK, which replaced the previous Art. 320 KPK. Also, see B. Fellegi,Meeting the
Challenges of Introducing Victim Offender Mediation in Central and Eastern European
Countries, Leuven: European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative
Justice 2005, p. 39.
54 Fellegi 2005, pp. 38 39; Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 105; and Miers 2001, p. 50.
55 Fellegi 2005, p. 40.
56 B. Czarnecka Dzialuk & D. Wójcik, ‘Victim Offender mediation in Poland’, in: The
European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice 2000, p. 317.
57 Art. 60, para. 1 KK.
58 Art. 60, para. 2, under 1 KK.
59 Fellegi 2005, p. 40.
60 Art. 6, para. 2 UPSN.
61 Art. 65 UPSN.
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made during preliminary proceedings. If the victim and the offender reach
an agreement, this will be presented to the court at the sentencing stage.62
The fulfilment of the agreement may lead to a mitigation of the sentence or
to a change of the educational measures.63
Poland has no formal regulations on which offences qualify for a referral
to victim offender mediation. This holds true for cases with both adult and
juvenile offenders.64 As in Belgium, mediation outcomes vary from financial
compensation to an apology by the offender.
2.4 Victim Offender Mediation after Conviction and Sentencing
The third category of victim offender mediation concerns mediation that
takes place after the offender has been convicted and sentenced, and
supplementary to criminal justice proceedings.65 It is mainly serious crimes
that qualify for this type of mediation, which, as a result, is most often
executed while the offender is incarcerated. Here too, the use of mediation
can be justified by taking the concept of ultimum remedium and the principle
of subsidiarity into account. The crimes concerned are clearly considered too
serious to involve victim offender mediation prior to the conviction and
sentencing of offenders, since this option has not been explored at an earlier
stage. A successful outcome of the current type of mediation therefore
neither leads to diversion, nor does it have any effect on the court’s
sentencing decision. The dialogue between victims and offenders will thus
primarily be focused on repairing emotional harm. Consequently, the
request to start a mediation after the offender has been convicted and
sentenced is usually made by the victim or the offender.
In view of the above, the moment that the court has given its definitive
ruling on a case can be termed as the lower limit of this modality of victim
offender mediation; mediation after that time can no longer influence the
court’s final decision. Theoretically, the upper limit can be considered non
existent, as mediation sessions can in principle be convened as long as both
the victim and the offender agree to participate. However, this assumption
may have undesirable consequences. For example, victims that are requested
to engage in mediation regarding crimes committed a long time ago might
be distressed by being confronted yet again with criminal events from the
past. Moreover, not setting an upper limit might also encounter practical
problems, such as having to trace a victim years after the crime was
committed. It would therefore be wise to set an upper limit for mediation
after conviction and sentencing too. The moment that offenders have served
their sentence and thus paid their dues would be the logical choice; from
62 Art. 3a UPSN.
63 Fellegi 2005, pp. 39 40; and Czarnecka Dzialuk & Wójcik 2000, pp. 313 314.
64 Fellegi 2005, p. 40; and Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, pp. 106 107.
65 Groenhuijsen 2000, p. 72. Also, Miers 2001, p. 81.
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that moment on, former prisoners are no longer regarded as offenders by the
criminal justice system. Setting a deadline for mediation, however, should be
left to the discretion of national jurisdictions.
Of the three categories of victim offender mediation presented in this
chapter, the modality discussed in this section is the least frequently used.66
The existing programmes are primarily project based and still experimental.
As the outcome of mediation after conviction and sentencing cannot
influence the court’s final decision, this modality rarely has an extensive
legal basis; it is mostly founded on general provisions stating that mediation
is possible at all stages of the criminal justice process.67
Due to the relative scarcity of this modality of victim offender mediation,
and the absence of a specific legal basis, a discussion of two main examples
similar to that in the previous sections cannot be presented here. Instead,
below three manifestations of this modality will be addressed briefly.
Belgium has been experimenting with mediation between convicted
offenders and their victims since June 2000, when the Belgian federal
government decided that all prisons must develop a ‘restorative oriented
system of detention’.68 To this end, restorative justice advisors were
appointed in every prison. Their duties included supporting the
development of culture, skills, and programmes, which give room to the
victim’s needs and restorative answers.69 In 2008, the position of restorative
justice advisor was abolished and its tasks were assigned to the regional
directional boards of the Directorate General for Penitentiary Institutions
(Directoraat Generaal Penitentiaire Inrichtingen).70 Also, in 2001, the mediation
umbrella organisation Suggnomè had set up a mediation programme in three
Flemish prisons, organising mediation sessions between victims and
offenders on request with the help of mediators from the mediation for
redress programme.71 The main objective of these sessions was to establish a
meaningful dialogue between the victim and the offender.72
The Netherlands uses various restorative measures, one of which was
restorative mediation (herstelbemiddeling), which generally took place after
the convicted offender had been sentenced. It focused on non material or
symbolic reparation, as well as on helping the victim and the offender to
cope with the psychological consequences of the crime and its aftermath.
This type of mediation was hoped to improve the quality of the lives of the
parties involved, and to facilitate and stimulate the reintegration of the
66 Miers 2001, p. 79.
67 For example, see Art. 155a of the German StPO and Art. 553 of the Belgian WvSv.
68 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 24.
69 Aertsen 2006, p. 73.
70 Directoraat Generaal Penitentiaire Inrichtingen, Activiteitenverslag 2008, 2008, p. 24.
71 Aertsen 2006, pp. 72 73.
72 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 26.
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offender in society.73 The project was nevertheless abandoned in 2003, not
because the clients were dissatisfied, but because the founding organisations
considered the project to be unsatisfactorily embedded in their
organisations.74 Currently, Dutch (mostly) juvenile detainees, their families,
and their victims, are invited to engage in restorative meetings on a small
scale.75
Finally, Poland also offers mediation to victims and offenders during the
sentencing phase; the Polish prison service can initiate mediation during the
term of an adult offender’s custodial sentence.76
2.5 Conclusion
The existing forms of victim offender mediation can be divided into three
main categories; victim offender mediation as a diversionary measure, as
part of regular court proceedings, and after conviction and sentencing. The
notion of ultimum remedium and the principle of subsidiarity justify the
potential influence of mediation on the course or outcome of criminal
proceedings. From criminal law theory it follows that a crime should be
dealt with through the least radical reaction. As victim offender mediation is
generally considered to be such a more moderate response, it should be used
whenever added value can be expected.
Victim offender mediation is most commonly used before and during a
criminal trial. These mediation modalities usually have a statutory basis.
Their outcome may influence the course of the criminal justice proceedings;
the prosecution may either be terminated (diversion) or the outcome of the
mediation process may affect the court’s sentencing decision (part of regular
court proceedings). Mediation programmes that can lead to diversion
generally deal with minor offences. Mediation during regular court
proceedings can also address more serious crimes. The answer to the
question which offences qualify for either the first or the second modality
differs between countries.
The third category of mediation – mediation after conviction and
sentencing – is rarely used but interest is growing. Mediation after a criminal
trial generally lacks a detailed statutory basis. This is mainly due to the fact
that its outcome cannot influence formal decisions of the prosecutor or the
court. It is mostly applied in the case of serious offences, while the offender
is incarcerated.
73 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 88. Also, see Miers 2001, p. 42; and J.M.L.A. Frijns &
J.H.M. Mooren, Herstelbemiddeling. Een brug tussen slachtoffer en dader, Utrecht: Uitgeverij
de Graaff 2004.
74 J. Blad, ‘A Critical View on the Netherlands’, in: Aertsen, Daems & Roberts (eds.) 2006,
pp. 102 103.
75 Blad 2006, p. 104.
76 Fellegi 2005, pp. 40 41; and Miers 2001, p. 50.
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The categorisation of the various forms of victim offender mediation has
played a central part in this research. For each of the three modalities
identified the role of confidentiality will have to be examined, but first the
next chapter will turn to the procedural requirements for victim offender
mediation.
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3 Standards for Victim Offender Mediation
3.1 Introduction
Victim offender mediation aims at establishing contact between a victim and
an offender through the help of an impartial third party or mediator. To
create a favourable setting for the interaction between the victim and the
offender, penal mediation has to meet various requirements. These
requirements secure and facilitate a proper progress and conclusion of the
procedure. As a result, the interests of the victim and the offender are
protected, and they are able to openly discuss their cares and concerns. The
need for standards to regulate victim offender mediation is generally
acknowledged, and this has led to the national and international codification
of these standards.
The Council of Europe and the United Nations have strived for
international harmonisation of mediation norms. Both organisations have
adopted detailed protocols concerning victim offender mediation. In 1999,
the Council of Europe issued the Recommendation on Mediation in Penal
Matters,77 and in July 2002 the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations adopted a resolution which notes the Basic Principles on the Use of
Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters (hereafter: Basic
Principles).78 Both documents include guidelines for national policymakers.
The stipulations thus have no binding effect, but are intended to give
orientation and support to those prepared and willing to use them.79
In some cases, the requirements of victim offender mediation have been
codified nationally. Various countries that offer victim offender mediation
have included a number of the standards in relevant legislation or policy
documents.
In this chapter, the origin, ratio, and codification of the main requirements of
penal mediation will be discussed. After a brief description of the most
important standards, special attention will be paid to the main focus of this
research, the principle of confidentiality.
77 Recommendation R (99)19, adopted on 15 September 1999.
78 Res/2002/12.
79 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 20; and United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes, New York: United Nations
2006, pp. 33 34.
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3.2 Standards Applying to the Victim and the Offender
3.2.1 Acknowledgement of Basic Facts by the Victim and the Offender
Victim offender mediation is a participatory procedure that focuses on
communication between the victim and the offender. It enables victims to
express their needs and feelings and offenders to accept and act on their
responsibilities regarding the crime concerned.80 To facilitate the
establishment of a dialogue between both parties, certain conditions have to
be met. One of these conditions is that the victim and the offender
acknowledge the basic facts of a case. The reason for this is that it would be
useless to start a mediation if the victim and the offender did not recognise
the occurrence and circumstances of the crime. Without this mutual
understanding, it would be impossible to reach an agreement. It is therefore
considered ‘conventional wisdom’81 that the basic facts of a case should be
acknowledged before the start of a mediation.82
The basic facts requirement is included in the Council of Europe
Recommendation and the United Nations Basic Principles. Both protocols
state that the parties should acknowledge the basic facts of a case as a basis
for mediation.83 Furthermore, both documents add that participation in
mediation should not be used as evidence of admission of guilt in
subsequent legal proceedings. The legal notion of the offender’s guilt is thus
separated from the basic facts recognition. This recognition should therefore
not be considered an admission of guilt in the legal sense of the word, as this
would infringe the presumption of innocence as laid down in Article 6,
paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).84 The offender’s acceptance of responsibility for what has
happened is generally assumed to be sufficient.85
Various jurisdictions have incorporated the basic facts standard in
80 Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the European
Forum for Victim Services (2004). Further, see Chapter Two.
81 M.S. Groenhuijsen, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Legal and Procedural Safeguards.
Experiments and Legislation in some European Jurisdictions’, in: The European Forum
for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice, Victim Offender Mediation in
Europe. Making Restorative Justice Work, Leuven: Leuven University Press 2000, pp. 77 78.
82 See also A. Duff, ‘Restoration and Retribution’, in: A. von Hirsch et al. (eds.), Restorative
Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms?, Oxford: Hart 2003, pp.
50 51.
83 Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 8 of the Basic Principles.
84 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 28. Also, see D. van Ness,
‘Proposed Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice: Recognizing the Aims and
Limits of Restorative Justice’, in: Hirsch et al. (eds.) 2003, pp. 168 169; and K. Lauwaert,
Herstelrecht en procedurele waarborgen, Apeldoorn/Antwerp: Maklu 2008, pp. 110 112. The
presumption of innocence will be discussed further in Chapter 4.3.4.
85 About the acknowledgement of basic facts and the implications for the question of guilt,
see further Chapter 6.3.
PART ONE – INTRODUCTION
32
                                                 
domestic legislation. Offenders are often required to confess that they have
committed the crime before they can participate in mediation. Alternatively,
sufficient evidence to charge the offender must be available.86 These
requirements preclude issues from arising out of the separation of the notion
of legal guilt and the acknowledgement of basic facts.
An example of the legal codification of this standard can be found in
Austrian legislation, which requires a sufficient clarification of facts before a
mediation can be initiated.87 Furthermore, the offender has to be willing to
take responsibility for the crime concerned.88
Apart from being incorporated in formal legislation, the basic facts
requirement can also be included in guidelines or be linked to a particular
victim offender mediation programme. Such instructions can be found in,
for example, Poland. There, in the case of juvenile offenders, responsibility
for the offence should be uncontroversially established before a mediation
can be started. This provision is not incorporated in formal law.89 A similar
example of this practice can be found in Slovenia.90
3.2.2 Free and Voluntary Consent of the Victim and the Offender
A standard that guarantees the fairness of the mediation procedure and thus
contributes to its success is the requirement that the victim and the offender
participate voluntarily.91 Since the parties in victim offender mediation aim
at reaching an agreement that is based on their true needs and feelings, it is
essential that they participate of their own volition. The voluntariness
applies to two aspects of the mediation procedure. The first is that the
parties’ decision to participate should be made freely and without pressure
being exerted. The voluntary nature of their participation secures their
commitment and cooperation, which are essential for the success of the
process. This also implies that the victim and the offender may withdraw
their consent to participate at any time, and thus end the mediation. The
second aspect of voluntariness concerns the agreement, which should also
be reached voluntarily. This is important to ensure that the parties feel
satisfied with the outcome of the mediation and will carry out the
agreement.92 Neither the victim nor the offender should therefore be
pressured into accepting the conditions of the agreement.
This standard is also inspired by the right to access to a court as laid down
86 Also, see Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Basic Principles. Furthermore, B. Hudson,
‘Victims and Offenders’, in: Hirsch et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 185.
87 Article 198, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO).
88 Art. 204, para. 1 StPO.
89 B. Fellegi, Meeting the Challenges of Introducing Victim Offender Mediation in Central and
Eastern European Countries, Leuven: European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation
and Restorative Justice 2005, p. 40.
90 Fellegi 2005, p. 58.
91 E.g., United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 18.
92 T.F. Marshall, Restorative Justice. An Overview, London: Home Office 1999, p. 24.
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in Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR. This right comes into play especially
when mediation is used as a diversionary measure. The offender’s right to
access to a court is curbed, when, as is generally the case, no appeal lies from
a decision aborting the criminal justice process. Although offenders are
unlikely to claim a violation of this right – they have, after all, voluntarily
consented to participate in mediation and to the mediation agreement – the
infringement of one of the fair trial implications should be avoided if at all
possible. It has, for instance, been proposed to consider the offender’s
decision to participate in victim offender mediation as a waiver of the right
to access to a court.93 According to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), a right covered by Art. 6 ECHR can be waived if certain conditions
are met. For example, it is crucial that the waiver is made under the right
circumstances, one of which is that offenders may not be pressured into
agreeing to a penal measure – for example, victim offender mediation – in
order to conclude the case against them.94
Furthermore, the voluntary nature of the participation of offenders is
important to ensure that they participate for the right reasons. Offenders
should ideally take part in victim offender mediation because they recognise
the value of the procedure, and not because they expect the outcome of a
trial to be worse.95 Victim offender mediation should not evolve into an easy
way out for offenders; victims should not be confronted with offenders who
are not dedicated to the mediation procedure.96
Additionally, it is of great importance that the victim is in no way
pressured into taking part in victim offender mediation.97 Victims may start
to feel guilty if they refuse to participate, because by doing so they will deny
the offender an opportunity to benefit from mediation. This holds especially
true for mediation programmes that are initiated and carried out by
offender oriented organisations. To avoid such situations, it is important to
broach the subject of participation with the victim carefully; it has been
suggested, for example, that a specially trained person be assigned to this
task.98
93 Lauwaert 2008, p. 257; I. Aertsen et al., Rebuilding Community Connections – Mediation and
Restorative Justice in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2004, pp. 42 43;
and Groenhuijsen 2000, p. 76.
94 ECtHR 27 February 1980, App. No. 6903/75, paras. 49 54 (Deweer v. Belgium), and more
recently ECtHR 15 June 2004, App. No. 36256/97, para. 43 (Thompson v. the United
Kingdom). See also, among others, C. van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht, strafprocesrecht &
internationaal strafrecht, Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2006, pp. 628 629.
95 M.S. Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation. An Essential Guide to Practice
and Research, San Francisco: Jossey Bass 2001, p. 202; and M.S. Groenhuijsen, ‘Mediation
in het strafrecht. Bemiddeling en conflictoplossing in vele gedaanten’, Delikt &
Delinkwent 2000, p. 445 (hereinafter: Groenhuijsen 2000a).
96 Due to the negative effect of an insincere attitude of the offender towards the victim. See
further Chapter Six.
97 Umbreit 2001, p. 202.
98 M.S. Groenhuijsen, ‘Een nieuw beleidsdocument van het “European Forum for Victim
Services”’, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2004 3, p. 45. Also, <www.euvictimservices.org>.
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The free and voluntary consent requirement has been incorporated in
both the Council of Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic
Principles. According to the definition of penal mediation in the
Recommendation, the victim and the offender should freely consent to
participate in a mediation process. This requirement is confirmed in
Paragraph 1 of the Recommendation, which additionally states that the
parties should be able to withdraw their consent at any time. Furthermore,
the voluntariness of reaching an agreement is embedded in Paragraph 31.
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the required voluntariness of
both aspects distinguishes mediation from traditional criminal justice
proceedings and indicates that the parties in mediation ‘own’ their case to a
large extent.99 The standard of voluntariness is also included in Paragraph 7
of the United Nations Basic Principles.100 Both the Recommendation and the
Basic Principles emphasise that ‘[n]either the victim nor the offender should
be induced by unfair means to accept mediation’.101
In principle, the voluntariness requirement applies to all victim offender
mediation programmes. Often, it is not laid down in formal legislation, but
in guidelines for mediators or other professionals who are engaged in
mediation. It is the responsibility of the professional approaching the victim
and the offender to ensure that they can make a pressure free decision. The
voluntariness of the agreement should be safeguarded by the mediator
during the mediation. Guidelines that contain such requirements can be
found in, for example, the United States. Although there is no legislation on
the subject, in the vast majority of the programmes victims and offenders
reportedly participated voluntarily.102
In Austria, the voluntariness requirement has to a certain extent been
incorporated in legislation. Art. 207 StPO, which concerns the accused’s
right to be informed about the diversion package regulations, states that the
alleged offender must be informed that the use of the diversionary measures
requires his agreement and that he can ask for continued prosecution if he so
In addition, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 66; and I. Aertsen,
Slachtoffer daderbemiddeling. Een onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van een herstelgerichte
strafrechtsbedeling, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven 2004, pp. 252 253.
99 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, pp. 22 23 and 33.
100 See also Van Ness 2003, p. 168.
101 Paragraph 11 of the Recommendation. Paragraph 12(c) of the Basic Principles contains a
similarly worded provision.
102 M.S. Umbreit, R.B. Coates & B. Vos, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Three Decades of
Practice and Research’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, p. 284 (reportedly, 79
percent of the offenders participated voluntarily in the programmes reviewed, and 91
percent of the victims experienced their own participation in these programmes as
voluntary); and Miers 2001, p. 75 (and references there). See also the Recommended
Ethical Guidelines issued by the American Victim Offender Mediation Association
(VOMA). Both the preamble and Section VI of these guidelines mention the requirement
of voluntariness.
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prefers.103 The voluntary nature of victim offender mediation is also
included in the definition of mediation in Article 3ter of the Belgian Code of
Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, WvSv).
3.2.3 Right to Information
To enable the victim and the offender to make a free and voluntary decision
about their participation in mediation, it is important that they are well
aware of the implications of their choice.104 As mentioned in Paragraph 10 of
the Council of Europe Recommendation and Paragraph 13(b) of the United
Nations Basic Principles, both the victim and the offender should be
informed in detail about their rights, the nature of the mediation process,
and the consequences of their decision to participate.105 The
Recommendation adds that ‘[m]ediation should not proceed if any of the
main parties involved is not capable of understanding the meaning of the
process’.106 Another right that is linked to the right to information is the right
to translation or interpretation,107 which aims at enhancing the
comprehensibility of the information provided to the victim and the
offender.108
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, it is ‘crucial’ that the victim
and the offender are aware of their procedural situation before agreeing to
mediation.109 The criminal justice authorities are responsible for providing
them with the information they need. According to the Memorandum, the
parties should be informed separately if this is necessary. In practice, the
task of informing the victim and the offender is often left to the mediator.
Nevertheless, it remains a responsibility of the police, the public prosecutor,
the court, and other actors in the criminal justice field to alert the parties to
the possibility of mediation.
103 However, critics have pointed out that the voluntariness requirement is in danger of
being overlooked in Austrian victim offender mediation, because of the ‘routinized and
all encompassing’ use of mediation as a diversionary measure (V. Hofinger & C.
Pelikan, ‘Victim Offender Mediation with Juveniles in Austria’, in: A. Mestitz & S.
Ghetti (eds.), Victim Offender Mediation with Youth Offenders in Europe, Dordrecht:
Springer 2005, pp. 177 178).
104 Lauwaert 2008, p. 259.
105 According to the European Forum for Victim Services, it would also be advisable to
inform the victim about the possibility to obtain independent support and advice
(Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the European
Forum for Victim Services (2004)).
106 Paragraph 13 of the Recommendation. According to the Explanatory Memorandum,
‘[t]his rule excludes mediation in cases where one of the main parties is unable to
comprehend the mediation process on intellectual grounds. These may be due to age or
mental retardation, or a similar handicap’.
107 Paragraph 8 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 13(a) of the Basic Principles.
108 Minors also have the right to be assisted by a parent or guardian (Paragraph 13(a) of the
Basic Principles). See also Paragraph 12 of the Recommendation; and p. 28 of the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation.
109 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 27.
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Only a few jurisdictions that operate victim offender mediation
programmes have incorporated the right to information in legislation. The
reason for this is that providing the parties with information generally
follows logically from introducing victims and offenders to the mediation
process. The obligation to inform the victim and the offender about the
topics mentioned above is often codified in guidelines for mediators and
other professionals involved in mediation. A long list of the information
parties should receive from the mediator can, for example, be found in the
Recommended Ethical Guidelines issued by the American Victim Offender
Mediation Association (VOMA).110 These guidelines oblige the mediator to
inform both the offender and the victim during pre mediation sessions. For
example, the mediator should inform the parties about the mediation
process itself, and about the resources available to them. Furthermore, the
victim and the offender should be made aware of the confidential nature of
victim offender mediation and the resulting restrictions.111
3.2.4 Right to Legal Assistance/Counselling
Because of the relationship between victim offender mediation and the
criminal justice system, both the Council of Europe Recommendation and
the United Nations Basic Principles state that the parties in mediation should
be able to consult with a legal advisor. It adds to the free and informed
consent of both the victim and the offender if they are given the opportunity
to confer with a legal professional on the judicial consequences of their
participation.112
Paragraph 8 of the Recommendation concerns the application of
fundamental procedural safeguards, the right to legal assistance in
particular, even though it does not specify when such assistance is required.
Paragraph 13(a) of the United Nations Basic Principles states that ‘the victim
and the offender should have the right to consult with legal counsel
concerning the restorative process’. This counsel should be provided before
or after the mediation session.113 The right to legal assistance does not entail
that victims have a right to free legal assistance; it rather holds a duty for
criminal justice officials to assist victims in obtaining legal advice or
information.114
110 See <www.voma.org/docs/ethics.pdf>.
111 Sections II.6.c, II.8.c, and V.2, respectively.
112 Lauwaert 2008, p. 147.
113 Van Ness 2003, pp. 171 172 (NB: Please note that the numbering of the provisions in the
Basic Principles changed after the completion of the paper by Van Ness). It should be
mentioned here that Van Ness’s paper discusses an older version of the Basic Principles
(ECOSOC Res/2000/14, 2000), which phrased the standard at hand as a right that could
be made effective ‘before and after’ the mediation process. Further, see J. Braithwaite,
‘Principles of Restorative Justice’, in: Hirsch et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 11.
114 Offenders generally have a right to legal representation based on Art. 6 ECHR and Art.
14 ICCPR. See also Van Ness 2003, pp. 170 171.
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Although providing legal advice to the parties can be useful to assure
informed consent, it also entails the risk of reducing the chances of reaching
an agreement. The informal and independent nature of victim offender
mediation should not be jeopardised by involving legal professionals whose
interests may not be best served by mediation; they may resist mediation
because of their monopoly in litigation and their financial interests in using
traditional procedures.115 The legal support that is provided to the mediation
parties should therefore be limited to advice before and after the procedure;
legal assistance beforehand may contribute to the free and informed consent
of the victim and the offender, while consultation afterwards may play a role
in concluding the mediation agreement.116 Victim organisations have
expressed the fear that legal support during mediation might not contribute
to a fruitful interaction between the parties.117
Domestic examples can be found in France, where legal aid is available to
the parties in mediation, and in order to encourage mediation, its costs are
covered.118 Some Polish mediation programmes even allow lawyers to speak
for their clients.119 A number of other countries, such as Belgium120 and
Austria, offer legal assistance to the participants in mediation, but do not
allow legal representation. In Austria, lawyers are often involved in the
effort to start a victim offender mediation, but the meeting itself is only
attended by the victim and the offender.121 Very few countries have
incorporated the standard of legal assistance in legislation. Generally,
existing provisions on legal aid and representation are followed, or
regulation of legal assistance is left to victim offender mediation
professionals.
115 Groenhuijsen 2000, p. 77. See also J. Shapland, ‘Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice:
Just Responses to Crime?’, in: Hirsch et al. (eds.) 2003, pp. 209 210; and C. Parker, Just
Lawyers. Regulation and Access to Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 38.
116 The risk may exist that legal advisors consulted prior to mediation advise their clients to
go to court instead (see also Lauwaert 2008, pp. 151ff.). However, the importance of
informing the parties about their procedural position should be put before this potential
risk, due to the contribution to their free and informed consent that can be expected
from legal advice.
117 Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the European
Forum for Victim Services (2004). This may not only be due to lawyers’ financial
interests (see above) in using traditional procedures, but also to the fact that they are, on
the nature of their profession, not accustomed to round to conflict resolution based on
consensus. See further Aertsen et al. 2004, p. 74.
118 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 61; and Miers 2001, pp. 28 29. On the involvement of
lawyers in mediation in France, see also J. Faget, ‘The French Phantoms of Restorative
Justice: The Institutionalization of Penal Mediation’, in: I. Aertsen. T. Daems & L. Robert
(eds.), Institutionalizing Restorative Justice, Devon: Willan Publishing 2006, pp. 162ff.
119 Fellegi 2005, p. 44; and Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 108.
120 E.g., Lauwaert 2008, 164ff. (legal assistance in the mediation for redress programme);
Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 26; and Miers 2001, p. 12 (both pertaining to penal
mediation). See also Aertsen 2004, pp. 252 254.
121 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 18; and Miers 2001, p. 10.
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3.2.5 Equality between the Parties
To enable the dialogue between the victim and the offender, it is important
that no great differences or inequalities exist between them, as these may
prevent the parties from talking about their cares and concerns. To avoid
this from happening, disparities between the parties should be taken into
account when selecting cases for mediation.
Both the Council of Europe and the United Nations have included the
standard of equality in their protocols. The United Nations Basic Principles
provides in Paragraph 9 that cultural differences and power imbalances
should be taken into consideration when referring a case to mediation, or
when conducting a mediation process. Factors such as differences in age,
maturity, or intellectual capacity can hamper the communication between
the victim and the offender if they cannot discuss the crime as equals.122
Paragraph 15 of the Council of Europe Recommendation states that obvious
disparities between the parties should be considered before a case is referred
to mediation. To further free participation and true consent to the
agreement, major power imbalances and implicit or explicit threats of
violence should be avoided. Nevertheless, whether a case is unsuitable for
mediation due to disparities between the parties largely depends on the
circumstances of a case. Many discrepancies in power and skills can possibly
be corrected by the mediator, who can seek to redress the balance in favour
of the disadvantaged party.123 It is therefore important that the mediator
carefully explores whether inequalities between the parties as mentioned
here are likely to actually frustrate the mediation, and what can be done to
neutralise such differences.
As the equality standard is closely linked to the selection of cases that are
referred to victim offender mediation, it is generally not incorporated in
domestic legislation of countries that operate mediation programmes. The
decision whether a case is unsuitable for mediation due to disparities
between the victim and the offender is left to the discretion of the referrer,
or, at a later stage, the mediator.
3.3 Standards Applying to the Mediator
The success of a victim offender mediation largely depends on mediators
and on how they conduct the process. To be able to perform their task
properly, mediators have to meet certain requirements. These qualities
concern, among other things, their background (mediators should be
recruited from all sections of society and should be familiar with local
122 Van Ness 2003, p. 169.
123 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, pp. 28 29.
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cultures and communities)124 and their personal capacities (mediators
should be able to demonstrate a sound judgement and possess good
interpersonal skills).125 A mediator whom the parties can relate to and who
is able to support and stimulate a fruitful exchange between the parties will
contribute to a successful outcome of the mediation. Therefore, various
standards have been adopted that address the training of mediators and
their role during
3.3.1 Training of the Mediator
To prepare mediators for their task in mediation, they must be properly
trained. Education concerning the specific needs and characteristics of
victim offender mediation will enable the mediator to contribute optimally
to its success.126
The importance of mediator training has been recognised by the Council
of Europe and the United Nations. According to their protocols, mediators
should receive training both before they start working as a mediator and
during the course of their work.127 Such training should pay attention to the
qualities that the mediator should possess as well as enhance the mediator’s
capacities to properly conduct a conflict resolution procedure. Furthermore,
it should develop the mediator’s awareness of the nature of victim offender
mediation and its participants. Special attention should be paid to specific
problems regarding victims and victimisation, and to social issues related to
offenders.128
As well trained mediators are vital to successful victim offender
mediation, most jurisdictions that use mediation oblige mediators to take
training courses. Because of the variety in mediation programmes, the
mediator capacities deemed necessary may differ between countries. The
set up of training programmes is generally not covered by domestic
legislation, but is usually left to the organisations that operate the mediation
programmes. In Finland, for example, the Finnish Mediation Association has
prepared a handbook that sets out training activities for mediators,129 which
must be carried out uniformly throughout the country. Austria also offers a
detailed training programme to mediators.130 Austrian mediators must
possess a qualification in social work and they must engage in initial as well
124 Paragraph 22 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 19 of the Basic Principles.
125 Paragraph 23 of the Recommendation.
126 Aertsen et al. 2004, pp. 54ff.
127 Paragraphs 20 and 24 of the Recommendation, and Paragraphs 12 and 19 of the Basic
Principles.
128 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 31; and Van Ness 2003, p. 174.
129 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 56; Miers 2001, p. 25; and J. Iivari, ‘Victim Offender
Mediation in Finland’, in: The European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and
Restorative Justice 2000, pp. 196 197.
130 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 17; Löschnig Gspandl 2004, p. 39; and Miers 2001, p.
8.
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as follow up training activities. In Germany, the training requirements that
mediators must meet may differ between regions, since each Servicebüro
(service agency, the German institution responsible for the operation of
victim offender mediation programmes) issues its own training standards.
In practice, however, these standards generally overlap and resemble those
of other jurisdictions.131 The training obligation may also differ between
countries. For example, in Germany, participation in the training
programme is voluntary, while in Austria, training is compulsory.
3.3.2 Impartiality of the Mediator
A requirement that is crucial to the success of mediation is the mediator’s
impartiality.132 The mediator must adopt an impartial attitude towards the
parties and must avoid an appearance of being biased towards either of
them. Nevertheless, the impartiality standard does not entail that the
mediator must treat the parties equally.133 The parties in victim offender
mediation take different positions; one party has caused harm to the other,
and it is up to the offender make things right. Mediators should recognise
this difference between the parties and act accordingly.134 They should
ensure that the parties can communicate freely and reach an agreement that
meets their interests and wishes.135 However, they should be careful not to
express any judgement on the question of the offender’s legal guilt.
The impartiality of the mediator has been laid down in the Council of
Europe Recommendation (Paragraph 26) and the United Nations Basic
Principles (Paragraphs 5 and 18). It is also mentioned in the
Recommendation’s definition of penal mediation, which speaks of an
‘impartial third party’ that should conduct the mediation. The Basic
Principles additionally mention impartiality as a requirement in its
definition of ‘facilitators’.136
Both protocols justify the incorporation of the impartiality standard on the
grounds mentioned above.137 The Explanatory Memorandum adds to this
that the impartiality standard does not exclude criminal justice personnel
from conducting a mediation. However, the prosecutor in charge of a case
that is referred to mediation should naturally not be allowed to become
involved in the mediation process in that case.
131 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 70; and Miers 2001, p. 35.
132 H. Astor, ‘Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and Practice’, Social & Legal
Studies 2007 2, p. 222.
133 Lauwaert 2008, pp. 229ff.
134 Aertsen et al. 2004, pp. 43 44.
135 In this respect, see also the standard of equality (Section 3.2.5): the mediator can redress
the balance between the victim and the offender, and this may involve different
approaches.
136 Paragraph 5 of the Basic Principles.
137 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, pp. 31 32; and Van Ness
2003, pp. 173 174.
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Even though the impartiality standard is not commonly incorporated in
domestic legislation, it is often addressed in mediator training programmes.
For example, the Recommended Ethical Guidelines issued by the American
VOMA contain a section on the impartiality and neutrality of the
mediator.138 According to these guidelines, the mediator’s impartiality
entails ‘freedom from favoritism or bias’ as well as a ‘commitment to aid all
participants’ without playing ‘either an adversarial or advocacy role’.139 The
guidelines also address neutrality, prior and post mediation relationships
with one of the participants, and conflicts of interest.140
3.4 Procedural Standards
3.4.1 Victim Offender Mediation at All Stages of Criminal Proceedings
In the previous chapter, the three main categories of victim offender
mediation were described. Victim offender mediation can take place before,
during, or after a criminal justice process. The use of these mediation
modalities differs between countries. Some have implemented only one
modality, others two or all three modalities.141 Which modality is used in a
certain country may depend on factors such as its national criminal policy
and the structure of its legal system.
Although not all countries use the available modalities of penal mediation,
the idea that victim offender mediation can be used at all stages of the
criminal justice process is generally recognised and has been included in the
Council of Europe Recommendation142 and the United Nations Basic
Principles.143 From the Basic Principles it follows that the choice for the
modality of mediation to be used is left to the discretion of national
policymakers. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation
stresses the importance of the availability of mediation at various stages of
the criminal justice process; in this way, parties that do not feel ready to
participate in mediation at an early stage can do so later, while conflicts that
need to be settled quickly can also be dealt with through mediation.144
The availability of mediation at all stages of criminal proceedings has
remained largely uncodified.145 Its implementation rather follows from the
fact that various jurisdictions operate mediation programmes at different
stages of the criminal justice process (examples of which were discussed in
138 See <www.voma.org/docs/ethics.pdf>.
139 Section IV.1.
140 Sections IV.2 IV.5.
141 See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, pp. 13 and 17 18.
142 Paragraph 4 of the Recommendation.
143 Paragraph 6 of the Basic Principles.
144 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 24. See also Aertsen et al. 2004, p.
44.
145 Examples of legal provisions can be found in Chapter Two.
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the previous chapter).
3.4.2 Reasonable Time Frame
To avoid frustration on either side or secondary victimisation,146 it is
important that decisions resulting from a victim offender mediation are
taken without delay. There are various situations that require a quick
response, especially if they are connected to the beginning or conclusion of a
mediation procedure. The Council of Europe Recommendation and the
United Nations Basic Principles contain a number of relevant provisions.
After a case has been referred to mediation, the mediator will usually
explore whether it is suitable for mediation, and whether the victim and the
offender are willing to participate. Usually, the regular criminal justice
process is suspended during this phase. If the attempts to start a mediation
fail, the case will be referred back to the criminal justice authorities and it
then becomes important to prevent further delay. As follows from
Paragraph 11 of the Basic Principles, a decision on how to proceed should be
taken as soon as possible. Paragraph 16 of the Recommendation adds that
the decision to refer a case to mediation should be accompanied by a
reasonable time limit. Within this time limit, the criminal justice authorities
should be kept informed of the progress of the mediation procedure in order
to avoid unnecessary delays.147 Nevertheless, mediation should be
conducted ‘at a pace that is manageable for the parties’.148
If a mediation ends due to a lack of agreement, the decision on how to
proceed should be taken promptly. The same applies when the
implementation of the mediation agreement fails.149 In these cases, the
mediation has been unsuccessful, and to avoid a further delay of the regular
criminal justice process, a quick response is needed.150 Furthermore, it is
important that both the victim and the offender know where they stand after
the failure of the mediation, and are informed about what will happen next
as soon as possible.
A country that has implemented this quick response requirement in its
legislation on victim offender mediation is Germany. Article 153a,
paragraph 1 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung,
StPO) provides that the public prosecutor can set a six month deadline for
the offender to make a decision about the offer to participate in victim
offender mediation.
146 ‘Secondary victimisation’ has been defined as ‘[v]iolations of rights and entitlements
which victims claim after having been victimized’ (L. Montada, ‘Injustice in Harm and
Loss’, Social Justice Research 1994 1, p. 7). In this respect, see also U. Orth, ‘Secondary
Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings’, Social Justice Research 2002 4,
p. 314.
147 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 29.
148 See also Paragraph 28 of the Recommendation.
149 Paragraph 18 of the Recommendation, and Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Basic Principles.
150 Van Ness 2003, pp. 171 172.
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3.5 Principle of Confidentiality
Confidentiality is one of the main requirements of penal mediation and is at
its very foundations. The private nature of victim offender mediation plays a
crucial role in realising its potential. In this section, the reasons for and
codification of the principle of confidentiality will be described.
3.5.1 Development and Ratio
Victim offender mediation aims at enabling victims and offenders to freely
express their cares and concerns, so that they can reach an agreement that is
based on their genuine needs and feelings. These need not have legal
significance only, but may also concern personal information. To facilitate
the exchange between the victim and the offender, an environment should
be created where both parties can express themselves without reservation.
During a mediation, the victim and the offender will usually talk about
their experiences, needs and interests that result from the crime concerned.
As mentioned before, both parties should acknowledge the basic facts of a
case before the start of a mediation. During the mediation process itself, they
can discuss what has happened and how this has affected them.151 For
example, offenders can explain what circumstances led them to commit the
crime, and how they selected the victim.152 Victims can explain the effects
the crime has had on them, for example, the fear of going out or of being
home alone. It is also conceivable that the victim is suffering from trauma as
a result of the crime. These and similar topics can be explored by the parties
in the course of mediation. This discussion of the crime, the events leading
up to it, and its aftermath are a significant part of any mediation procedure,
because mutual recognition and understanding are necessary to achieve an
agreement. Another important element of victim offender mediation is the
focus on the future.153 Especially victims should be given the opportunity to
state their expectations with regard to offenders. They may, for example,
request financial compensation, an apology, or the participation of the
offender in community service. Offenders can also express what they are
prepared to offer the victim in terms of material and immaterial
compensation. The parties may then reach an agreement on how the
offender will redress the harm that has been caused to the victim.
According to the principle of confidentiality, all information of this kind
exchanged between the victim and the offender should be kept secret (unless
otherwise stipulated in the agreement). This also follows from how this
standard has been formulated in international and national legislation (see
below). The main reason for the advocated confidentiality of all mediation
information is that the potential disclosure of the information concerned
151 Duff 2003, p. 50.
152 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 87.
153 Duff 2003, p. 55.
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may deter the victim and the offender from taking part in victim offender
mediation. They may not feel free to discuss their needs and feelings when
privacy is not guaranteed. The information that is disclosed by offenders
may harm their position during subsequent legal proceedings. They may, for
example, incriminate themselves when they explain the circumstances that
led them to commit the crime. If the mediation setting does not offer
guaranteed confidentiality, the offender may decide not to participate.
Victims may also feel uncomfortable with the idea that the information they
share is open to disclosure. If they explain the psychological consequences of
the crime during the mediation, they may well prefer that such personal and
sensitive information remains confidential.154
Ensuring the participation of the victim and the offender is one of the
main reasons for the confidential nature of victim offender mediation. The
principle of confidentiality is also inspired by the idea that a private setting
contributes to a fruitful exchange between the parties. If the victim and the
offender feel free to exchange their needs and interests, they may be more
likely to come to an agreement.155 However, they may be more reticent if
certain issues can be disclosed afterwards.156 As a result, the principle of
confidentiality does not only play a role before a mediation has started,
when it bears on the decision to take part, but also during the mediation
process itself, when it concerns the exchange of relevant information.
A third reason for the confidential character of victim offender mediation
concerns the nature of the process as compared to that of the criminal justice
system. Victim offender mediation is a private procedure, while a criminal
trial is open to the public.
The criminal justice system generally produces a repressive reaction to
crime on behalf of society. It holds perpetrators of a crime publicly
accountable for their actions. Traditionally, victims play no role in the
administration of justice. Their interests are represented by the public
prosecutor. The prosecutor can take offenders to court to have them judged
by an impartial tribunal. The court has been given the task of determining
the guilt of the alleged offender. If the accused is found to have broken the
law – the rules of society – he or she can be punished by the court. For the
sake of transparency and controllability, criminal proceedings should be
held in open court.157
154 J. Dignan et al., ‘Staging Restorative Justice Encounters against a Criminal Justice
Backdrop: A Dramaturgical Analysis’, Criminology and Criminal Justice 2007 1, pp. 19 20.
155 For example, it might be more advantageous to all persons involved when the offender
apologises in a private setting, since an apology in a public setting may have deleterious
effects and may lead, among other things, to more anger and moral indignation (C.J.
Petrucci, ‘Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an
Additional Component in the Legal System’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2002 4, p.
346).
156 See also Braithwaite 2003, pp. 10 11.
157 Also, see A. von Hirsch, A. Ashworth & C. Shearing, ‘Specifying Aims and Limits for
Restorative Justice: A ‘Making Amends’ Model?’, in: Hirsch et al. (eds.) 2003, p. 34.
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The purpose of victim offender mediation is not to respond repressively to
crime and to inflict a penalty on the perpetrator. It rather deals with the
needs of both the victim and the offender after a crime has been committed.
The main object of penal mediation is to establish a dialogue between the
parties. For this reason, victim offender mediation does not require public
access for reasons of transparency and controllability, nor does it need to be
performed in a public setting. Whether mediation is considered part of the
criminal justice system or a separate procedure is not particularly pertinent;
the central relationship remains that between the victim and the offender.
However, this does not mean that the quality of mediation outcomes and the
execution of the mediation agreement should not be supervised.158 The
extent of publicity that is needed for such quality control is logically defined
by the level of confidentiality that is necessary to guarantee the quality of
victim offender mediation procedures.159
3.5.2 Codification
The principle of confidentiality has been codified in both the Council of
Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic Principles.
Paragraph 2 of the Recommendation states:
Discussions in mediation are confidential and may not be disclosed subsequently, except
with the agreement of the parties.
Paragraph 14 of the Basic Principles reads as follows:
Discussions in restorative processes that are not conducted in public should be confidential,
and should not be disclosed subsequently, except with the agreement of the parties or as
required by national law.
Both provisions are based on the reasons above. The encouragement of
participation in mediation and a free exchange during the procedure are
considered to be the main grounds for incorporating the confidentiality
rule,160 especially concerning the exchange of incriminating or legally
irrelevant information.161
Additionally, both protocols include exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality, stating that an exception should be made if the parties agree
on the disclosure of certain information. During the mediation, the victim
and the offender may negotiate the confidentiality of the information being
discussed. If they agree that talking about certain matters is allowed after the
mediation has been concluded, the principle of confidentiality no longer
158 See further Section 3.6.3 and Chapter Seven.
159 Lauwaert 2008, p. 294; and further D. Roche, Accountability in Restorative Justice, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2003.
160 See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 34.
161 Van Ness 2003, p. 171.
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applies to these issues. Moreover, the Basic Principles state that an exception
should be made if national law requires the disclosure of information.162
Various implications of the principle of confidentiality have been codified in
both international protocols. Below, the provisions concerned will be briefly
described.
The Council of Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic
Principles both add to the required acknowledgement of basic facts that
participation in mediation should not be used as evidence of admission of
guilt in subsequent legal proceedings.163 The Explanatory Memorandum to
the Recommendation additionally states that a confession of guilt made by
the alleged offender in the context of a mediation should also be kept out of
court.164
One of the Council of Europe Recommendation provisions which
addresses the confidential nature of victim offender mediation is Paragraph
29, which reads that ‘[m]ediation should be performed in camera’. In other
words, victim offender mediation sessions should not be publicly accessible.
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the objective of this provision
is to provide confidence between the parties and the mediator.165 The
Recommendation also lists a number of reporting duties of the mediator. In
the first place, ‘the mediator should convey any information about imminent
serious crimes, which may come to light in the course of mediation, to the
appropriate authorities or to the persons concerned’.166 The mediator’s
obligation to notify the authorities corresponds to national law requirements
regarding the reporting and prevention of such crimes.167 Secondly,
Paragraph 32 of the Recommendation states that the mediator should report
on the steps taken during the mediation and on its outcome to the criminal
justice authorities. To avoid infringing confidentiality, ‘[t]he mediator’s
report should not reveal the contents of mediation sessions, nor express any
judgment on the parties’ behaviour during mediation’.168 If the mediation is
unsuccessful, the mediator’s report should try to briefly indicate the
reasons.169
The United Nations Basic Principles also address the topic of a failed
mediation. Paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively state that failure to reach an
agreement should not be used in subsequent criminal justice proceedings,
162 Although the Council of Europe Recommendation does not contain a similar provision,
the same condition applies, since both protocols have the status of guidelines and
therefore cannot overrule national law.
163 Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation, and Paragraph 8 of the Basic Principles.
164 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 23.
165 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 32.
166 Paragraph 30 of the Recommendation.
167 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 33.
168 Paragraph 32 of the Recommendation.
169 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 33.
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and that failure to implement an agreement should not lead to a more severe
sentence. The parties should not be required to explain the failed mediation,
since this may breach confidentiality. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of
the parties’ participation might be endangered, because they will not be able
to withdraw without consequences. There is also the risk that discussing the
causes of an unsuccessful mediation will legalise the process. For the same
reasons, the court should not investigate the causes of the failed mediation.
The causes of failure to reach an agreement or to implement an agreement
should therefore not play a role in subsequent proceedings or in imposing a
sentence. Hence, an unsuccessful mediation or a failed implementation of a
mediation agreement should be considered merely an incentive to resume
criminal justice proceedings.170
The importance of the confidential nature of victim offender mediation is
also recognised nationally. Practically all domestic victim offender
mediation programmes start from the idea that mediation should take place
in a private setting. The principle of confidentiality has been secured in, for
example, formal legislation, ministerial regulations, and guidelines for
professionals that are engaged in mediation.
Belgium has devoted a great deal of attention to the principle of
confidentiality in its legislation on victim offender mediation. The private
nature of penal mediation is mentioned several times in the WvSv. Art. 3ter
WvSv contains a definition of penal mediation, and confidentiality is
mentioned as one of its main elements. Art. 555, para. 1 WvSv states that all
mediation related documents and all party statements are confidential. As a
result, such information cannot be used as evidence in any subsequent
procedure, be it criminal, civil, administrative, or arbitral. Furthermore, the
statements concerned cannot be used as an extrajudicial confession. The
victim and the offender can, however, agree on the disclosure of certain
issues.171 According to para. 2 of Art. 555 WvSv, documents that are revealed
contrary to this provision will be officially kept out of the court discussions.
Finally, paragraph 3 states that mediators cannot disclose anything that they
have learned by virtue of their profession. In addition, they cannot be called
as a witness in any of the procedures mentioned above, unless they are
obliged by law to give testimony. If mediators violate these rules, they can
be punished with imprisonment or a fine.172 The JBW provides a similar set
of rules.173
Other countries that operate victim offender mediation programmes, such
170 Van Ness 2003, pp. 171 173.
171 See also Arts. 163 and 195 WvSv.
172 Art. 555, para. 3 WvSv in conjunction with Article 458 of the Belgian Criminal Code
(Wetboek van Strafrecht,WvSr).
173 Art. 37quater, para. 3 JBW.
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as Poland174 and Norway,175 have included the principle of confidentiality in
subsidiary legislation, for example, ministerial regulations.
The confidential nature of penal mediation is also referred to in guidelines
that apply to mediation professionals, such as the VOMA Recommended
Ethical Guidelines. Section V of these guidelines includes a number of
provisions on the topic of confidentiality. It addresses, for example, the
limits of confidentiality, the consequences of wrongful disclosure, the release
of information by the mediator after the mediation has been concluded, and
the storage and disposal of records.176 According to these guidelines, the
mediator also has the duty to inform the parties about the limitations of the
mediation’s confidentiality (such as statutorily or judicially mandated
reporting) and about the circumstances under which a mediator is
compelled to testify in court.
3.6 Frictions Caused by the Principle of Confidentiality
Victim offender mediation in a confidential setting stimulates the
participation in and communication during the session. Nevertheless, it does
not function as a stand alone procedure; it plays a role within the framework
of criminal and civil law.177 The outcome of a mediation can influence the
course and outcome of the criminal justice process. Furthermore, penal
mediation can be followed by civil litigation. Because of the interaction
between victim offender mediation and these legal concepts, the
confidentiality principle may conflict with norms and values of criminal and
civil law. This section aims at identifying such frictions and will also address
problems that occur outside the legal area.
3.6.1 Out of Court Disclosure to Third Parties
From the phrasing of the principle of confidentiality in the Council of
Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic Principles, it follows
that all those involved in mediation (namely the victim, the offender, the
mediator, and trusted third parties) are expected to remain silent about
things said and done during the mediation. None of the participants in
mediation is allowed to divulge mediation related information. The strict
interpretation of the confidentiality rule advocated by the two protocols
leads to the conclusion that the ban on disclosure extends to out of court
statements. The participants in victim offender mediation are initially
174 Fellegi 2005, p. 44 (the regulations are, however, incomplete on the subject of
confidentiality).
175 Miers & Willemsens (eds.) 2004, p. 101; and Miers 2001, p. 46.
176 See <www.voma.org/docs/ethics.pdf>.
177 See, e.g., H. Zehr, ‘Commentary: Restorative Justice: Beyond Victim Offender
Mediation’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, p. 312.
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forbidden to talk about their experiences with friends or family. The same
goes for organisations or institutions that are part of the community of the
victim and the offender, such as the media or schools.178
The consequences of this strict confidentiality may have drawbacks for the
participants in mediation. The victim and the offender may feel isolated or
ill understood if they are not allowed to share their mediation experiences
with their social network.179 For the victim, meeting the offender usually is
an imposing event,180 and re victimisation should be avoided.181 The
advocated extent of the principle of confidentiality may therefore be
questioned, considering that it implies that the victim and the offender are
not allowed to talk to anyone about the process they have been involved
in.182
3.6.2 Offender Related Issues
3.6.2.1 Behaviour of the Offender Frustrating the Success of the Mediation
It is conceivable that information about imminent serious crimes comes to
light during a mediation. According to Paragraph 30 of the Council of
Europe Recommendation, the mediator should convey such information to
the appropriate authorities. The crimes concerned may be crimes offenders
are planning to commit, or crimes that they know others will commit. It is
also possible that the offender commits another crime against the victim
during the mediation, for example, a threat of violence.
It goes without saying that especially the latter situation may have serious
drawbacks for the victim. Currently, the victim is unable to report such
situations, because the behaviour of the offender during the mediation
cannot be taken into account in subsequent proceedings. The mediator must
report crimes, but only if they are of a serious nature. Information about
crimes that cannot be regarded as being of a serious nature should be kept
secret, and victims are thus left empty handed; they cannot disclose
information about crimes after a mediation has been concluded. Such
information will remain confidential if the crimes concerned are not
considered serious, even though the victim may experience them as such,
irrespective of how they are qualified by domestic law.183 Moreover, the
178 See also Van Ness 2003, p. 171.
179 Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the European
Forum for Victim Services (2004); and Duff 2003, p. 46.
180 See also H. Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice, Oxford: Clarendon
Press 2002, pp. 56 57; and P.A. Wyrick & M.A Constanzo, ‘Predictors of Client
Participation in Victim Offender Mediation’,Mediation Quarterly 1999 3, p. 255.
181 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 59.
182 The question of enforceability will be addressed in Chapter Five.
183 Committing a new crime against the victim in the supposedly ‘safe’ mediation
environment is likely to cause the victim severe distress, especially because the victim
may suffer secondary victimisation if he considers the offender’s expressions of regret
and apologies to be insincere. See, e.g., A. Opdebeeck, G. Vervaeke & F.W. Winkel,
‘Bemiddeling in het strafrecht’, in: P.J. van Koppen et al. (eds.), Het Recht van Binnen,
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mediation process is likely to be frustrated by statements of the offender
pertaining to other crimes, or by the commission of another crime during the
mediation. The current scope of the principle of confidentiality may
therefore cause additional distress for the victim and secondary
victimisation.184
3.6.2.2 Confessional Statements by the Offender
From the two protocols it follows that the participation of offenders in
mediation and their acknowledgement of the basic facts of a case should not
be regarded as a confession of legal guilt. Although it is questionable how
the acknowledgement of facts can be separated from the acceptance of legal
guilt,185 the fact that confessional statements of the offender are not open to
disclosure may lead to burdensome situations for the victim, particularly
when offenders withdraw their confession after the mediation has ended.
After all, all communication during the mediation is subject to
confidentiality, and, as a result, neither the victim nor the other mediation
participants can disclose in court a confession made by the offender during
the mediation. This may especially have drawbacks since it is unlikely that
an offender, who has not committed the crime concerned, will agree to take
part in victim offender mediation.186
3.6.3 Outcome Related Issues: Implementation Failure
A successful victim offender mediation will in most cases be concluded with
an agreement between the victim and the offender. This agreement will lay
down obligations the offender has to fulfil in order to compensate the harm
caused to the victim. For example, the offender may have to pay restitution
to the victim or perform community service. However, if an offender does
not meet the agreed obligations, this may conceivably be to the detriment of
the victim. The offender’s fulfilling of the mediation agreement can be
considered the ultimate recognition of the victim’s needs and feelings that
have been discussed during the mediation.187 Failure to implement the
mediation agreement may cause the victim to feel frustrated and
distressed.188 The current scope of the principle of confidentiality prevents
Deventer: Kluwer 2002, pp. 941 942. For a more detailed explanation of the effects of an
apology on the well being of victims, see Chapter Seven.
184 Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the European
Forum for Victim Services (2004).
185 See also Lauwaert 2008, p. 114.
186 See also The European Forum for Victim Services, Statement on the position of the victim
within the process of mediation (2004); and Groenhuijsen 2000, p. 78.
187 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p, 61.
188 J. Blad, ‘De betekenis van de overeenkomst. Toezien op en nakomen van afspraken’,
Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2007 2, p. 11; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2006, p. 68; J. Latimer, C. Dowden & D. Muise, ‘The Effectiveness of Restorative
Practices: A Meta Analysis’, The Prison Journal 2005 2, p. 141; and A. Morris & G.
CHAPTER 3 – STANDARDS FOR VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION
51
                                                 
the victim from talking about such issues and from reporting the offender’s
non performance.189 As a result, the victim is left empty handed and
seemingly cannot disclose the implementation failure.190
3.6.4 Procedural Position of the Mediation Participants
A victim offender mediation may be followed by a legal procedure. The first
(in the case of a failure) and the second modality of penal mediation can be
followed by a criminal trial, and all three mediation modalities can be
followed by civil litigation. The information that has been discussed during
the mediation may be relevant in the light of ensuing legal proceedings.
Mediation participants may therefore be asked to make a statement or to
give testimony about what has happened in mediation. The position of each
of the participants has specific characteristics. The victim, the offender, the
mediator, and the professional caregiver may all play different roles during
legal proceedings that follow a mediation.
A confrontation between the confidentiality standard and rules of the legal
system may give rise to friction. The main friction concerns the legal
obligation to give testimony. Most jurisdictions have legislation that compels
witnesses to make a statement if they have been summoned in that
capacity.191 The only option for a witness to refrain from making a statement
is to appeal to a privilege to refuse to testify. In the context of victim
offender mediation, this mainly applies to the professional caregivers who
are entitled to a professional privilege. Other mediation participants are
generally obliged by law to give testimony. As information from a mediation
may be relevant to subsequent proceedings, it is conceivable that the hearing
of a mediation participant will include questions about the mediation
process. In this respect, a conflict arises between the mediation’s confidential
environment and the legal duty to appear as a witness; the principle of
confidentiality prohibits the mediation participants from disclosing
information, while the legal duty to testify obliges them to make a
statement.192
In civil litigation, the victim, the mediator, and the professional caregiver,
as well as the offender can be called as witnesses (see below). In criminal
proceedings, the first three participants can appear as witnesses as well,
Maxwell, ‘Restorative Justice in New Zealand: Family Group Conferences as a Case
Study’,Western Criminology Review 1998 1, pp. 8 9.
189 This has also been put into words as such in the United Nations Basic Principles,
Paragraphs 16 and 17.
190 On this topic, see also the Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of
Mediation of the European Forum for Victim Services (2004).
191 This is the case in most common law and civil law countries. For more detailed
examples of domestic legislation concerning the obligation to give testimony, see
Chapter Eight.
192 See also the Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation of the
European Forum for Victim Services (2004).
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however, in a criminal trial the position of offenders is different. As the
accused, they can appeal to the right to a fair trial laid down in the ECHR
and the ICCPR. The right to a fair trial entails that offenders cannot be forced
to incriminate themselves. This implies that they have a right to remain
silent. Furthermore, the fair trial notion implies that alleged offenders have
the right to defend themselves, which entails that they have a right to speak.
The right to remain silent creates no tension in this respect; it enables
offenders to respect the mediation’s confidentiality, because they cannot be
forced to make a statement. However, the offender’s right to speak may
collide with the principle of confidentiality. Observing the confidentiality
rule may restrict the freedom of offenders to respond to the criminal charge
against them and conflict with an important rule that derives from the right
to a fair trial.193
Victims can make a statement of their own accord, for example, a Victim
Impact Statement (VIS). In a VIS, victims can explain the consequences that a
crime has had for them. Here too, the principle of confidentiality may prove
an obstacle, since respecting the confidential nature of the mediation can
restrict the information the victim may want to include in the VIS.
Observing the confidentiality standard may also have ramifications in the
context of civil law. If a victim offender mediation is followed by civil
litigation, it is likely that the victim and the offender will be parties to the
civil proceedings. This implies that they in principle will bear the burden of
proving their claims. The confidentiality rule, however, will restrict them in
this respect, since they cannot furnish information from the mediation as
evidence. In this way, the confidentiality rule can be at odds with a basic
principle of civil law procedure. The legal obligation to give testimony may
also cause friction when the parties call the mediator as a witness or appear
as party witnesses themselves.194
3.7 Conclusion
Various standards have been developed and laid down in international
protocols to enable a proper course and successful ending of victim offender
mediation. These standards guarantee the interests of the mediation
participants and safeguard a fruitful progress of the process. To ensure the
participation of the victim and the offender as well as a free exchange of
information, one of the mediation standards requires that mediation
operates in a confidential setting.
Victim offender mediation is not a stand alone procedure. This means that
it can interact with other concepts, such as criminal and civil law principles,
and may challenge the norms and values of these areas of law. The principle
193 Further, see Chapter Four.
194 Further, see Chapter Eight.
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of confidentiality that governs victim offender mediation can be
incompatible with criminal and civil law tenets.
To assess whether these incongruities urge for a reaction, and what this
reaction should be, the features of victim offender mediation as well as those
of criminal and civil law should be taken into account. The next chapter will
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4 The Features of Victim Offender Mediation,
Criminal Law and Civil Law
4.1 Introduction
Victim offender mediation cannot be considered a stand alone procedure; it
interacts with the law of criminal and civil procedure and primarily operates
in the context of criminal law. It can take place before, during or after a
criminal trial. Consequently, the contents and the outcome of a mediation
can be relevant to subsequent criminal proceedings. These matters may also
play a role in ensuing civil litigation.
Currently, no jurisdiction has replaced its criminal justice system by
restorative practices; as a result, mediation in criminal matters has to be
fitted within the existing judicial context. To avoid a conflict between the
values of mediation and those of criminal and civil law, the main features of
criminal and civil law should be taken into account vis à vis those of victim
offender mediation.
Tension may arise between basic standards of victim offender mediation
and tenets of criminal and civil law. For example, the fundamental criminal
law principle that an accused has the right to remain silent can cause
difficulties in a mediation setting; the communication in mediation would be
gravely hampered if offenders could invoke this right during a mediation
session. The underlying idea of mediation – offenders should accept and act
on their responsibilities – does not mesh with ignoring the victim’s questions
or refusing to discuss their actual or alleged crime. Such a situation could
easily lead to secondary victimisation. Conflicts between mediation
fundamentals and those of criminal and civil law may also arise pertaining
to the confidentiality principle. The advocated extent of mediation
confidentiality implies that because mediation participants are not allowed
to disclose mediation information afterwards, they are not free to make a
statement regarding discussed topics in court. By contrast, it is an important
feature of criminal and civil law to focus on the fact finding process and
clarifying relevant facts and circumstances. Consequently, people who are
called in evidence generally have a legal duty to testify, and mediation
participants can in principle be obliged to give testimony, even if this entails
the disclosure of mediation information. These and other frictions
concerning the confidentiality rule have been identified in Chapter 3.6, and
will be discussed further in the following chapters.
The fundamentals of victim offender mediation and those of criminal and
civil law conflict, because the interests they represent appear to be
irreconcilable. The rules of criminal and civil procedure aim to protect the
procedural position of the subjects involved, while the goal of penal
mediation is to enable a dialogue between the victim and the offender. To
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resolve this conflict, it will be necessary to develop an approach that makes
it possible to soundly and carefully balance the tenets of these vital concepts.
To facilitate such an assessment, a research framework will be developed in
this chapter, listing and examining the essential features of the systems
involved. The relevant essentials of these three possible judicial reactions to
crime will define the inner perimeter of the desired scope of mediation
confidentiality. They will provide leads for the appraisal of the conflicting
interests that are related to the tension caused by the private nature of
victim offender mediation.
This chapter will be devoted to the main features of victim offender
mediation, and of the law of criminal and civil procedure. Due to the focus
of this research, the discussion of these features will be limited to those that
are important in the light of the principle of confidentiality. These will
mainly concern the way in which these systems deal with information,
including restrictions on the admissibility of information in court.
4.2 Characteristics of Victim Offender Mediation
The first concept that needs to be examined is victim offender mediation
itself. The relevant features of victim offender mediation concern some of
the standards that have been mentioned in the previous chapters and their
main implications will therefore only be discussed briefly here.
The goal of victim offender mediation is to offer the victim an opportunity
to seek restoration;195 it aims at compensating the material and immaterial
harm suffered by the victim at the hands of the offender.196
For victim offender mediation to be successful, it is essential that the
victim and the offender agree on the basic facts of a case.197 This requirement
is considered a conditio sine qua non for the start of a mediation. Without
mutual understanding about the relevant events, the victim and the offender
will be unable to reach an agreement. Acknowledging basic facts also
enables the offender to accept and act on his responsibilities. This is a
necessary element of victim restoration, considering that it is impossible for
an offender to provide compensation without acknowledging responsibility.
The basic facts requirement is related to the principle of confidentiality in
the sense that it contributes to a mutual understanding between the parties
of the central issue of the mediation. Reciprocal recognition of the facts
enables the victim and the offender to make a thought out and conscious
decision about their participation. This may have implications for the
required level of confidentiality to be applied to the communication in
195 Among others, see H. Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 2002, p. 44.
196 Among others, see M.S. Umbreit, R.B. Coates & B. Vos, ‘Victim Offender Mediation:
Three Decades of Practice and Research’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, p. 279.
197 Chapter 3.2.1.
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mediation; the parties’ recognition presupposes that they are aware of the
central focus of the issue and that they will not act in a way that conflicts
with this premise.
The basic facts requirement thus functions as a significant means to achieve
the aim of mediation, namely restoration for the victim. Other standards that
safeguard a proper course of victim offender mediation are the requirements
of voluntary participation and voluntary agreement,198 and the participants’
right to information.199 Both requirements also play a role in relation to the
confidential character of victim offender mediation.
The voluntary nature of the parties’ participation entails that they have
committed willingly to the mediation procedure. The same goes for their
consent to the conditions that are included in the mediation agreement. This
dual voluntariness may have consequences for the required level of
confidentiality.
The right to information implies that the participants must be informed
about various aspects of the mediation process. This includes information
about the confidential nature of the process. The right to information thus
ensures that the victim and the offender are aware of the implications of
participating in mediation. Again, this aspect of their participation may
affect the suitable level of confidentiality of the matters that are discussed in
mediation.200
The other mediation standards are not directly linked to the principle of
confidentiality and they will therefore not be discussed here. Nevertheless,
they ought to be observed when searching for ways to deal with issues that
are related to the confidentiality rule.
4.3 Characteristics of Criminal Law
4.3.1 Introduction: Fact Finding and Right to a Fair Trial
The main object of criminal law is to respond adequately to a criminal act.
The circumstances of the offence are investigated to determine who is liable
under criminal law. If there is enough evidence to find the person accused
guilty, he (or she) should be punished in a way that does justice to their
person as well as to the nature of the crime.201 To decide what is to be
198 Chapter 3.2.2.
199 Chapter 3.2.3.
200 The consequences of these mediation standards for the required level of confidentiality
will be examined further in the following chapters.
201 Among others, see A.E. Taslitz, M.L. Paris & L.C. Herbert, Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, New York: Foundation Press 2007, pp. 53 54; C. van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht,
strafprocesrecht & internationaal strafrecht, Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2006, pp. 425 427;
B. Bouloc, G. Stefani & G. Levasseur, Procédure pénale, Paris: Dalloz 2008, p. 3; and M.S.
Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge, ‘Algemeen Deel’, in: M.S. Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge (eds.),
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regarded as the appropriate reaction, criminal law focuses on fact finding,
or, in other words, on investigating what actually happened.202 Clarification
of the actual course of events and relevant characteristics of the accused
enable a proper response to the criminal violation of the law.
Considering that a proper reaction to a crime befits both the crime and the
alleged offender, most jurisdictions take the circumstances of the case as
well as the personal situation of the accused into account. However, the
stage at which both aspects come into sight differs between countries. In
most jurisdictions with a jury system, the personal circumstances of the
offender are examined at the sentencing stage, after the jury has found the
perpetrator guilty. As a result, criminal investigation in common law
countries is mainly focused on taking evidence. Available reports on the
perpetrator’s pre delict and post delict behaviour (such as the offender’s
explanation for the offence, any remorse shown, personal problems, medical
history, etc.) are considered by the court after the accused has been found
guilty and pertain to the sentence to be imposed.203 In most civil law
systems, the investigation into the personal circumstances of the alleged
offender is part of the preliminary investigation. These circumstances may
influence the punishability of the accused as well as the determination of the
appropriate punishment. The investigation into the personal characteristics
of the defendant can include post delict behaviour, such as his willingness to
express remorse.204 From this it follows that post delict behaviour of the
(alleged) offender can play a role in criminal law in a large number of
jurisdictions, in both common law and civil law systems. This is important
in the context of this research, since the offender’s behaviour during victim
offender mediation also qualifies as post delict behaviour.
The fact finding process is crucial for criminal law to reach its goal;
responding to crime and punishing the offender is impossible without
clarifying the relevant facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, the fact
finding process has to respect certain boundaries. These limitations mainly
consist of standards that safeguard the rights and interests of those who are
being investigated and of other parties involved. The standards concerned
can generally be categorised under the right to a fair trial laid down in
Het onderzoek ter zitting. Eerste interimrapport onderzoeksproject Strafvordering 2001,
Deventer: Gouda Quint 2001, p. 16. See also C.H. Brants et al. (eds.), Op zoek naar
grondslagen. Strafvordering 2001 ter discussie, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003,
pp. 26 27.
202 Regarding this topic, see also J. Crijns & P. van der Meij, ‘Over de grenzen van de
materiële waarheidsvinding’, in: R.H. Haveman & H.C. Wiersinga (eds.), Langs de randen
van het strafrecht, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2005, pp. 45 69.
203 Among others, see S. Easton & C. Piper, Sentencing and Punishment, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2006, pp. 97 98, 209 210 and 214ff.; and S. Seabrooke & J. Sprack,
Criminal Evidence and Procedure: the Essential Framework, London: Blackstone Press
Limited 1999, pp. 373ff.
204 Among others, see G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands strafprocesrecht, Deventer: Kluwer
2008, p. 33; and Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 237ff.
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human rights treaties.205 Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR both state that any
person facing a criminal charge is entitled to a fair and public hearing.206 Art.
14 ICCPR is a more detailed provision on the fair trial requirement, but the
elements of the right to a fair trial that have not been incorporated in the
ECHR have been recognised in the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. The notion of a fair trial, as it has been included in both
treaties, thus generally offers similar rights to its addressees.207
The concept of a fair trial applies to any person facing a criminal charge.208
The criminal charge applies to both the trial phase and the pre trial phase,
including the preliminary investigation.209 Gathering relevant information
and evidence during both phases therefore has to comply with the
requirements that follow from Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR.
The right to a fair trail is an umbrella concept210 for many other rights and
regulations concerning the (conduct of) a criminal trial. Some of these rights
are explicitly mentioned in Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR. Generally, these
rights concern specifications of the notion of a fair trial;211 the fairness of the
hearing as such can still be challenged, even if the requirements of Art. 6
205 Other human rights may also influence the process of fact finding, such as the right to
privacy. This right has been incorporated in Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 17 ICCPR, and in
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).
206 The notion of a fair trial is also included in Art. 8 of the ACHR. The discussion of the fair
trial requirement in this chapter can therefore – mutatis mutandis – also be considered to
apply to the American Convention. On the ACHR and the notion of a fair trial, see, e.g.,
A.A.C. Trindade, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial under the American Convention on Human
Rights’, in: A. Byrnes (ed.), The Right to a Fair Trial in International and Comparative
Perspective, Hong Kong: Centre for Comparative and Public Law 1997, pp. 4 11.
207 Generally, the fair trial provisions in both treaties have a similar meaning and effect. As
the notion of a fair trial has been dealt with in more detail by the ECtHR, the case law
pertaining to Art. 6 ECHR has been chosen as the point of departure here. Specific
features concerning the ICCPR and the ACHR will be referred to where appropriate. On
the relation between the ECHR and the ICCPR, see M.G. Schmidt, ‘The
Complementarity of the Covenant and the European Convention on Human Rights –
Recent Developments’, in: D. Harris & S. Joseph (eds.), The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995, pp. 629 659,
and pp. 632 633 (on the fair trial principle).
208 The ACHR here mentions ‘any accusation of a criminal nature’ (Art. 8, para. 1 ACHR).
209 The moment a criminal charge is brought is generally marked by ‘the official
notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he
has committed a criminal offence’ (ECtHR 27 February 1980, App. No. 6903/75, para. 46
(Deweer v. Belgium)). However, a formal notification is not always required; the opening
of preliminary investigations can also imply a charge (ECtHR 10 December 1982, App.
No. 8304/78, para. 34 (Corigliano v. Italy)). In addition, see P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia
2006, pp. 540 541; and F.G. Jacobs & R.C.A. White, The European Convention on Human
Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996, pp. 134ff.
210 See also S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights. Achievements, Problems and
Prospects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 251.
211 Among others, see Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 579 580 and references there; p. 624
regarding the presumption of innocence included in Art. 6, para. 2 ECHR and Art. 14,
para. 2 ICCPR; and p. 631 regarding minimum rights for the criminal suspect
incorporated in Art. 6, para. 3 ECHR and Art. 14, para. 3 ICCPR.
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ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR have been complied with.212
Paragraph 2 of both fair trial articles mentions the presumption of
innocence (see Section 4.3.4) as a right of the accused. Paragraph 3 concerns
additional rights of the alleged offender. These rights constitute minimum
standards pertaining to accused’s possibilities to conduct their defence
properly and fairly. They apply to their position in the actual proceedings
and during the preliminary phase, since violations of the fair trial concept
prior to the court hearing of a case can also jeopardise the overall fairness of
the proceedings. The rights that are incorporated in paragraph 3 of the two
fair trial provisions will not be discussed here separately, but will be
referred to where appropriate.
To facilitate the fact finding process, the criminal justice authorities have a
large number of methods of investigation and quite a few coercive powers at
their disposal. Most of these can be used against the will of the suspect.
Because of the importance of the fact finding process for the criminal justice
system, there are few exceptions to these investigative methods.
The rights that follow from the notion of a fair trial safeguard a proper
conduct of the prosecution and aim at protecting the parties involved, the
suspect in particular. They lead the fact finding process in the right
direction, and determine the boundaries of the criminal investigation. The
fair trial concept, and its influence on the national fact finding process
therefore limit the options of domestic authorities to investigate the relevant
facts and circumstances of a crime.213 Such limitations are inspired by the
need to avoid infringing various implications of the right to a fair trial and
possibly also by the wish to prevent violation of other human rights, such as
the right to privacy and private life.214
The boundaries of the fact finding process set by the right to a fair trial
imply that the use of relevant information in criminal procedures is limited
by this concept.215 The admissibility of any information in court, including
that deriving from mediation, therefore depends on the limitations set by the
fair trial requirements. As far as is relevant to this research, the current
section will therefore pay attention to the right to a fair trial. The rights that
derive from the general notion of a fair trial will be discussed in the order of
their appearance in the international treaties. The rights that have been
developed in case law will be examined in Section 4.3.2. In addition,
attention will be paid to how criminal law deals with the use and
admissibility of information, by examining three general exceptions to the
212 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 632 633; and Greer 2006, p. 253.
213 See also Crijns & Van der Meij 2005, pp. 54 55.
214 Art. 8 ECHR, Art. 17 ICCPR, and Art. 11 ACHR.
215 Nevertheless, the ECtHR exercises restraint in this respect, and has ruled that it is not
the role of the Court to judge the admissibility of evidence (ECtHR 12 July 1988, App.
No. 10862/84 (Schenk v. Switzerland). See further Section 4.3.5.3.
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use of information (Section 4.3.5).
4.3.2 Right to a Fair Trial
The right to a fair trial is expressed first and foremost in paragraph 1 of Art.
6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR on a fair hearing.216 The implications of this
umbrella concept are specified further in both provisions, but are not
restricted to the topics that are explicitly mentioned in the human rights
treaties.217
The ECtHR has ruled that the main goal of the right to a fair hearing is ‘to
place the ‘tribunal’ under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the
submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without
prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision’.218 To
judge the fairness of proceedings, they will have to be considered as a
whole.219 The Human Rights Committee has stated that the fair trial concept
‘should be interpreted as requiring a number of conditions, such as equality
of arms, respect for the principle of adversary proceedings, preclusion of ex
officio reformatio in pejus […] and expeditious procedure’.220
4.3.2.1 Right to Adversarial Proceedings
The right to a fair trial includes the accused’s right to adversarial
proceedings221 or, as the adage goes, audiatur et altera pars. This right
primarily entails that a defendant must have access to and be able to
examine all the evidence that is filed in the course of criminal proceedings.
Similarly, the prosecution is obliged to provide alleged offenders with all the
available evidence against them, unless it is considered strictly necessary to
withhold the evidence concerned.222
Art. 6, para. 3, under d ECHR and Art. 14, par. 3, under e ICCPR codify an
aspect of the right to adversarial proceedings.223 According to these
216 Art. 8, para. 1 ACHR does not mention a fair hearing as such, but it does stipulate that a
hearing be provided ‘with due guarantees’.
217 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 578 579 and references there. See also A. Sanders, ‘A Fair
Trial for the Suspect’, in: A. Eser & C. Rabenstein (eds.), Strafjustiz im Spannungsfeld von
Effizienz und Fairness, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2004, pp. 191 204.
218 ECtHR 19 April 1993, App. No. 13942/88, para. 30 (Kraska v. Switzerland).
219 See further S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2005, pp. 86 89.
220 Human Rights Committee 28 July 1989, Com. No. 207/1986, para. 9.3 (Morael v. France).
Footnote (asterisk) following ‘ex officio reformation in pejus’ omitted.
221 Among others, see Trechsel 2005, pp. 89ff.; Jacobs & White 1996, p. 125; S. Stavros, The
Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993, p. 186.
222 For example, see the judgement of the ECtHR of 16 February 2000, App. No. 28901/95,
para. 61 (Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom); and ECtHR 23 April 1997, App. Nos.
21363/93; 21364/93; 21427/93; and 22056/93, para. 58 (Van Mechelen and others v. the
Netherlands). In addition, see Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 587 588.
223 Bailey 1995, p. 228.
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provisions, alleged offenders have the right to examine and cross examine
witnesses and to call witnesses on their behalf. This does, however, not
mean that the accused has an unlimited right to hear witnesses; the decision
whether or not to hear a particular witness is left to the discretion of the
court.224 The right to (cross ) examine and to call witnesses does not put
forward any restrictions on the questions that the defence can pose to a
witness. Nevertheless, in both common law and civil law systems, the court
can decide not to allow certain questions.225
To protect the procedural fairness, the right to adversarial proceedings
should also be observed if information from a mediation is used in a
subsequent criminal trial.
4.3.2.2 Right to an Oral Hearing
The fair trial concept also includes the right to an oral hearing.226 This right
is closely connected to the accused’s right to be present at the trial and his
right to defend himself in person.227 These rights ensure that defendants can
be present at the criminal proceedings concerning their case in person and
that they can be heard during the trial. They are entitled to react to evidence
that is produced against them and to adduce evidence to plead their case.
The right to an oral hearing also applies to the hearing of a case on appeal,
insofar as the appellate court has to examine the facts and law pertaining to
a case, and makes an assessment of the question of guilt.228 The applicability
of an exception to the right to an oral hearing additionally depends on
whether the accused was entitled to be present at the hearing at first
instance.229 Other aspects that have been taken into account by the ECtHR
include the nature of the national appeal system, the scope of the powers of
the appeal court, and the gravity of what is at stake for the accused.230
The right to an oral hearing and the right to defend oneself in person
combine to give the alleged offender the right to make a statement in court.
As follows from the above, the defendant’s right to speak in appeal
procedures is not absolute. In addition, the alleged offender does not have
an ‘unlimited right to use any defence arguments’.231 The contents of the
224 For example, see the ECtHR Doorson case of the European Court (judgement of 26
March 1996, App. No. 20524/92, para. 82 (Doorson v. the Netherlands)); and, for a more
recent example, the Court’s judgement of 3 February 2004, App. No. 50230/99, para. 35
(Laukanen and Maninnen v. Finland).
225 Among others, see P. Murphy, Murphy on evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2005, pp. 540ff.; and Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 648.
226 Stavros 1993, p. 189. See also Trechsel 2005, pp. 126ff., who considers the right to an oral
hearing to be an extension of the right to a public hearing (Section 4.3.3).
227 Art. 6, para. 3, under c ECHR and Art. 14, para. 3, under d ICCPR.
228 For example, see the Court’s judgement of 6 July 2004, App. No. 50545/99, para. 27
(Dondarini v. San Marino).
229 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 589.
230 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 589 590 and references there.
231 ECtHR 28 August 1991, App. Nos. 11170/84; 12876/87; and 13468/87, para. 52
(Brandstetter v. Austria).
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accused’s statements can be limited by requirements of national law. It can
therefore not be excluded that alleged offenders will be prosecuted if
warranted by the contents of their statement, for example, because they raise
false suspicions of punishable behaviour.232 Nevertheless, in the Brandstetter
case the ECtHR ruled that ‘if it were established that, as a consequence of
national law or practice in this respect being unduly severe, the risk of
subsequent prosecution is such that the defendant is genuinely inhibited
from freely exercising these rights’, the contents of the defendant’s
statements might not lead to subsequent prosecution. This situation can
occur when the accused is ‘stopped […] or in any way restrained’ from
making a statement, for example, by being threatened with the possibility of
prosecution if he exercises his right to speak.233 In the case the accused’s
statement causes a disturbance of the hearing in court (such as contempt of
court), the court can deal with this incident as it sees fit.234
As has been mentioned in Chapter Three, there may exist tension between
the defendant’s right to speak and the principle of confidentiality when the
offender has participated in victim offender mediation. The accused has the
right to make a statement, whereas the confidentiality prohibits him from
disclosing mediation derived information.
4.3.2.3 Right against Self Incrimination
The notion of a fair trial also includes the right against self incrimination (or
nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum). Nobody can be forced to furnish evidence
against him or herself. The right against self incrimination has been
recognised in the case law of the ECtHR,235 and has been incorporated in
Art. 14, para. 3, under g of the ICCPR.236 It applies to the pre trial phase as
well as to the actual proceedings. During the preliminary investigation, the
right entails that no pressure may be exerted on the suspect to produce
evidence. If the right is violated, the evidence obtained can be exc
The main implication of the right against self incrimination concerns the
right to remain silent.238 The accused cannot be forced or obliged to make a
statement, thereby disclosing information that might subject them to
232 ECtHR 28 August 1991, App. Nos. 11170/84; 12876/87; and 13468/87, para. 50
(Brandstetter v. Austria). According to the Court, ‘it would be overstraining the concept
of the right of defence of those charged with a criminal offence if it were to be assumed
that they could not be prosecuted when, in exercising that right, they intentionally
arouse false suspicions of punishable behaviour concerning a witness or any other
person involved in the criminal proceedings’ (para. 52).
233 Ibid., para. 53.
234 On the accused’s right of to express himself, see also Trechsel 2005, pp. 342 343.
235 For example, see the judgement of the ECtHR of 25 February 1993, App. No. 10828/84
(Funke v. France).
236 In this respect, see also Art. 8, para. 3 ACHR.
237 Further, see Section 4.3.5.3.
238 On the relation between the right against self incrimination and the right to remain
silent, see Trechsel 2005, p. 342; and P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence,
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, pp. 392ff.
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criminal prosecution. In addition, defendants cannot be compelled to
produce other types of evidence. The main exception to this rule is when the
information concerned exists independently of the will of the suspect.
According to the ECtHR, this category includes ‘documents acquired
pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for
the purpose of DNA testing’.239
The right against self incrimination enables the accused to determine how
they position themselves with regard to the criminal trial. Their ability to
make or not to make a statement, or to provide evidence otherwise
acknowledges their autonomous position in criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the right to remain silent is not absolute.240 The court may,
under certain circumstances, draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s
decision to remain silent.241 These circumstances are to be assessed in view
of all aspects of a case, and can include ‘the situations [covered by law –
RvS] where inferences may be drawn, the weight attached to them by the
national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the degree of
compulsion inherent in the situation’.242 However, the possibility to draw
adverse conclusions from alleged offenders’ silence must not cause them to
be threatened with a criminal sanction merely because they refuse to make a
statement or to provide evidence.243
The freedom of the accused to decide on his strategy for the hearing of
their case is connected to the right to legal assistance,244 and to the
professional privilege of lawyers to refuse to testify.245 These aspects allow
offenders to make a well informed decision about their position pertaining
to the case against them.
To avoid a violation of the right against self incrimination, a privilege to
refuse to give testimony is also awarded if an intended witness246 or a close
239 ECtHR 17 December 1996, App. No. 19187/91, para. 69 (Saunders v. the United Kingdom).
However, obtaining information that exists independently of the accused’s will can –
under certain circumstances – cause a violation of the right against self incrimination,
for example, if the evidence concerned is obtained by significantly interfering with the
defendant’s mental and physical integrity, and through a high degree of compulsion.
Other factors that the Court has taken into account include the weight of the public
interest in the investigation and in the punishment of the offence concerned, the
existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, and how the material concerned
is used (ECtHR 11 July 2006, App. No. 54810/00, paras. 103ff. (Jalloh v. Germany)).
240 ECtHR 8 February 1996, App. No. 18731/91, para. 47 (John Murray v. United Kingdom).
241 See also Murphy 2005, pp. 318ff.; and Seabrooke & Sprack 1999, pp. 82ff.
242 ECtHR 8 February 1996, App. No. 18731/91, para. 47 (John Murray v. United Kingdom).
The Court repeated its judgement in the Condron case of 2 May 2000, App. No. 35718/97,
para. 56 (Condron v. the United Kingdom). See also paras. 44 58 of the John Murray
judgement.
243 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 593 and references there.
244 The right to legal assistance has been incorporated in Art. 6, para. 3, under c of the
ECHR and Art. 14, para. 3, under d of the ICCPR.
245 On this topic, see further Section 4.3.5.2.
246 This does however not discharge him from taking the oath as a witness if domestic law
requires him to do so. ECtHR 20 October 1997, App. No. 20225/92 (Serves v. France).
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relative were to incriminate himself by giving testimony. Otherwise, the
reliability of the statements concerned could be challenged, and close
relationships might be endangered. The right to non disclosure will be
discussed further in Section 4.3.5.2.
When offenders have participated in victim offender mediation and
criminal proceedings ensue, the right to remain silent initially enables them
to observe the principle of confidentiality, since they cannot be forced to
make a statement about the mediation process.
4.3.3 Right to a Public Hearing
A significant element of the concept of a fair trial is the requirement that a
hearing be public.247 The public nature of criminal proceedings vis à vis the
confidential nature of victim offender mediation has been briefly discussed
in Chapter Three. Public access to criminal proceedings is mainly inspired
by the public interest in transparent, verifiable, and accurate information
about the administration of justice.248 The accused can waive his right to a
public hearing, as long as he does so in an ‘unequivocal manner’ and the
waiver does not ‘counter [to] any important public interest’.249 Such a waiver
can be the voluntary and well informed participation of the alleged offender
in victim offender mediation.
The main pertinence of the right to a public hearing in the context of this
research is that the disclosure of information in court implies that this
information is put in the public domain. This is a factor that has to be taken
into account in the process of examining the suitable level of confidentiality
in victim offender mediation.
4.3.4 Presumption of Innocence
Art. 6, para. 2 ECHR and Art. 14, para. 2 ICCPR both state that ‘[e]veryone
charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law’.250 This provision is generally referred
to as the presumption of innocence (or presumptio innocentiae). It is an
important aspect of the right to a fair trial, and an infringement of the
presumption of innocence constitutes a violation of the fairness of the
247 Both Art. 6, para. 1 ECHR and Art. 14, para. 1 ICCPR mention ‘a fair and public [italics
added – RvS] hearing’. In addition, see Art. 8, para. 5 ACHR, which states that ‘criminal
proceedings shall be public’.
248 This ratio also follows from the judgement of the European Court of 8 December 1983,
App. No. 7984/77 (Pretto and others v. Italy). See further Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 597,
footnote 589 and references there; Jacobs & White 1996, p. 140; and Stavros 1993, p. 189.
249 ECtHR 21 February 1990, App. No. 11855/85, para. 66 (Håkansson and Sturesson v.
Sweden). Further on this topic, see Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 597 598 and cases
quoted there. In addition, see also Greer 2006, pp. 254 255; Trechsel 2005, pp. 124 125;
and Stavros 1996, pp. 190ff.
250 See also Art. 8, para. 2 ACHR.
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proceedings concerned.
The presumption of innocence is a significant feature of criminal law. It
expresses the basic idea that the prosecution sets out to prove the guilt of the
accused on the basis of lawful evidence that is put forward during the trial.
Consequently, defendants are not responsible for proving their innocence,251
and the court must not be prejudiced against them prior to the
proceedings.252 The presumptio innocentiae also applies to the pre trial phase,
which implies that the suspect has to be regarded as innocent during the
preliminary investigation.
The presumption of innocence is further linked to the right not to
incriminate oneself and the right to remain silent.253 The presumptio
innocentiae is not to be violated if the offender exercises these rights.
However, the court may draw adverse conclusions from alleged offenders
invoking their right to remain silent;254 the ECtHR then tends to consider the
persuasiveness of the evidence under discussion.255
The presumption of innocence has inspired the adoption of the mediation
standard that neither participation in mediation nor the acknowledgement
of basic facts by the offender are to be used as evidence of admission of guilt
in subsequent legal proceedings.256
4.3.5 Three Exceptions to the Use and Admissibility of Information in
Court
The criminal justice process focuses on fact finding, and the criminal justice
authorities have many methods of investigation at their disposal. However,
they cannot gather evidence unlimitedly, nor is all information admissible in
court. Gathering proof during the preliminary investigation is restricted, as
is the use of this information in court afterwards. Criminal law recognises
three specific exceptions to the use and admissibility of information in court.
These exceptions have been inspired by the protection of the notion of a fair
trial and other human rights. The restrictions on the use of evidence show
how the criminal justice system deals with the question of what information
can or cannot be used in criminal proceedings, and why. Below, the use of
coercive powers, the privilege to refuse to testify, and the exclusion of
evidence, respectively, will be discussed.
251 Jacobs & White 1996, p. 150.
252 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 625 626; and Bailey 1995, pp. 219 220.
253 Also Trechsel 2005, p. 166.
254 See further Section 4.3.2.3.
255 In the John Murray case of the European Court (8 February 1996, App. No. 18731/91,
paras. 44 58 (John Murray v. United Kingdom)), the fact that ‘adverse inferences’ were
drawn from the accused’s silence was not considered a violation of the presumptio
innocentiae. In the Telfner case, however, the Court ruled in the opposite direction
(judgement of 20 March 2001, App. No. 33501/96, paras. 17 20 (Telfner v. Austria)).
256 Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 8 of the Basic Principles. See also
Chapter 3.2.1.
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4.3.5.1 Coercive Powers
The methods of investigation that are available to the criminal justice
authorities mainly concern coercive powers. They include surveillance,
searches, telephone taps, and collecting body tissue and fluids for purposes
of DNA testing. The use of coercive powers facilitates the fact finding
process, tracing suspects, and gathering evidence. Criminal justice officials
can obtain information without the cooperation or knowledge of the
accused. As a result, the exercise of coercive powers may breach rights of the
alleged offender or of other persons involved. For example, the right to
privacy or private life, which follows from Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 17 ICCPR,
is likely to be violated by the exertion of coercive powers.257 Nevertheless,
such a violation is permissible under certain circumstances.
Where appropriate, the provisions in the human rights treaties include
escape clauses that indicate the circumstances under which the right can be
legitimately infringed with. The main escape clauses stipulate that the
intrusion should be in accordance with the law (ECHR and ICCPR) and in
the interest of national security, public safety and economic well being of a
democratic society (ECHR). From this it follows that human rights can be
infringed if the intrusion is regulated by law.258 Considering that the
exertion of coercive powers may cause a violation of human rights, its use
has to be controlled by legislation. Consequently, gathering information that
may be relevant to a trial is curbed by law – a legal restriction of the fact
finding process, which results from the assessment by national legislators of
the admissibility of gathering certain information. As a result, gathering and
using information that can be relevant in criminal court is limited.
4.3.5.2 Privilege to Refuse to Testify
Fact finding generally also involves interrogating people who may be able to
provide relevant information, and a wide range of individuals can be
questioned. Most jurisdictions impose a legal duty on people who are called
in evidence to make a statement.259 People who have been summoned to
give testimony have few options to refrain from doing so. The main ground
to decline to appear as a witness is the privilege to refuse to testify. People
who are entitled to a privilege cannot be obliged to make a statement when
257 In addition, see R. Stone, The Law of Entry, Search and Seizure, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2005, pp. 2, and 4ff. on the meaning of privacy under Art. 8 ECHR. The fair trial
requirements can be violated by wrongfully exercising coercive powers, which may
constitute a violation of Art. 3 ECHR or Art. 7 ICCPR (see Stone 2005, pp. 243 244).
258 According to the ECtHR, the legislation concerned does not necessarily have to be of a
formal nature, as long as the legislation in question is accessible and foreseeable. For
example, see ECtHR judgement of 26 April 1979, App. No. 6538/74, para. 49 (Sunday
Times v. the United Kingdom). This may, however, be different according to domestic law.
For example, the codification of the right to private life in Article 10 of the Dutch
Constitution (Grondwet) ensures that noncompliance has to be based on Acts of
Parliament.
259 See further Chapter Eight.
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they are called as witnesses. Such a privilege has been awarded to various
categories of potential witnesses, and for various reasons, but in all cases, the
fact finding process is considered subordinate to the interest of secrecy. In
this sense, the privilege to refuse to testify (hereafter referred to as privilege)
is another exception to the use of information that may be relevant to a
criminal trial.
A privilege can be awarded on relational or professional grounds. The first
category concerns close relatives and (ex ) partners of the alleged offender.
The degree of relationship covered by this category differs between
countries and depends on domestic family law, but the underlying reasons
are generally the same in all jurisdictions; the general purposes of the
relational privilege are to safeguard the reliability of the evidence concerned
and to observe the right to privacy and family life260 by protecting the
relationships of accused with their family members and/or (ex ) partners.
However, the relational privilege does not entail that relatives of the accused
are prohibited from making a statement. They have the right to refuse to
give testimony, but they are under no obligation to either invoke or
relinquish this right.261
A privilege is also awarded when giving testimony would incriminate a
person the relational privilege applies to. The same goes for witnesses that
would incriminate themselves by making a statement.262
The privilege can also be awarded on professional grounds. Proper
professional performance is then considered to be dependent on the
possibility of refusing to give testimony. The restrictions on the use of
relevant information in court in this respect imply that people with a
professional privilege are allowed to refrain from providing information
because of a quality they have willingly accepted; they do not have a
privilege because of their relationship with the offender, but because of the
office they carry out.
Professionals with a professional privilege usually offer a service, such as
medical, legal, or spiritual support. Furthermore, their tasks often include a
pledge of secrecy pertaining to the relationship between them and their
client: professionals do not reveal information they become privy to in the
execution of their duties. However, not all service oriented professions that
involve a pledge of secrecy are assigned a privilege. The interests that are
served by such a pledge do not in all cases prevail over the interest of
260 Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 17 ICCPR.
261 Further on the relational privilege, see Murphy 2005, pp. 485ff.; and Roberts &
Zuckerman 2004, pp. 230 235.
262 Since no one can be obliged to incriminate himself, see Section 4.3.2.3. In addition, see,
for example, Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 927; Murphy 2005, pp. 435 445; and Roberts &
Zuckerman 2004, pp. 228 230.
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establishing the truth. A limited number of professions have been granted a
privilege, because their well functioning is considered so important that the
interest of safeguarding proper professional performance outweighs the
interest of fact finding.263
Countries differ in determining which professions apply for a privilege.
Some have opted to include an open norm in domestic legislation. In such
cases, the decision to grant a privilege in a specific case is left to the
discretion of the court.264 Others have chosen to draw up an exhaustive list
of professions that qualify for the privilege.265 A combination is also found:
national law explicitly mentions certain categories of professions, but
includes an open norm as well.266 Despite these differences, four categories
of professions can be distinguished that are traditionally entitled to refuse to
testify: doctors, lawyers, civil law notaries, and clergymen.267 These
professionals provide a service that is considered so vital that their
accessibility, approachability, and reliability warrants protection by a
privilege. Doctors, lawyers, civil law notaries, and clergymen are regarded
as being unable to carry out their task if they cannot guarantee secrecy to
those who have confided in them. The societal essentiality of their
professions requires inviolable confidentiality.
The reasons for granting doctors a privilege concern the interest of
protecting the privacy of individual patients and the interest of public
health, which depends on the accessibility of medical health care. Awarding
the privilege to lawyers facilitates and secures the right to legal assistance –
which is part of the notion of a fair trial – enabling lawyers to properly assist
and advise their individual clients in legal matters.268 The services provided
by civil law notaries are indispensible in many situations, and will often
involve topics that concern sensitive personal information. Their
professional privilege precludes such information from being disclosed.
Finally, the privilege secures the approachability of clergymen and their role
263 In addition, see on this topic C. Brants et al., Verschoningsrecht in het strafrecht van
Nederland en België, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2006.
264 The Netherlands, France, Portugal and Spain (F.J. Fernhout, Het verschoningsrecht van
getuigen in civiele zaken, Maastricht: Gianni 2004, p. 332). The United Kingdom also
included an open norm in Article 12 of its Official Secrets Act 1992 (Stone 2005, pp.
118ff.). Further, see Murphy 2005, pp. 444ff.
265 For example, Denmark (e.g., clergymen, doctors, lawyers), Sweden (e.g., doctors,
lawyers, clergymen), Finland (e.g., doctors, lawyers, clergymen), and Norway (e.g.,
clergymen, lawyers, doctors) (Fernhout 2004, p. 333).
266 Belgium (doctors are explicitly mentioned, while an open standard is also included),
Germany (clergymen and doctors are explicitly mentioned), and Luxembourg (doctors
and related professions are explicitly mentioned) (Fernhout 2004, p. 333). Pertaining to
Belgium, see also Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 926ff.
267 C. Brants & T. Spronken, ‘Het professionele verschoningsrecht: de arts, de advocaat en
de journalist in de Nederlandse strafrechtpraktijk’, in: Brants et al. 2006, p. 13; and
Fernhout 2004, pp. 199 207. In addition, see Murphy 2005, pp. 445ff.
268 For example, see Murphy 2005, pp. 445 446. For a further explanation of the privilege to
refuse to testify for lawyers in the United Kingdom, see pp. 445 452.
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as counsellor or confessor. Their profession is partly protected by the right to
freedom of religion.269
In addition to the four professions that are traditionally granted a privilege,
other professions could also conceivably gain from the right to refuse to give
testimony. However, in many cases, they have been denied a privilege,
either because it was deemed unnecessary for practising the profession, or
because the fact finding process was considered to prevail. Uniform criteria
for assessing whether a professional privilege has been rightfully awarded
are hard to deduce, as categories of professions and reasons for denying the
grant of a privilege vary widely. Being granted a privilege also depends on
how national jurisdictions have incorporated the right to refuse to testify in
legislation. Countries that have chosen to include an exhaustive list of
professions that qualify for the privilege, tend to interpret the categories
concerned extensively. For example, midwives and pharmacists are often
classified in the category of doctors. When domestic legislation contains an
open or a semi open standard, awarding the privilege to ‘new’ professions is
based on that standard. Due to these differences, it is hard to provide a
detailed overview of all aspects that are relevant to granting an entitlement
to refuse to give testimony. Nevertheless, some requirements that have been
developed in case law are common to various jurisdictions. They will be
briefly discussed below.
The first argument that can be deduced from case law concerns the pledge of
secrecy. The sole existence of a pledge of secrecy does not automatically
imply the entitlement to refuse to appear as a witness.270 The interests that
are protected by the promise to observe secrecy do not in all cases prevail
over the interest of the fact finding process.
Secondly, mandatory legal qualifications are a significant factor. The
absence of such qualifications is an incentive not to grant the privilege to a
certain group of professionals, because the homogeneity of this group
cannot be guaranteed. An example of this can be found in the Netherlands,
where the designation ‘tax consultant’ is not protected by law.271 As a result,
this group has not been awarded a privilege. A related factor is whether the
group of professionals concerned is subject to sector specific disciplinary
law.
A third factor is the homogeneity of the professional’s client group. Client
heterogeneity has been mentioned as a motive for not awarding a privilege.
Considering that a professional may serve an indefinable group of people
269 See Art. 9 ECHR and Art. 18 ICCPR.
270 For example, see Brants & Spronken 2006, pp. 8 12; P. Traest & J. Meese, ‘Het
verschoningsrecht naar Belgisch recht’, in: Brants et al. 2006, pp. 117 118 (NB: in the
Belgium context, the pledge of secrecy that is referred to here is the Belgian
discretieplicht; Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 926 927); and Fernhout 2004, pp. 335ff.
271 Hoge Raad (HR) 6 May 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1986, 815.
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and organisations, it cannot be assumed that the interest of secrecy prevails
over that of fact finding in all cases. This has been mentioned as one of the
reasons why the chartered accountant has not been granted a privilege.272
A fourth point is whether it is legally or otherwise imperative for the
public to procure the services of a professional. For example, a criminal
suspect generally needs to be assisted by a lawyer, and a patient is
dependent on a doctor for diagnosis and treatment. Nevertheless, not all
professionals offer a service that is indispensable to the public. Granting the
privilege to legal professionals (other than lawyers) is partly dependent on
whether people have a legal duty to seek the assistance of a professional;
then, the right to refuse to testify plays a role in securing the access to legal
aid. For that reason, tax counsellors are among those who have not been
awarded the privilege,273 since their clients request their assistance primarily
of their own volition. If clients do not want information exchanged between
them and the professional to be disclosed in court, they will have to
reconsider approaching the professional. Nevertheless, professionals may
still have to observe confidentiality outside court, due to their professional
pledge of secrecy.
A fifth element is that certain professions perform a number of different
tasks. Some of these tasks may require a privilege, while others do not.
However, separating the different components of a profession’s area of work
often seems artificial and may be hard in practice. Consequently,
professionals that fall into this category are usually not granted a privilege.
It is one of the reasons why social workers have thus far not been awarded a
privilege.274 A significant part of their job consists of collecting information
for reports or the authorities. Awarding them a privilege would be
inexpedient, since the information concerned is gathered with a view to
notifying others. However, social workers may also offer mental support
and assistance. If this aspect of their job could be visibly and practically
separated from their other duties, a privilege could be granted for this
component of their work. The same goes for victim support volunteers, who
may also discuss personal and sensitive information with their clients in a
professional capacity.275 Probation officers, however, are awarded the
privilege as far as offering mental support and assistance is concerned.276
The position of journalists pertaining to the professional privilege is special.
They do not provide medical, legal, spiritual, or notarial assistance to their
clients, and their profession is subject neither to the fulfilment of mandatory
272 See for Dutch decisions on this matter HR 25 October 1983, NJ 1984, 132; and, more
recently, HR 4 January 2000, NJ 2000, 537.
273 Fernhout 2004, pp. 227 228.
274 Although social workers are sometimes excused from testifying in individual cases
(Fernhout 2004, p. 233).
275 Fernhout 2004, p. 227.
276 Fernhout 2004, p. 874. See also HR 20 June 1968, NJ 1968, 332.
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legal requirements, nor to sector related disciplinary law. Nevertheless, their
right to protect their sources, and therefore to keep information secret, has
been confirmed numerous times in case law. The freedom of the press and
the right to free access to information,277 entitle them to refuse to reveal their
sources, despite the fact that the journalist profession does not comply with
the above mentioned criteria for being granted a privilege. In 1996, the
ECtHR ruled that this right implies that journalists can only be forced to
divulge their sources if the escape clauses apply, namely if disclosure is
‘necessary in a democratic society’ due to ‘an overriding requirement in the
public interest’.278 In other situations, journalists cannot be compelled to
reveal their sources.279
Opinions differ on whether mediators ought to be given a privilege. In
view of the confidential nature of victim offender mediation, they would
understandably benefit from a privilege, and some jurisdictions have
therefore regulated the competences of the mediator.280 Awarding the
privilege to mediators will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.
A professional privilege to refuse to testify is not absolute – it may not apply
in certain situations. In the first place, the privileged professional can decide
to make a statement despite an applicable legal privilege. Secondly, the
privilege can be restricted for other reasons.
The decision whether to give testimony in spite of an applicable
entitlement to refuse to testify is initially left to the privileged professionals,
even when a client agrees to disclosure.281 Professionals have to weigh the
277 Art. 10 ECHR and Art. 19 ICCPR.
278 Judgement of 27 March 2002, App. No. 17488/90, para. 39 (Goodwin v. the United
Kingdom). For recent implications of this judgement, see the judgements of the European
Court of 22 November 2007, App. No. 64752/01 (Voskuil v. the Netherlands), 25 April 2006,
App. No. 69698/01 (Stoll v. Switzerland); and 24 November 2005, App. No. 53886/00
(Tourancheau and July v. France).
279 The Netherlands has not laid down the journalist’s right to protect his sources and
material in legislation, but has nevertheless complied with the decision of the European
Court in its case law. See for recent cases HR 23 January 2007, NJ 2007, 94; HR 17
October 2006, NJ 2007, 25; and HR 5 December 2006, NJ 2006, 665. Countries that do
have legal provisions on this topic, include Denmark, Finland, and Norway. See for the
situation in the United Kingdom, Murphy 2005, pp. 461ff.
280 For some examples, see Chapter 3.5.2.
281 Although legislation in some jurisdictions states that the privilege is no longer effective
in such cases. This is true in, e.g., Denmark, Germany, Finland, and Austria (Fernhout
2004, p. 299; and Y.G.M. Baaijens & J.B.H.M. Simmelink, ‘Normering van de opsporing’,
in: M.S. Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge (eds.), Dwangmiddelen en rechtsmiddelen. Derde
interimrapport onderzoeksproject Strafvordering 2001, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, p. 574). In the
United Kingdom, the accused is considered the person to whom the privilege has been
awarded. Consequently, certain communications between the alleged offender and his
lawyer cannot be disclosed. In such instances, the decision to reveal certain information
is left to the discretion of the accused, since the privilege is granted to him, not to the
professional (Baaijens & Simmelink 2002, pp. 578 579). However, in France and Italy, the
professional privilege remains intact, even when the client has agreed to disclosure
(Fernhout 2004, p. 338).
PART TWO – RESERACH FRAMEWORK
74
                                                 
consequences of disclosure against those of maintaining secrecy. In this
appraisal, they should not only take the interests of their individual clients
into consideration, but also their own, and those of their professional group.
Consequently, a professional may, for example, decide not to exercise his
privilege so as to prevent serious harm or injustice, such as life threatening
situations or the conviction of an innocent person.
A legal privilege may also be restricted by a professional’s legal duty to
report certain issues. Such a duty can either be a professional one (for
example, a doctor may have certain reporting duties related to the protection
of national health), or apply to any civilian (for example, a reporting duty
pertaining to the protection of public safety).
4.3.5.3 Exclusionary Rule
The criminal justice authorities have many sources at their disposal – such as
coercive powers and oral testimony – to facilitate the fact finding process.
The use of these investigation methods is regulated in the human rights
treaties282 and in domestic legislation to protect the quality of the
information obtained and the rights of the accused. A violation of these rules
may endanger the right to a fair trial283 and can therefore carry the following
sanctions: dismissal of a case, exclusion of evidence, or mitigation of the
sentence to be imposed. These sanctions can be found in many jurisdictions,
although their use may vary due to systemic legal differences.
This section discusses possible exceptions to the use of information in
criminal law, and reduced sentences and dismissed cases are therefore
irrelevant. The exclusion of evidence is important here, since it prohibits the
use of unlawfully obtained information as evidence in court. If breaching the
confidentiality rule would lead to this designation, mediation information
would consequently be inadmissible in court, and this would
understandably have a negative effect on the effectiveness of making
exceptions to the principle of confidentiality.284
The exclusionary rule implies that unlawfully obtained evidence has to be
excluded from the court’s assessment of a case. It mainly concerns
information that has been gathered during the preliminary investigation;
irregularities in the collection of evidence in the course of the hearing can be
repaired during the hearing, or can cause the judgement to be reversed by a
court of higher jurisdiction.
282 Regarding the infringement of human rights, see Stone 2005, pp. 60ff.
283 Among others, see Murphy 2005, pp. 52 53; and Y.G.M. Baaijens, ‘De rechtsgevolgen
(sanctionering) van onrechtmatigheden in het opsporingsonderzoek’, in: M.S.
Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge (eds.), Afronding en verantwoording. Eindrapport
onderzoeksproject Strafvordering 2001, Deventer: Kluwer 2004, p. 345.
284 The confidentiality rule initially prevents the mediation procedure from being used as
an illegitimate method of taking evidence, since the information concerned is subject to
secrecy.
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The exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence aims at repairing the
violated rules. Furthermore, it shows that the government has to observe its
own rules and that an infringement will have consequences. In addition,
penalising the criminal justice authorities for wrongful actions may make
them more aware of the importance of their compliance with the law.
The main shortcoming of the exclusionary rule is that it cannot fully
prevent the court from being influenced by the evidence concerned. The
exclusion decision is usually made by the court hearing the case,285 which
will inevitably take note of the contested evidence. As a result, it cannot be
ruled out that the court’s decision is affected by this evidence, despite the
fact that, once dismissed, it has to be disregarded.286 The exclusionary rule
can also have a limiting effect on the fact finding process. Furthermore, if an
accused is acquitted because of inadmissible evidence, there may be public
incomprehension about and social dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice.287
Leaving the application of the exclusionary rule to the discretion of national
courts corresponds with ECtHR case law. In the Schenk case, the Court ruled
that it is not the role of the Court to judge the admissibility of evidence.288
However, the Court may give a ruling on the appropriate consequences of
an unlawful obtainment of evidence. The Khan judgement implies that the
manner in which evidence has been obtained must not infringe the accused’s
right to a fair trial.289 In line with this judgement, the Court tends to react to
unlawful obtainment of evidence if such unlawfulness undermines the
fairness of the proceedings as a whole.290
285 This is the case in the Netherlands (Article 359a of the Dutch Code of Criminal
Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, WvSv), and Baaijens 2004, p. 345), Germany
(Baaijens 2004, p. 373; and M.C.D. Embregts, Uitsluitsel over bewijsuitsluiting: een
onderzoek naar de toelaatbaarheid van onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs in het strafrecht, het civiele
recht en het bestuursrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2003, pp. 35 38), the United States (Baaijens
2004, pp. 365 366; and also Taslitz, Paris & Herbert 2007, p. 550), and the United
Kingdom (Stone 2005, p. 60; Baaijens 2004, p. 375; and Seabrooke & Sprack 1999, p. 154).
286 Belgium circumvents this issue, since the exclusion assessment can be made by the
criminal division hearing the case, but also by the court’s indictment division. This
division is a separate department of the court that supervises the observance of the rules
of conduct for criminal investigations and the gathering of evidence (Van den Wyngaert
2006, p. 587; and Baaijens 2004, p. 366).
287 For the ratio and disadvantages of the exclusionary rule, see, among others, Taslitz,
Paris & Herbert 2007, pp. 613ff.; Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 1105 1106; Roberts &
Zuckerman 2004, pp. 150ff.; Baaijens 2004, pp. 354 357; and Embregts 2003, pp. 104 107
and 109 111.
288 ECtHR 12 July 1988, App. No. 10862/84 (Schenk v. Switzerland). For a more recent
example, see the judgement of 5 November 2002, App. No. 48539/99 (Allan v. United
Kingdom). In addition, see Stone 2005, p. 60; and Seabrook & Sprack 1999, pp. 154 155.
289 ECtHR 12 May 2000, App. No. 35394/97, para. 35 (Khan v. the United Kingdom).
290 For example, see ECtHR 9 June 1998, App. No. 25829/94 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal);
ECtHR 5 November 2002, App. No. 48539/99 (Allan v. United Kingdom); and Stavros
1996, pp. 225ff. On the (same) opinion of the Human Rights Committee, see Bailey 1995,
pp. 231 232.
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The overall procedural unfairness of the procedure as a ground for the
exclusion of evidence is the main guidance offered by the ECtHR in this
respect.291 Additionally, the notion of a fair trial has inspired domestic
legislation on the exclusionary rule. However, because of the casuistic nature
of domestic rulings on the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence,
few general requirements can be distinguished. The aspects that can be
deduced from national practice will be discussed below. They are important
here, since they point to incentives not to disclose certain information in
court.
Four elements are common to various jurisdictions. The first concerns the
question whether the violated right or norm aims at protecting the accused
(the Schutznorm theory). If not, the defendant is not directly disadvantaged
by the infringement of the rule concerned. In such cases, national courts tend
not to apply the exclusionary rule. The Schutznorm theory can, for example,
be found in the Netherlands (relativiteitstheorie)292 and the United States
(‘standing’); one of the requirements of the application of the American
exclusionary rule is that the violated norm must be directed at the suspect.293
More or less the same regimen is followed in Germany (Rechtskreise
theory).294
The second factor is the causal link between the unlawfulness of the
investigative activities and the resulting evidence. In other words, if the
availability of certain evidence is not directly related to the unlawful
methods that were used to obtain it, this can be a reason not to exclude the
evidence. The causality between the illegality of obtainment and the
evidence obtained is a factor common to practice in the United States,295
Belgium,296 and the Netherlands.297
The third element concerns the reliability of the challenged evidence as
well as the available verification options.298 If the unlawfulness impairs the
reliability of the evidence, this can be a reason for exclusion. This aspect
plays a role in Belgium (the unlawfulness must not affect the reliability of
the evidence),299 the United States,300 and the United Kingdom
(unlawfulness and unreliability of the evidence are considered to threaten
291 However, the violation of other rights, (such as Art. 3 ECHR (Freedom of Torture and
Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment)) may also be taken into account (ECtHR 11
July 2007, App. No. 54810/00 (Jalloh v. Germany)).
292 Baaijens 2004, p. 348; and Embregts 2003, pp. 124ff.
293 Baaijens 2004, p. 365; and Embregts 2003, pp. 124ff.
294 Baaijens 2004, p. 373; and Embregts 2003, pp. 129 131.
295 Taslitz, Paris & Herbert 2007, pp. 564ff.
296 Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 1114.
297 See also Embregts 2003, pp. 132ff.
298 Unreliable evidence may also simply be ignored by the court, regardless of how it was
obtained.
299 Belgium Court of Cassation (Hof van Cassatie), no. P.03.0762.N/1. On the functioning of
the Belgian exclusionary rule, see also Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 1119 and 1121.
300 Taslitz, Paris & Herbert 2007, pp. 576ff.
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the fairness of the proced
The fourth element concerns the question whether the unlawfulness is
caused by an excusable error of the criminal justice authorities. If so, this is
an incentive not to exclude the contested evidence. This factor is common to
the Netherlands,302 the United Kingdom (‘good faith’),303 and the United
States (‘good faith exception’).304
4.4 Characteristics of Civil Law
4.4.1 Introduction: Active Parties and Right to a Fair Hearing
The main object of civil law is to establish the rights and obligations of
parties in civil lawsuits (based on the submitted claims and counterclaims)
by examining the arguments and information presented. The initiative to
take a matter to court is left to the parties. They have an active role during
the proceedings and are responsible for determining the object of litigation.
They must also additionally produce the evidence that is necessary to
substantiate their claims. Litigation is started by the plaintiff, who submits
his or her legal claim to the court. The plaintiff’s opponent may
subsequently state additional facts and thus extend the focus of the
proceedings. The information that is put forward by the parties constitutes
the extent of the proceedings. Within this framework, the parties are obliged
to disclose the necessary information completely and truthfully.
The parties to a civil action are initially considered equal. They both have
similar opportunities to argue their case and they can exercise similar rights.
From this it follows that the parties can generally decide to end a procedure
by mutual consent. Furthermore, it implies that the court refrain from ruling
on matters that do not concern submitted claim(s) and that it not extend the
original claim(s) by adding facts or circumstances. In addition, the court
must accept facts that are not challenged by the parties. In other words, the
court has little influence on the substantive focus and extent of the
proceedings; its main role concerns the course of the proceedings.
The court charges the parties with the burden of proof based on their
claims. Generally, the claiming party has to produce the corresponding
evidence. If no proper offer to furnish proof is made, the court can order a
party to advance evidence. Furthermore, in some cases the court is entitled
to investigate the case brought before it of its own accord. These
investigation methods can include an on the spot inspection and a request
301 Baaijens 2004, p. 375 and references there.
302 HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376; and HR 19 June 2001, NJ 2001, 574.
303 Seabrooke & Sprack 1999, pp. 143ff.
304 Regarding the United States, see Taslitz, Paris & Herbert 2007, pp. 576ff.; and Embregts
2003, pp. 149ff.
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for an expert opinion. Other evidence that is used in civil proceedings
consists largely of documents and testimonies. Testimonial evidence can be
offered by witnesses that have been summoned by the parties, but can also
include statements that are made by the parties themselves.305
To protect the rights and the interests of the parties involved, lawsuits and
the evidence collection process must meet certain procedural standards that
follow from the fair hearing concept codified in Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14
ICCPR. These provisions regulate the investigation into the facts and
circumstances of a case. Art. 6 ECHR applies to anyone who is subject to ‘the
determination of his civil rights and obligations’.306 Art. 14 ICCPR speaks of
‘the determination […] of his rights and obligations in a suit at law’.307 The
applicability of the fair hearing requirement thus requires a ‘determination’;
there must be a connection between the dispute to be resolved and a civil
right or obligation.308
To answer the question whether civil rights and obligations are involved,
the object and purpose of both the ECHR and law of the state concerned
must be taken into account.309 According to the ECtHR, the term ‘right’
applies if the claim can be said, at least ‘on arguable grounds’, to be
recognised under domestic law.310 Consequently, a civil right may well be
considered to exist even if the Court is not convinced that this right is well
founded under domestic law.311 However, this is different if a domestic
court has ruled that a right does not exist under national law; in such cases,
the ECtHR cannot overrule this decision by considering Art. 6 ECHR
applicable.312 The issue of the applicability of the term ‘obligation’ has so far
not caused problems that needed to be dealt by the Court.313
For Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR to be applicable, the right or
obligation concerned needs to be of a civil nature. The main determent is
305 Currently, most Western countries allow parties to give testimony. For example, see
C.H. van Rhee (ed.), European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia
2005, p. 189. For a further explanation of the position of party witnesses, see Chapter
Eight.
306 Art. 6, para. 1 ECHR.
307 Art. 14, para. 1 ICCPR. In the ACHR, the right to a fair trial is laid down in Article 8: ‘the
determination of his [every person’s – RvS] rights and obligations of a civil […] nature’.
308 On the term ‘determination’, see in more detail Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 521 524
and references there.
309 ECtHR 28 June 1978, App. No. 6232/73, paras. 88 89 (König v. Germany). In addition, see
Jacobs & White 1996, pp. 128ff.
310 For example, see ECtHR 21 February 1986, App. No. 8793/79, para. 81 (James and others v.
the United Kingdom); and, more recently, the judgement of 10 May 2001, App. No.
29392/95, para. 87 (Z. and others v. the United Kingdom).
311 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 517 and references there.
312 ECtHR 10 May 2001, App. No. 29392/95 (Z. and others v. the United Kingdom); and ECtHR
28 June 2001, App. No. 45424/99, para. 27 (Truhli v. Croatia). On the relationship between
national recognition of a ‘right’ and the view of the European Court, see Van Dijk et al.
(eds.) 2006, pp. 518 519 and references there.
313 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 519.
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‘the substantive content and effects’ of the right, rather than its legal
classification.314 As a result, domestic civil law rights,315 public law rights,
and rights that concern a conflict between a public authority and an
individual can be qualified as such.316 The phrase ‘civil rights an obligations’
can thus be considered to apply to a large variety of proceedings.317
As the fair hearing requirement applies to civil law, various rights that
follow from it also apply in civil cases. Examples include the right to
adversarial proceedings and the right to an oral hearing. A violation of these
rights implies an infringement of the fairness of the proceedings concerned.
In addition, the fairness of a civil action may also be violated if a criminal
law requirement is infringed, for example, the right to legal aid.318 However,
since rights such as this one have not been included in the human rights
treaties regarding civil law, the ECtHR has ruled that national authorities
have greater latitude in this respect when dealing with civil cases.319
The rights that follow from the right to a fair hearing govern the taking of
evidence and the subsequent furnishing of this evidence in court. They
regulate the use of information that may be relevant to the parties in civil
proceedings, including mediation information. As far as relevant to this
research, the fair hearing principle will be discussed below. The various
requirements will again be discussed in order of appearance in the human
rights treaties. The standards that have been developed in case law will be
dealt with in the section on the right to a fair hearing (Section 4.4.2).
Additionally, three exceptions to the use of information in civil law will be
examined, since the reasons for their applicability may be relevant to the
admissibility of information from a mediation.
4.4.2 Right to a Fair Hearing
The meaning of the notion of a fair hearing, as it has been discussed in
Section 4.3.2 pertaining to criminal law, also applies here. The fairness of a
civil action again depends on how the proceedings as a whole have been
conducted. The applicable written standards are included in Art. 6, para. 1
314 ECtHR 28 June 1978, App. No. 6232/73, para. 89 (König v. Germany).
315 ECtHR 28 November 1984, App. No. 8777/79, para. 32 (Rasmussen v. Denmark).
316 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 524 525.
317 For an extensive list and corresponding case law, see Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 528.
For the discussion about procedures that cannot be categorised under the fair trial
concept, see Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 528 535.
318 For example, see the ECtHR judgement of 9 October 1979, App. No. 6289/73, paras. 24
26 (Airey v. Ireland), regarding the right to legal aid in civil proceedings.
319 ECtHR 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88, paras. 32 33 (Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the
Netherlands); ECtHR 9 March 2004, App. No. 30508/96, para. 59 (Pitkänen v. Finland); and
Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 579 and 631.
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ECHR and Art. 14, para. 1 ICCPR.320 Furthermore, an infringement of one of
the rights concerning criminal law may, under certain circumstances, also
constitute a violation of the fair hearing requirement in civil context.321 In
addition, the fair hearing requirements that have been developed in case law
also apply to civil proceedings. The unwritten standards that are relevant to
this research will be discussed below.
4.4.2.1 Right to Adversarial Proceedings
In civil law, the right to adversarial proceedings applies at two levels. In the
first place, each party has the right to be acknowledged by the court and to
present its case. This implies that the parties have equal opportunities to
furnish evidence. Secondly, parties must be allowed to react to each other’s
assertions and claims, including oppositional evidence.322
The adversarial principle is an important element of civil law. It
safeguards the active role of the parties during civil proceedings, and creates
the parameters of debate on equal footing. The autonomous position323 of
the parties in a civil lawsuit also allows them to renounce their right to
advance evidence. Such a waiver can, for example, be the free and voluntary
consent of the litigating parties to participate in victim offender mediation.
This would prevent a party from challenging the fairness of a civil action –
mediation confidentiality confines the freedom to furnish evidence.324
Art. 6, para. 3, under d ECHR and Art. 14, para. 3, under e ICCPR state
that accused have the right to examine and cross examine witnesses and to
call witnesses on their behalf.325 Under certain circumstances, this standard
also applies to civil law.326 In principle, parties in civil lawsuits have similar
opportunities to summon witnesses and to request an expert opinion.327
Consequently, these issues may also play a role in assessing the fairness of a
civil action.328 According to the ECtHR, the parties in litigation must have an
320 And in Art. 8, para. 1 ACHR.
321 Further, see Section 4.4.1 and references there.
322 In addition, see the ECtHR judgement of 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88, para. 33
(Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands). This aspect of the right to adversarial proceedings
is also referred to as the right to ‘equality of arms’ (Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 580; and
Jacobs & White 1996, pp. 124 125). Further, see the ECtHR judgements of 22 September
1994, App. No. 13616/88, para. 56 (Hentrich v. France); and 9 December 1994, App. No.
13427/87, para. 46 (Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece).
323 On the autonomy of civil parties, see also W.D.H. Asser et al., Een nieuwe balans, The
Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003, pp. 65ff.; and W.D.H. Asser et al.,
Uitgebalanceerd, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, pp. 49 51.
324 Regarding the waiving of a right, see also Section 4.3.3.
325 See Art. 8, para. 2, under 6 ACHR.
326 See also Section 4.4.1.
327 For example, see the ECtHR’s judgement of 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88, paras.
33 35 (Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands). The Ankerl case (judgement of 23 October
1996, App. No. 17748/91, para. 38 (Ankerl v. Switzerland)) dealt with inequality as the
result of a witness having been granted a relational privilege (on this topic in a civil
context, see Section 4.4.4.1).
328 ECtHR 9 March 2004, App. No. 30508/96, paras. 59 65 (Pitkänen v. Finland).
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effective or real opportunity to react to the evidence that is furnished in the
course of the proceedings.329
In conclusion, the right to adversarial proceedings must be observed when
information from a mediation is used in court and may, as a result, influence
the admissibility of that information. For that reason, the litigating parties
must be able to respond to the submitted evidence, also if mediation
information is concerned.
4.4.2.2 Right to an Oral Hearing
The parties in litigation have the right to an oral hearing. Although civil
proceedings are in many jurisdictions mainly conducted in writing, this
right implies that the parties are entitled to be present at the actual hearing
of their case and to be heard.330 In the Helmers case, the ECtHR has ruled that
the seriousness of what is at stake for the applicant must be taken into
account when assessing an alleged violation of this right.331
During the hearing of a case, the parties in civil proceedings must be
allowed to argue their case. In addition, most jurisdictions allow the
possibility for parties to appear as witnesses,332 so they can provide the
information they feel is necessary to substantiate their claims.333 If
information from a mediation is open to disclosure, the parties can, for
example, furnish such information when appearing as party witnesses.
4.4.3 Right to a Public Hearing
Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR both state that – in addition to being fair – a
hearing has to be public. The proceedings themselves and the
pronouncement of the judgement must be publicly accessible. Escape clauses
provide for exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, the parties in litigation can
waive their right to a public hearing,334 for instance, through the voluntary
and informed nature of the parties’ participation in victim offender
mediation.
329 Judgement of 9 March 2004, App. No. 21497/93, paras. 35 36 (Mantovanelli v. France).
330 On the right to an oral hearing, see also the ECtHR judgement of 25 November 1997,
App. No. 18928/91, paras. 21 22 (Fredin v. Sweden, no. 2). In this case, the Court linked
the right to an oral hearing to the right to a public hearing. In addition, see ECtHR 26
April 1995, App. No. 16922/90, para. 44 (Fischer v. Austria). In this judgement, the Court
posed the question whether the beneficiary of the right to a public hearing had explicitly
waived his right. The importance of the proceedings for the beneficiary was mentioned
as a factor to be taken into account in assessing the violation of the right to an oral
hearing.
331 ECtHR 29 October 1991, App. No. 11826/85, paras. 36 39 (Helmers v. Sweden). See also,
for example, ECtHR App. No. 18928/91, para. 22 (Fredin v. Sweden, no. 2); and ECtHR 12
July 2001, App. No. 33071/96, para. 60 (Malhous v. the Czech Republic).
332 The position of the party witness will be discussed in Section 4.4.4.2 and Chapter Eight.
333 In addition, see Jacobs & White 1996, p. 126.
334 ECtHR 21 February 1990, App. No. 11855/85, para. 66 (Håkansson and Sturesson v.
Sweden).
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The right to a public hearing in civil cases is also inspired by the required
transparency, verifiability and accuracy of information about the
administration of justice. Transparency and publicity will understandably
contribute to the observance of the law. Naturally, the parties involved in
civil litigation must be protected against arbitrariness, and their claims must
be assessed properly. Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions, civil proceedings
are mainly conducted in writing. For obvious reasons, public access to such
proceedings does not apply. In addition, in civil litigation the parties
themselves are primarily responsible for submitting their claims and
furnishing the necessary evidence. They are not subjected to the discretion of
the state personified by the public prosecutor, as they would be in criminal
proceedings. As a result, the transparency and verifiability of the
administration of justice are of minor importance in this context.
Nevertheless, information that is disclosed during a civil hearing is public.
This must be taken into account when assessing the admissibility of
information from a victim offender mediation.
4.4.4 Three Exceptions to the Use and Admissibility of Information in
Court
The determination of the subject matter of civil proceedings is primarily left
to the litigating parties. They are responsible for submitting claims and for
furnishing evidence. They have many information sources at their disposal,
but the use of information as evidence can be restricted in order to avoid a
violation of the right to a fair hearing or other rights that have been
incorporated in the human rights treaties. In the civil law context, three
exceptions can be distinguished. They show how civil law deals with the
admissibility and exclusion of information and what the reasons for this
approach are. The three exceptions are the privilege to refuse to testify, the
limited conclusive force of party witnesses’ statements, and the exclusionary
rule.
4.4.4.1 Privilege to Refuse to Testify
As in criminal trials, witnesses that are summoned to appear in civil lawsuits
are generally obliged by law to give testimony.335 Only if they have been
awarded a privilege to refuse to testify can they refrain from making a
statement. In such cases, the interest of taking testimonial evidence is
considered subordinate to the interests of secrecy. In that respect, the
privilege constitutes an exception to the use of relevant information in the
course of civil proceedings.
As in criminal law, so in civil law; the privilege is awarded based on
relational or on professional grounds. In the first place, relatives and (ex )
335 Further, see Chapter Eight.
CHAPTER 4 – THE FEATURES OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, CRIMINAL LAW AND CIVIL LAW
83
                                                 
partners of the parties can refuse to give testimony. The relatives that fall
into this category may vary between countries, due to differences in
domestic family law.336 Secondly, the privilege will be awarded if making a
statement implies that witnesses would incriminate themselves or any of the
people that the relational privilege applies to. The privilege can also be
granted to the litigating parties if they appear as party witnesses. Their
position as witnesses during civil proceedings will be discussed in Section
4.4.4.2.
The third category is that of the professional privilege. In civil law, this
privilege is largely awarded to the same professionals as in criminal law – it
is related to certain features of their task.337 As a result, lawyers, doctors,
clergymen, and civil law notaries are traditionally entitled to refuse to give
testimony.338 The services they offer are considered so important that their
approachability and reliability must be secured by enabling them to
maintain secrecy.339 The ‘traditional four’ are generally recognised in the
civil context, although jurisdictions differ in securing their privilege in
legislation; some have opted for an open norm, while others have included
an exhaustive list.340 Other professionals have also been granted a privilege
that enables them to refrain from testifying in civil court. Case law criteria
that have been discussed in the context of criminal law also apply here. The
following criteria are therefore involved in assessing whether or not to grant
a professional privilege: secrecy pledges,341 mandatory legal qualifications
and sector specific disciplinary law, the homogeneous nature of a
professional’s group of ‘clients’, a legal duty for the public to make use of a
professional’s services, and the homogeneous nature of a professional’s
duties.342
The mediator is one of the professionals whose ability to refuse to make a
statement has been examined. Mediation can be used as a means to resolve
civil disputes. The depositional position of the mediator has been regulated
in a few jurisdictions. It exceeds most regulations of the mediator’s position
in criminal law, because civil mediation is used more regularly and is thus
further elaborated. As a result, the mediator in civil cases has been granted a
privilege in a number of countries, which have included the mediator’s
privilege in legislation.343 Some examples will be discussed below.
336 See also Fernhout 2004, pp. 330 331.
337 Fernhout 2004, pp. 166ff.
338 See Section 4.3.5.2. See also Fernhout 2004, pp. 199 207; and M. Pel & M.A. Vogel (eds.),
Mediation en vertrouwelijkheid, The Hague: SDU Uitgevers 2004, pp. 37 38 and 68 71.
339 Further, see Section 4.3.5.2 and Fernhout 2004, pp. 190 191.
340 For an overview of the situation in West European countries, see Fernhout 2004, pp.
332ff.
341 Although this does not automatically imply that a privilege to refuse to testify is
awarded.
342 See also Pel & Vogel 2004, p. 37.
343 See also Fernhout 2004, pp. 240 241 and 327.
PART TWO – RESERACH FRAMEWORK
84
                                                 
Article 1728 of the Belgian Judicial Code (Gerechtelijk Wetboek, GW) states
that the parties in mediation are not allowed to summon their mediator as a
witness. If mediators contravene this rule, they can be imprisoned or
fined.344 Article 131 14 of the French Code of Civil Procedure (Code de
procédure civile, CPC) excludes ‘findings of the mediator and the declarations
he has taken down’345 from being used in any proceedings. A similar
provision can be found in Article 320, paragraph 4 of the Austrian Code of
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO). Norway has included the
mediator in its list of professionals that are granted the privilege; Article 205
of the Norwegian Code of Civil Procedure (Tvistemålsloven) lists the
mediator in divorce matters next to priests, lawyers, and doctors. In the
United States, a privilege for the mediator has been incorporated in Article 4,
paragraph b.2 of the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA),346 which puts forward
guidelines that federal States should incorporate in their legislation. The
mediator’s privilege is consequently recognised in various state laws. The
UMA states that mediators are entitled to refuse to disclose ‘mediation
communication’, and may also ‘prevent any other person from disclosing a
mediation communication of the mediator’. The UMA provision, however, is
not absolute; mediators may renounce their privilege if both the mediator
and the parties unambiguously agree to this. In case law, this rule has been
relaxed to the extent that the mediator can be heard if both parties explicitly
so request, even if the mediator has not consented to appear as a witness.347
The main reason why these countries award the mediator a privilege is
related to the importance of keeping the mediation’s proceedings
confidential. In civil mediation, the parties often have similar interests in
maintaining secrecy, because they initially operate on equal terms. They may
both want to prevent the disclosure of personal or business sensitive
information. For these reasons, and as the examples given above show,
mediators in civil cases may refuse to testify, even when they do not meet
the case law criteria. Nevertheless, some jurisdictions do not grant a
privilege to civil mediators, because they do not comply with these
requirements. For example, in the Netherlands, mediators are not entitled to
refrain from giving testimony because they are not subject to mandatory
344 Art. 1728, para. 1 GW in conjunction with Article 458 of the Belgian Criminal Code
(Wetboek van Strafrecht, WvSr). According to Art. 1728, para. 2 GW, the same regime
applies to an expert whose opinion is requested in the course of the mediation.
345 The official French text reads: ‘Les constatations du médiateur et les déclarations qu il
recueille […]’.
346 Please note that Art. 4, para. b.3 even extends the privilege to ‘mediation
communication’ of ‘non party participant[s – RvS]’.
347 For example, see Olam v. Congress Mortgage Company, 68 F. Supp. 2d. 1110 (1999). In
literature, this decision has given rise to discussion; see for example W.B Leah & K.E
Rubin, ‘Keeping the ‘R’ in ADR: How Olam Treats Confidentiality’, 1999, through
<http://www.mediate.com/articles/cprolam.cfm>; and R.C. Reuben, ‘Deconstructing
Confidentiality’, 2000, through <http://www.mediate.com/articles/reuben.cfm>.
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legal qualifications.348
A privilege can be relinquished under certain circumstances. In civil law,
these situations are similar to those of criminal law. A professional privilege
can be waived to prevent serious harm or injustice, because of legal
provisions, or when the client consents to the disclosure of information.349
The decision to make a statement, and thus to renounce a privilege, must be
made by the professional.
4.4.4.2 Party Witnesses
Parties in civil proceedings can furnish evidence by hearing witnesses.
Generally, summoned witnesses can only refrain from making a statement if
they can invoke a privilege to refuse to testify. A special situation occurs
when one of the parties gives testimony. In such instances, the parties can
either make statements to substantiate their own claims, or furnish refuting
evidence. They may appear as witnesses of their own volition, but they can
also be summoned by the other party. Such oral evidence can conceivably be
used to introduce information from a victim offender mediation in court,
since the parties (and the mediator) are often the only ones that were present
at mediation sessions.
The procedural step of parties appearing as a witness is a factor common
to most Western jurisdictions,350 made possible by the Dombo judgement of
the ECtHR.351 In this judgement, the Court has stated that ‘each party must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his
evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial
disadvantage vis à vis his opponent’.352 The Court held that one of the
parties had been substantially disadvantaged, because it had not been
allowed to make a statement due to its position as a party to the proceedings
(Dutch legislation did not at the time allow litigants to testify). Considering
that both parties had acted on an equal footing during the negotiations that
preceded the civil procedure, the Court established a violation of Art. 6
ECHR,353 thereby accepting the right of parties to testify.354
348 Parliamentary Papers (Kamerstukken) II 2001/02, 26352, no. 60. The Dutch government also
notes that the absence of a professional privilege for mediators has thus far not raised
serious issues (pp. 2 3). However, this point of view does not alter the fact that
mediation organisations persist in calling for a privilege for mediators. See also
Fernhout 2004, pp. 240 241; and Pel & Vogel 2004, pp. 38 39 and 88 90.
349 Please note the qualifications made in Section 4.3.5.2 and the Olam case in the United
States described above.
350 Van Rhee (ed.) 2005, p. 189.
351 ECtHR 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88 (Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands).
352 Ibid., para. 33.
353 Ibid., para. 35.
354 The European Court nevertheless expresses in para. 31 that ‘it is not called upon to rule
in general whether it is permissible to exclude the evidence of a person in civil
proceedings to which he is a party’. The procedural unfairness was caused by the
inequality between the parties in producing evidence. This could have been different if
the party in question had had other opportunities to make a statement during the civil
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Chapter Eight will discuss the possibility of party witnesses in more detail.
Here, the restrictions that are imposed on such statements will be looked at,
because such restrictions limit the use of potentially relevant information
during civil proceedings. Two limitations are common to most
jurisdictions.355 In the first place, the conclusive force of party witnesses
statements is restricted; it functions primarily as a subsidiary means of
evidence that must be supported by other proof.356 Secondly, the party being
heard as a witness in its own case cannot invoke a relational privilege.
Procedural inequality of arms might ensue if family members that are
parties in civil litigation could invoke the relational privilege, while non
family parties would remain subject to the general rules applying to
witnesses (which means that they would in principle be obliged to give
testimony).357 The privilege regarding the right against self incrimination
and the professional privilege remain in full force in the case of party
witnesses.358
These restrictions on the statements of party witnesses – especially
concerning the limited conclusive force of such statements – affect the
possibilities of the parties to take evidence in civil proceedings. Considering
that the parties (and the mediator) are generally the only ones that can
disclose information from a mediation, this is a factor to be taken into
account when assessing the admissibility of such information.
4.4.4.3 Exclusionary Rule
The parties in litigation can use all sorts of evidence to substantiate their
claims. Gathering and using such evidence is bound by rules to prevent a
violation of the notion of a fair hearing. A violation of these rules may cause
an infringement of the fair hearing requirements, and the evidence under
discussion can be excluded by the court.359 The exclusionary rule is the third
exception to the use of information in civil action, since it prevents the use of
unlawfully obtained evidence in court. As has been mentioned regarding
criminal law, this may have implications for the admissibility of mediation
information in court, if breaching the confidentiality rule would cause this
information to be obtained unlawfully.
proceedings. Whether a ban on party witnesses violates the right to a fair trial must
therefore be assessed in the light of the applicable domestic law. See also M. de Tombe
Groothuis, ‘Het Europese Hof en de partijgetuige’, Nederlands Juristenblad 1994 6, pp.
185 188.
355 See also W. Hugenholtz & W.H. Heemskerk, Hoofdlijnen van Nederlands Burgerlijk
Procesrecht, The Hague: Elsevier juridisch 2006, pp. 91 92.
356 This may, however, be different if the subsidiary nature of the party statement causes an
infringement of the equality of arms principle. See the Dombo judgement of the ECtHR
of 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88 (Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands); and Van
Rhee (ed.) 2005, p. 251.
357 See also Fernhout 2004, pp. 127ff.
358 See further Section 4.4.4.1.
359 Murphy 2005, pp. 55 57; and Embregts 2003, p. 237. Reducing the sentence and
dismissing the case naturally do not apply to civil law.
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The decision to exclude certain evidence is left to the discretion of the civil
court. If the court decides that exclusion is called for, it must formally
disregard the evidence concerned.360 As is the case in criminal law, applying
the exclusionary rule aims at repairing the harm that has been caused by
unlawfully obtaining the evidence concerned. In addition, the exclusion of
evidence in criminal proceedings demonstrates to the public that the
government is bound by its own rules. The reason for this is that the proof in
criminal cases will have been gathered by the criminal justice authorities,
whereas in civil cases, the parties themselves are responsible for taking
evidence.
The main shortcomings of the exclusionary rule in civil law pertain to the
limiting effect it may have on the parties’ possibilities to substantiate their
claims, and the risk that the court’s deliberations may be influenced by the
excluded evidence, although it formally disregarded.361 Furthermore, the
autonomous position of the parties during litigation may be affected by the
‘patronising’ decision of the court to exclude the evidence concerned.362
The remarks that have been made in Section 4.3.5.3 about the guidance
offered by the ECtHR also apply here.363
The assessment of grounds for the exclusion of unlawfully obtained
evidence largely depends on a judicial balancing of interests. Apart from the
overall fairness of the proceedings, grounds for applying the exclusionary
rule are hard to deduce, due to the differences in legal systems.
Nevertheless, a few general criteria can be distinguished. On the whole, they
resemble those that have been mentioned pertaining to criminal law, and
their importance also follows from the fact that they entail incentives not to
submit certain information in court.
The first criterion is the question to whom the allegedly violated norm
applies – is it directed at one of the parties, or at a third person that is
involved in the proceedings in a non party capacity? In such situations, the
evidence concerned may be admissible, depending on the gravity of the
violation. This criterion is used in the Netherlands, where unlawfully
obtained evidence that has infringed a norm that is directed at a third person
is generally admissible (but the gravity of the violation must be taken into
consideration).364 In the United States, unlawfully obtained evidence is, as a
rule, admissible if the unlawfulness is directed at a third person.365
Another issue concerns the causal relationship between the unlawfulness
and the resulting evidence. Civil law courts do not easily apply the
360 See also Section 4.3.5.3.
361 On these matters, see also Embregts 2003, pp. 241 242.
362 However, this does not exclude that the position of the parties might be unequal in
practice, for example, if a private person opposes a multinational.
363 For more on the meaning of the notion of a fair trial in relation with the exclusionary
rule in a civil law context, see Murphy 2005, pp. 52 53; and Embregts 2003, pp. 243 244.
364 Embregts 2003, pp. 246ff.
365 Taslitz, Paris & Herbert 2007, pp. 604ff.
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exclusionary rule to issues of this kind, but when no connection can be
established, the evidence is allowed.366
Other factors that play a role in the assessment of the admissibility of
unlawfully obtained evidence include the seriousness of the unlawfulness,
and the question whether the evidence could also have been obtained in a
lawful manner. These criteria are used in, for example, the Netherlands and
Germany.367
4.5 Conclusion
Using victim offender mediation to deal with crime means that this process
interacts with the criminal and civil law systems. For a proper assessment of
the confidentiality issues identified in Chapter Three, the main features of
these systems, and of victim offender mediation, must be taken into
consideration. These features constitute the boundaries of this assessment,
since their essential nature dictates that they should be observed under all
circumstances. The main focus in this chapter has been on how these
systems deal with information – the rules on gathering and furnishing
evidence, and the restrictions on the use of such evidence. Consequently, the
research framework consists of three pillars.
The first comprises the essentials of victim offender mediation: the
acknowledgement of basic facts, the voluntary consent to participate, and
the parties’ right to information. A violation of these requirements would
subvert the mediation procedure, and for that reason they should be
complied with.
The second pillar is formed by the fundamental features of criminal law. A
primary observation is that criminal law attaches great importance to the
fact finding process. It facilitates the clarification of the actual course of
events and the relevant characteristics of the suspect(s) and/or the accused.
Both aspects are taken into account in criminal proceedings in order to
respond in a manner befitting both the crime and the alleged offender. To
protect the rights of the accused and secure the fairness of the proceedings,
the right to a fair trial has to be complied with in the course of the criminal
administration of justice. From the right to a fair trial, other essentials of
criminal law can be deduced: the right to adversarial proceedings, the right
to an oral hearing, the right against self incrimination, the right to a public
hearing, and the presumption of innocence. These rights should be
honoured in order to secure the potential use of mediation information in
criminal court. The final element of the criminal pillar consists of three
significant limitations on the fact finding process; the restricted use of
coercive powers, the privilege to refuse to testify, and the exclusionary rule.
366 Embregts 2003, pp. 248 249.
367 Embregts 2003, pp. 253ff.
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The third pillar concerns civil law. An important feature of civil litigation
is the relatively active role of the litigating parties. It is up to them to
determine the object of litigation, and it is primarily their responsibility to
submit their claims and to furnish the evidence that is necessary to
substantiate these claims. Civil proceedings – including evidence rules – are
governed by the notion of a fair hearing and its derivatives. The relevant
elements are the right to adversarial proceedings, the right to an oral
hearing, and the right to a public hearing. The usability of mediation
information in the civil administration of justice depends on the observance
of these rights. The civil pillar also contains restrictions on the use of
information: the privilege to refuse to testify, the restricted conclusive force
of party witness statements, and the exclusionary rule.
The tenets identified will structure the remainder of this book, constituting
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5 Out of Court Disclosure to Third Parties
5.1 Introduction
The contents of a victim offender mediation can potentially be disclosed to
two categories of recipients; those that are in some way involved in the
judicial system, and those that are not. This chapter will discuss disclosure to
the latter category. Issues regarding the divulgence of mediation information
to first category parties will be examined in the following chapters.
Due to the focus of this chapter, the tenets of criminal and civil law
identified in Chapter Four do not apply here, since out of court disclosure
does not concern the admissibility of information in court. Therefore, the
observance of the fair hearing requirements is not relevant in this context
and consequently, only the first part of the research framework – the
fundamentals of victim offender mediation – will play a role here. Attention
will primarily be paid to the advantages and disadvantages of breaching
confidentiality for the mediation parties, and to how this affects the
mediation essentials discussed in the previous chapter. This way, the
possibilities of the mediation participants to talk to third parties about the
mediation will be examined. This approach implies a collective discussion of
the three modalities of victim offender mediation, considering that their
position vis à vis the criminal justice system is of little significance in this
context.
This chapter will first give an overview of the issue of out of court
disclosure and then discuss how the issue should be dealt in the context of
victim offender mediation.
5.2 Overview
The current wording of the principle of confidentiality seems to imply that it
also prohibits sharing mediation information with third parties outside
court.368 In Chapter 3.5.1, the reasons for observing secrecy of mediation
information were discussed. These also apply here. Respecting the
mediation’s confidential nature vis à vis the non legal environment
facilitates communication during the mediation, and thus contributes to a
successful conclusion of the procedure. Furthermore, the confidentiality rule
prevents the parties from questioning each other’s commitment to the
mediation process; wrongful disclosure can endanger the fragile relationship
between victims and offenders and reduce the willingness of the parties to
368 D. van Ness, ‘Proposed Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice’, in: A. von
Hirsch et al. (eds.), Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable
Paradigms?, Oxford: Hart 2003, p. 171.
CHAPTER 5 – OUT OF COURT DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES
93
                                                 
reach an agreement.
A second reason for observing confidentiality relates to the fact that
information from a mediation can be requested during subsequent legal
proceedings. In the forthcoming chapters, guidelines for the disclosure of
such information in court will be developed. If it were allowed to submit
mediation information in court, this information would largely concern
legally relevant issues. Out of court disclosure relates to other matters, such
as information about how the participants have experienced the mediation,
their satisfaction with the outcome, or their opinion of the other party. Out
of court disclosure may cause this kind of information to be made public –
for example, if it is disclosed to the media – while it is not open to disclosure
in court. Such disclosed information might create a particular image of the
case, despite the fact that the information concerned may be irrelevant to or
disallowed from the court proceedings.
Consequently, the victim and the offender that have participated in one of
the three types of victim offender mediation currently seem to be forbidden
to share their experiences with others, including their family and friends.
The same goes for the mediator, and for any (professional) supporters or
caregivers of the parties. Out of court recipients can also include the media,
and other parties that belong to the personal environment of the mediation
participants, such as employers, schools, sports clubs, insurance companies,
and government institutions. Information that has come up during a
mediation session could conceivably be of interest to these third parties. For
example, family and friends may want to offer support to the victim and the
offender, the media may want to publish a juicy story, and schools may be
interested in punishable behaviour of one of its students.
Although the ban on disclosure is based on the principle of confidentiality,
the current interpretation of this rule has drawbacks for mediation
participants. Talking about significant experiences increases the overall
wellbeing of the victim and the offender. Since the meeting with the other
party can be regarded as such an experience, the participants in mediation
may benefit from sharing their thoughts and feelings on the mediation
process with others. Social studies have demonstrated that self disclosure of
significant information improves both physical and psychological health. 369
Among other things, such disclosure is reported to have a positive effect on
369 J.W. Pennebaker, ‘Emotion, Disclosure, and Health: An Overview’, in: J.W Pennebaker
(ed.), Emotion, Disclosure, and Health, Washington DC: American Psychological
Association 1995, p. 8; and J.W. Pennebaker, ‘Putting Stress into Words: Health,
Linguistic, and Therapeutic Implications’, Behaviour Research and Therapy 1993 6, p. 539.
See also B. Rimé, G. Herbette & S. Corsini, ‘The Social Sharing of Emotion: Illusory and
Real Benefits of Talking about Emotional Experiences’, in: I. Niklí ek, L. Temoshok & A.
Vingerhoets (eds.), Emotional Expression and Health. Advances in Theory, Assessment and
Clinical Applications, Hove/New York: Brunner Routledge 2004, pp. 29 42, where it is
emphasised that sharing emotional experiences with others helps the person that shares
to ‘make future life possible and meaningful in spite of what happened’ (p. 40).
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the number of physician visits, reported physical symptoms, psychological
distress, and adaptive skills.370 Emotional expression and sharing are
assumed to stimulate emotional recovery.371 Especially self disclosure of
negative experiences to supportive significant others, such as
partner/spouse, family, and friends, is believed to have a positive effect on
the level of symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder;372 positive reactions
of confidants in the discloser’s immediate environment enhance the latter’s
potential to deal with the events that he or she has been exposed to.373
Sharing significant information with others has long proven to have a
positive effect on the health and wellbeing of individuals. This conceivably
also goes for the participants in mediation, especially for the victim and the
offender. During the mediation, the victim and the offender discuss the
crime that has happened and how it has affected them. They can discuss the
circumstances that have led to the crime, offenders can elaborate on their
motives, and victims can explain the consequences the crime has had for
them. Discussing these issues in face to face meetings may have a huge
impact on both parties. For victims, facing the perpetrator that has inflicted
pain or harm on them can be very confronting. Offenders may experience
similar feelings when encountering the person they have victimised or when
being confronted with the consequences of their acts. Victims and offenders
may feel isolated when they are subsequently unable to share their
mediation experiences with others.374 Victims may even suffer secondary
victimisation. Not allowing the victim and the offender to talk about a
mediation with their family and friends can have a negative impact on their
overall wellbeing.
Another drawback concerns the appeal of taking part in victim offender
mediation. For its success, penal mediation depends on voluntary
participation. The appeal of participation may be negatively affected by the
current prohibition on out of court disclosure; this may expose the
participants to feelings of frustration and loneliness due to the ban on self
disclosure. In addition, a negative impact on the parties’ wellbeing may
influence their dedication and willingness to contribute to the mediation
procedure. Since research seems to indicate that prohibiting self disclosure
370 M.A. Greenberg & S.J. Lepore, ‘Theoretical Mechanisms Involved in Disclosure. From
Inhibition to Self Regulation’, in: Niklí ek, Temoshok & Vingerhoets (eds.) 2004, pp. 43
44.
371 F.W. Winkel, ‘Peer Support Groups: Evaluating the Mere Contact/Mere Sharing Model
and Impairment Hypotheses’, International Perspectives in Victimology 2006 1, p. 102.
372 E.E. Bolton et al., ‘The Relationship Between Self Disclosure and Symptoms of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Peacekeepers Deployed to Somalia’, Journal of
Traumatic Stress 2003 3, pp. 208ff.
373 Bolton et al. 2003, p. 209.
374 This has also been pointed out by the European Forum for Victim Services in its
Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation (2004). The document
states that the victim and the offender should be enabled to discuss the process they
have been involved in with friends, relatives and other supporters.
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affects psychological health, doing so may hold victims and offenders back
from participating as fully as possible. So, even though mediation
confidentiality is an incentive for victims and offenders to participate,375 it
may also discourage them from engaging in mediation. The required level of
secrecy seems to be a crucial element in this respect; the confidentiality of
mediation information should not have a deterring effect on the parties’
willingness to participate, because it is either too strict or too relaxed.
Furthermore, the benefits of self disclosure correspond to the underlying
thought of victim offender mediation. Victim offender mediation focuses
partly on acknowledging the needs and feelings of both victims and
offenders to help them deal with the crime concerned and its aftermath. Self
disclosure serves the same goal, since it enhances the coping skills of the
persons concerned. Prohibiting victims and offenders to share their
experiences may therefore be counterproductive and undermine one of the
objects of victim offender mediation. These potential consequences of the
currently advocated ban on disclosure to out of court third parties speak in
favour of reconsidering the required level of confidentiality.
An additional point is that in practice it is hard to enforce the observance of
the principle of confidentiality regarding out of court disclosure. It is
impossible to monitor all communication of the mediation participants,
especially where their private lives are concerned. For the same reason, it is
hard to assess the scope of the problems that may arise. Trying to force the
participants to observe confidentiality vis à vis out of court recipients might
undermine the significance of the confidentiality rule. For that reason, this
chapter aims at developing guidelines to indicate the appropriate level of
confidentiality for out of court disclosure.
From the above it follows that, although victim offender mediation is
generally considered to benefit from a measure of confidentiality, the
observance of the resulting secrecy vis à vis the non legal environment of the
mediation participants may have ramifications that necessitate
reconsideration. What must therefore be contemplated is to what extent the
current interpretation of the principle of confidentiality is to be maintained.
5.3 The Permissibility of Out Of Court Disclosure
This section will discuss the advisability of allowing the mediation
participants to talk with others about their experiences.
The first category of recipients is that of the immediate environment of the
mediation participants, namely their family and friends. Above, a ban on
375 See Chapter 3.5.1.
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self disclosure denying the mediation participants the benefits that result
from sharing information with significant others was named as one of the
main disadvantages of the current interpretation of the confidentiality rule.
This holds especially true for the victim and the offender, who may both
experience their encounter during the mediation as an important and
unnerving event. Talking to their social environment about what has
happened during the session can improve their mental health and reduce
stress. Furthermore, it prevents feelings of loneliness that may arise because
the parties feel that they have to deal with their experiences alone.376
Additionally, self disclosure to the immediate environment may have a
positive effect on the willingness of victims and offenders to contribute to
the mediation. This corresponds to one of the objectives of mediation itself,
which partly aims at enabling victims and offenders to deal with the crime
that has happened and its aftermath. For these reasons, victims and
offenders should be allowed to share their experiences with their immediate
environment.377 The fact that this implies a breach of the confidential nature
of mediation is not sufficient justification for maintaining the current ban on
disclosure, since talking to family and friends generally presupposes a
private setting. The risk that the information that is discussed with these
third parties will be widely publicised can be considered negligible. When
one of the confidants does disclose the information that came to their
knowledge, this can be considered an unavoidable side effect; if the
mediation participants feel aggrieved by this, they may try to sue for breach
of privacy.
Victims and offenders may seek the support of non professional
caregivers during a mediation procedure, such as close friends or parents.
Since highly sensitive information can be discussed during a mediation,
such non professional supporters may also feel the need to talk about these
issues in their social environment. Nevertheless, their position in mediation
differs from that of the victim and the offender. Generally, non professional
caregivers will have willingly taken on the commitment to support one of
the parties during the mediation. This implies that they should refrain from
doing so if they expect not to be able to deal with the encounter and
discussions during the session. If non professional caregivers are unaware of
the consequences of providing assistance during victim offender mediation,
it is important that they too are adequately prepared for the session. Non
professional supporters will obviously be less involved in the crime than the
victim or the offender, and for these reasons their sharing needs cannot be
equated to those of the victim and the offender. Although it may be
376 N.E. Mahon, ‘The Relationship of Self Disclosure, Interpersonal Dependency, and Life
Changes to Loneliness in Young Adults’, Nursing Research 1982 6, p. 345. The findings of
this study support the idea that the process of disclosing oneself decreases the
likelihood of experiencing loneliness.
377 This point of view is also advocated by The European Forum for Victim Services in its
Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation (2004).
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disconcerting for non professional caregivers to, for example, participate in a
meeting with the perpetrator who has victimised someone close to them,
they should abstain from taking part in such meetings, rather than divulge
mediation information to others – they freely chose to participate and their
position is less vulnerable.378
The professionals that can attend mediation sessions are the mediator and
professional caregivers of the victim or the offender, such as a victim
services worker or a probation officer. Although they may learn shocking
information during the session, the professional nature of their involvement
implies that they must not discuss mediation information with others. Only
if it were to be considered in the interest of improving the quality of their
work, should professionals be allowed to talk about their mediation
experiences with, for example, their superior or a co worker. Sharing
mediation information for these reasons will generally not cause problems,
since the information will usually remain within the organisation the
professional caregiver is working for. For example, if victim services
workers discuss their experiences with their peers, the information
concerned must subsequently not be shared with parties outside the
organisation of victim support; according to various instruments, victims are
entitled to having the information they share with a victim services worker
remain confidential.379 This right to confidentiality does not address
individual professional caregivers, but their organisation. In addition,
professionals should not be allowed to disclose mediation information to
their social environment, even though disclosure can neither be ruled out,
nor can it be verified. They should be able to deal with the issues concerned,
since they can be considered part of their job. What adds to this is that some
professionals must observe secrecy due to the nature of their profession (e.g.,
mental health professionals or therapists that support the victim or the
offender during the session).
The above mentioned guidelines regarding self disclosure of the
mediation participants to their immediate environment are primarily
normative in nature, considering that it will be virtually impossible to
enforce them in practice. When the occasion arises, the injured party may
sue for libel or wrongful disclosure, and sector related disciplinary law may
apply if a professional caregiver breaks his pledge of secrecy; wrongful
378 The voluntary nature of the participation of the victim and the offender does not lead to
the same conclusion, because they will be more affected by the encounter with the other
party and thus have more pressing needs of self disclosure. Secondly, the ‘appeal’ of
taking part in victim offender mediation should not be endangered for these parties,
since mediation will not be possible without the participation of victims and offenders.
This is different where non professional supporters are concerned. The fact that they
mainly provide assistance to one of the parties implies that their commitment (possibly
enhanced by self disclosure) to the mediation is less important for its success.
379 E.g., The Statement of Victim’s Rights of Standards of Service of the European Forum for
Victim Services (1998); and The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime of the UK Home
Office (2004).
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disclosure in this context has not been criminalised otherwise. To safeguard
the observance of the guidelines mentioned above, it is important that the
extent of the confidentiality rule is adequately explained to all participants
before the start of a mediation.
The second category recipients are the media. Victim offender mediation
deals with crime. Therefore, the issues discussed, such as the circumstances
that have caused the offender to commit the crime, may be considered
newsworthy or even sensational. For these reasons, the media can be
interested in the information shared by the mediation participants during
the mediation sessions.
It is unlikely that the victim or the offender will tell their story to the
media because of the self disclosure benefits, which have been discussed
above. Disclosure to the immediate environment has proven to be primarily
beneficial in this respect. Individuals seeking psychological relief are
therefore more likely to turn to their family and friends. Disclosure to the
media will sooner be inspired by other motives, such as frustration or
vengefulness. Such grounds may, for example, result from an uncooperative
attitude of the offender during the mediation causing the process to be
terminated. The victim may then be tempted to blacken the offender’s
character by reporting the offender’s disruptive behaviour.
Disclosure for reasons such as revenge does not correspond to the main
goals of mediation, namely to reach an agreement that is based on the true
needs and feelings of the participants. The vital yet fragile relationship
between the victim and the offender will conceivably be damaged if one of
them shares mediation information with the media; allowing victims and
offenders to do so would most likely jeopardise the mediation concerned as
well as the reliability and appeal of victim offender mediation in general.
Furthermore, a ban on disclosure that is prompted by such motives will not
have similar drawbacks (such as secondary victimisation) for victims and
offenders as prohibiting disclosure to their immediate environment does.
Vengefulness is believed to have negative consequences for the overall
wellbeing of individuals, and has been found to be correlated to greater
rumination about an offence and lower life satisfaction.380 The interest of
victims or offenders (i.e., acting on vengeful feelings) in disclosing
information to the press therefore does not prevail over the significance of
observing mediation confidentiality. Consequently, making an exception to
the principle of confidentiality is neither necessary nor advisable in this
context.
Another reason to continue to observe the confidentiality rule pertains to
the risk that disclosure to the media infringes fundamental rights of the
380 M.E. McCullough et al., ‘Vengefulness: Relationships With Forgiveness, Rumination,
Wellbeing, and the Big Five’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2001 5, p. 601. In
this context, see also D.T. Miller, ‘Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice’, Annual
Review of Psychology 2001, pp. 542ff.
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mediation participants, such as the right to privacy and private life. What
should also be prevented is that information from a mediation is used to
foster a ‘trial by media’, especially when the mediation can or will be
followed by criminal proceedings (mediation modalities one and two,
respectively). Information that should be kept out of court due to the
guidelines to be developed in the following chapters must not become
available to the press.381
This also applies to the mediator and the professional and non
professional caregiver: they are not allowed to talk to the press about their
experiences in mediation. In addition, the issues mentioned above relating to
disclosure to family and friends by these participants also apply here.382
Violation of the directions concerning disclosure to the media is currently
not punishable. An infringement of basic rights of one of the participants can
nevertheless be challenged. Furthermore, some professionals may be subject
to sector related disciplinary law. Thoroughly informing the mediation
participants about the scope of confidentiality remains the most important
way of preventing problems.
The third category of recipients consists of a variety of institutions that are
part of the environment of the mediation participants, such as schools,
companies, churches, insurance companies, and sports clubs. Whether
disclosing mediation information to such institutions should be allowed
depends on the reason(s) for disclosure. When a victim divulges information
about the offender’s utterances regarding the crime to, for example, the
offender’s employer with the intention of discrediting the offender, sharing
information is likely to be inspired by negative emotions such as
vengefulness. A breach of confidentiality prompted by such sentiments
(similar to reasons discussed above regarding disclosure to the media)
should be rejected.
However, in some cases sharing information with institutions may benefit
the victim and the offender; among other things, it can enable the
institutions to properly deal with the victim and the offender in the future.
For example, when a victim, an offender, or both, are students, their
school(s) may have pedagogical reasons for requesting information about
the contents of a mediation. Such information may help the school to pay the
necessary attention to their students after the mediation has ended.
Furthermore, schools may play a role in the rehabilitation of the mediation
381 See also K. Lauwaert, Herstelrecht en procedurele waarborgen, Apeldoorn/Antwerp: Maklu
2008, p. 292; and J. Dignan et al., ‘Staging Restorative Justice Encounters against a
Criminal Justice Backdrop: A Dramaturgical Analysis’, Criminology and Criminal Justice
2007 1, pp. 20 and 23.
382 Although the contents of a mediation should not be discussed with the media, the
media may play a role in explaining a mediation programme to the general public, and
keeping it informed of new developments. See also United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes, New York: United Nations 2006, p.
79.
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participants, and can thus ease the continuation of their school life.
Potentially relevant information may include a cooperative attitude of the
offender, apologies from the offender, or even an admission from the victim
that he or she in some way contributed to the crime. Disclosing such issues
to the school would help rather than damage the offender. Other institutions
that are part of the social lives of the parties may have similar interests in
learning mediation information. If, for example, a member of a sports club
participated in a mediation with another member regarding a complaint of
assault, information about the proceedings of the mediation may enable the
sports club to vindicate the accused member, or to keep an extra eye on him
or her if necessary. For these reasons, sharing mediation information with
these recipients should not be prohibited in all cases.
Disclosure in these situations should first of all be possible if the victim
and the offender both recognise the benefits of disclosure, and agree to it.383
The victim and the offender may also include the disclosure of certain
information as a condition in the mediation agreement. The resulting
awareness of the informed institution may then function as a form of
reparation for the victim, and entail an extra guarantee that the offender will
not relapse. Secondly, offenders (or their parents) may deem it necessary to
discuss the mediation procedure with the institution concerned in order to
facilitate the offender’s participation in or membership of the institution.
Victims may also want to disclose certain information, for example, to
inform their insurance companies after they have been victimised in a traffic
accident; in the course of the investigation into who should be held
responsible and pay damages, the insurance company may request
mediation information. If only one of the parties is in favour of sharing
mediation information with others, it is initially up to this party to decide
whether to proceed with disclosure. If the other party (in the example above
concerning insurance companies, the offender) feels aggrieved by the
revelation of the mediation information concerned, he or she may sue the
party that disclosed these matters. The interests involved should then be
weighed carefully; offenders should not be discouraged from participating
in victim offender mediation, but under certain circumstances, other
interests may prevail, such as the insurance company’s financial interest in
determining who is responsible for an accident that has caused the victim to
be on extended leave.
The professional and non professional caregiver and the mediator should
in principle observe confidentiality. The reasons mentioned above
pertaining to these mediation participants also apply here. However, an
exception should be made when the victim and the offender agree that it
would be best if one of these participants informed the institutions of the
383 Disclosure of mediation information based on mutual agreement is always possible, as
also follows from the Council of Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic
Principles.
CHAPTER 5 – OUT OF COURT DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES
101
matters discussed above. For example, the victim can decide to disclose
certain information against the offender’s will, with the victim services
worker present during the mediation supporting this decision. The
professional and non professional caregiver concerned should then decide
whether to support the victim or not. Again, the offender may object by
going to civil court. Mediators should initially show reservation in such
situations, due to their impartial position vis à vis the parties.
Violation of confidentiality has not been criminalised for disclosure to
third category recipients. An injured party may again bring action to seek
compensation for wrongful disclosure, and sector related disciplinary law
may be applicable with regard to the professionals involved. Here too,
providing the mediation participants with the necessary information is of
great importance. In addition, the mediator should ensure that victims and
offenders are aware of the implications of disclosing certain information.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the first friction caused by the principle of
confidentiality as identified in Chapter 3.6, namely that of out of court
disclosure to third parties. The current interpretation of the confidentiality
rule seems to indicate that the participants in mediation should not reveal
anything that is said and done during a mediation. As a result, mediation
confidentiality also extends to the non legal environment of the mediation
participants. This, it is hoped, will prevent the readiness of the victim and
the offender to participate in mediation from dwindling. The same goes for
the free sharing of information during mediation sessions. Prohibiting
disclosure to out of court third parties also precludes the information
concerned from becoming known without good cause to the actors in a
subsequent legal action. The ban on disclosure to out of court recipients
implies that the participants in mediation must not talk about their
experiences with their immediate environment (family and friends), the
media, or institutions that they may participate or be involved in (schools,
sports clubs, employers, insurance companies, etc.). Despite the benefits of
this approach, it does have a number of drawbacks. Self disclosure of major
events – especially to the immediate environment – has been found to
improve psychological health and to reduce symptoms of stress. Apart from
diminishing the appeal of taking part in victim offender mediation and
undermining the parties’ willingness to cooperate, depriving the victim and
the offender of the opportunity to share their mediation experiences with
their family and friends may have the opposite effect.
For these reasons, the victim and the offender should be allowed to
discuss their mediation process with their family and friends. Non
professional caregivers should not be not allowed to do so, because of the
different nature of their involvement. The same goes for the mediator and
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the professional caregiver, because of their professional role.
The divulgence of mediation information to the media will in most cases
be inspired by negative emotions such as vengefulness. Acting on the desire
for revenge presumably serves neither the overall wellbeing of victims and
offenders, nor the mediation process. The mediator and the professional and
non professional caregiver should not be allowed to talk to the media about
mediation contents, because of the nature of their involvement and the
damage such disclosure may do to the mediation process.
Divulging information to other institutions based on feelings of
vengefulness should be prohibited for the same reasons. This goes for all
mediation participants. However, it is conceivable that the parties agree on
the disclosure of certain issues to such institutions, for example, if the
disclosure of information is deemed to be beneficial to the victim and the
offender, or if it is included as a condition in the mediation agreement. In
such cases, talking about the contents of a mediation should be allowed. A
party may also disclose information of his or her own volition if he or she
considers this necessary. The mediator and the professional and non
professional caregiver should nevertheless observe the principle of
confidentiality in these situations. This may be different if the parties agree
on disclosure and request the professional caregivers to disclose certain
information, or if professional caregivers feel that they should support
disclosure by their clients.
The observance of the guidelines that have been developed in this chapter
are hard to enforce in practice, especially since wrongful disclosure to these
categories of recipients currently does not constitute a criminal offence.
Where appropriate, injured parties may sue or challenge a violation of
fundamental rights. Furthermore, the compliance of certain professionals
with the observance of secrecy may be subject to sector related disciplinary
law. To prevent a violation of the principle of confidentiality and its
advocated extent vis à vis the non legal environment, it is essential that the
participants in mediation are sufficiently informed about the implications
and scope of the confidentiality rule.
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6 Offender Related Issues
6.1 Introduction
The frictions arising from the confidentiality rule to be discussed in this
chapter and the next concern the disclosure of mediation information in
court. These frictions prompt the question whether some information should
be open to disclosure in spite of the confidentiality rule, and, if so, whether
this information should be admissible as evidence during related legal
proceedings. The current chapter will deal with two of these frictions that
relate to the offender, namely offender behaviour that frustrates the success
of a mediation, and a confession made by the offender during mediation.
As the focus here is on the use of information in court, the essential
characteristics of criminal and civil law, identified in Chapter Four, will have
to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the moment of referral to
mediation influences the likelihood that a mediation is followed by a
criminal trial or civil litigation, and consequently raises the issue whether
information from a mediation can be used during such subsequent
proceedings. This logically affects the applicability of the essentials of
criminal and civil law. For that reason, the question whether an exception to
the principle of confidentiality is in order will be discussed for each of the
three modalities of victim offender mediation separately.
The first friction to be discussed concerns undermining behaviour of the
offender. Secondly, a confession made by the offender during mediation will
be addressed. Both sections will start with an overview of the issue
concerned. After that, the three mediation modalities will be examined. For
each topic, the main findings will be summarised at the end of each section.
6.2 Offender Behaviour Frustrating Mediation Success
6.2.1 Overview
To offer a favourable setting for the interaction between the victim and the
offender, victim offender mediation has to meet various requirements. The
main ones are the acknowledgement of the basic facts of a case by the victim
and the offender, and the voluntary and informed nature of their
participation. Mutual understanding about the main focus of the mediation
and a voluntary and conscious decision to participate are considered
preconditions for the success of mediation. Nevertheless, even when these
conditions are fulfilled, the dialogue between the victim and the offender
can still be disrupted by frustrating behaviour on either side. To enable the
parties to reach an agreement, such behaviour should be prevented as much
as possible. Nevertheless, if victims or offenders act in a way that reduces
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the chances of success, this may affect the appropriate level of confidentiality
that applies to such issues; it should then be questioned whether certain
mediation information should be open to disclosure, in spite of its
confidential nature. As the current chapter discusses the admissibility of
mediation information in court, the mediation information concerned is
mainly legally relevant information. As a result, not all mediation
information that causes a discontinuation of the process should, when
disclosed, be considered a breach of confidentiality. For example, if
offenders explain their reasons for committing the crime, and victims find
themselves unable to cope with these revelations, the latter should be able to
end the procedure without consequences. After all, if such a situation
automatically justified an exception to the principle of confidentiality, it
would be impossible for victims and offenders to freely withdraw from the
mediation at any time and to share any information with others. However, if
the parties behave or express themselves in a way that causes unnecessary
harm to the other party or the mediation process, disclosure of the
information concerned must be considered an option.
The most striking example of such behaviour concerns other crimes. In the
first place, offenders may talk about future crimes that they (or others) know
about, or that they intend to commit in the future. Secondly, the offender can
commit another crime against the same victim during mediation, for
example, by threatening the victim with violence. Both situations, but
especially the latter, may cause the victim to feel distressed and unsafe.
According to the current state of affairs, mediators are the only ones who
are allowed to divulge information concerning other crimes. Nevertheless,
their power to report crimes only extends to crimes that can be considered
‘imminent’ and ‘serious’.384 Due to the advocated strict interpretation of the
confidentiality rule, the other mediation participants are currently not
allowed to do so,385 and mediation information regarding crimes that cannot
be considered ‘serious’ must therefore remain secret. This not only concerns
other or future crimes that offenders know about, but also crimes that they
commit against victims during mediation.
Understandably, this situation can have drawbacks for the victim, who is
unable to put forward the information concerned during judicial
proceedings that follow a mediation.386 This may result in feelings of
384 Paragraph 30 of the Recommendation.
385 This point of view is not absolute, since they may also have a reporting competence or
duty based on domestic law.
386 Unless domestic law allows or obliges the victim to report such issues to the appropriate
authorities. Victims can also report a crime against them to the police. However, the
advocated interpretation of the principle of confidentiality seems to imply that
mediation information about other crimes cannot be adduced during judicial
proceedings that follow a mediation. If victims want to seek justice for a new crime an
offender committed during the mediation, they must institute a new action, and cannot
use this information in the proceedings that concern the crime the mediation focuses on.
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frustration, distress, and secondary victimisation,387 especially if the offender
commits another crime against the same victim.
Behaviour of the offender that is related to other crimes is the main focus of
this section, since it is the most striking example of behaviour that can
frustrate a mediation process and harm the victim. As such, it is an
indication to reconsider the appropriate level of confidentiality. The
information concerned should perhaps be allowed to be disclosed and to be
put to use during judicial proceedings that follow the mediation. Both
aspects will be discussed below. Other offender behaviour which may also
give cause for adjusting the scope of mediation confidentiality but which
does not constitute a crime will be discussed in Section 6.3 and Chapter
Seven.
6.2.2 Victim Offender Mediation as a Diversionary Measure
The first type of victim offender mediation to be discussed here concerns
victim offender mediation as a means of diverting cases from the criminal
justice system. In such cases, the mediation session functions as the primary
reaction to a crime. Consequently, diversionary victim offender mediation is
considered the most appropriate response to the types of crime it applies to.
It offers victims and offenders the opportunity to talk about the
consequences of the crime and how it has affected them, and to come to
terms with each other and the criminal event that has happened. As
mediation is apparently regarded as the preferable way of dealing with the
crime in question, the parties must not be denied the opportunity to
participate in victim offender mediation without good cause. This would
imply that victims are denied the benefits that mediation has to offer,
because of offender behaviour that frustrates the mediation. On top of that,
they may experience feelings of secondary victimisation caused by this
behaviour. Furthermore, the failure of diversionary mediation can have a
strong impact on how a case is handled. The offender will probably be
brought to trial, and the victim’s possibilities to be involved in dealing with
the crime will diminish accordingly.388 During regular criminal proceedings,
victims have little opportunities to communicate directly with offenders, and
387 In Chapter 3.6.2.1, it was mentioned briefly that committing a new crime against the
victim in the supposedly ‘safe’ mediation environment is likely to cause severe distress
to the victim, because victims can experience secondary victimisation if they consider
the offender’s expressions of regret and apology to be insincere. See A. Opdebeeck, G.
Vervaeke & F.W. Winkel, ‘Bemiddeling in het strafrecht’, in: P.J. van Koppen et al. (eds.),
Het Recht van Binnen, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, pp. 941 942. The effect of an insincere
apology on the victim will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.
388 See also M. Kilchling & M. Löschnig Gspandl, ‘Legal and Practical Perspectives on
Victim/Offender Mediation in Austria and Germany’, International Review of Victimology
2000 4, pp. 305 332.
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to express their needs and feelings.389
In the case of diversionary mediation, the continuation of the criminal
proceedings is a direct effect of the failure of the mediation. The cause of this
failure can therefore be relevant when the case is dealt with in court. When
the failure results from offender behaviour (the offender has committed
another crime during mediation, or knows about future crimes), the court
should consider using the information concerned because of the drawbacks
of the offender’s behaviour for the victim. For these reasons, it is reasonable
to contemplate whether disclosure of information should outweigh
confidentiality.
To assess the appropriateness of making an exception to the principle of
confidentiality for information pertaining to other crimes, the exception
must first of all be deemed compatible with the main characteristics of
victim offender mediation. As the principle of confidentiality is widely held
to contribute to the success of victim offender mediation, an exception
should only be made if the disadvantages of observing confidentiality
outweigh the consequences of a breach of secrecy. Such disadvantages may
result from a violation of other mediation essentials. Secondly, it must be
determined whether the disclosed information is admissible as evidence in
court. This depends on the compatibility of making an exception with the
essentials of criminal and civil law. Admitting mediation information as
evidence must not violate the fairness of the judicial proceedings concerned.
Thirdly, how does making an exception relate to the limitations on the use of
relevant information in criminal and civil law? Since the principle of
confidentiality may also restrict the use of potentially relevant information,
similarities with these limitations may be an incentive to observe the
principle of confidentiality.
The main characteristics of victim offender mediation are the
acknowledgement of the basic facts of a case by the victim and the offender
and the informed and voluntary nature of the parties’ participation. The
acknowledgement of basic facts implies understanding between the victim
and the offender of the focus of the mediation. This enables the parties to
make a well thought out decision about their participation, which
contributes to the informed and voluntary nature of their consent to take
389 Research has shown that victims find it very important to be heard and that their
procedural justice judgements are largely determined by how strong they feel their
voice is heard (J.A. Wemmers & K. Cyr, ‘What Fairness Means to Crime Victims: A
Social Psychological Perspective on Victim Offender Mediation’, Applied Psychology in
Criminal Justice 2006 2, p. 122). Furthermore, procedures that allow victims to be heard
can effectively reduce the risk of secondary victimisation (Wemmers & Cyr 2006, pp.
124 125). However, in the case victims feel hindered in making demands, or feel that
they are unable to make themselves heard, they experience the mediation process as
unfair (Wemmers & Cyr 2006, pp. 122 123). These findings stress the significance of not
denying victims the opportunity to participate in victim offender mediation, and the
importance of providing compensation if they are wrongfully impeded to take part.
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part. The voluntary character of the participation of the victim and the
offender also implies that they may withdraw from the mediation at any
time. Moreover, the parties’ freedom to decide whether to participate in
victim offender mediation implies that their ultimate decision to commit to
the process signifies their intention to successfully conclude the mediation.
The voluntariness requirement safeguards the parties from being pressured
into taking part; their choice to participate implies that they are determined
to bring the mediation to a favourable conclusion. Consciously frustrating
the mediation process (for example, by committing another crime during the
mediation) obviously conflicts with this, since the parties have the
opportunity to withdraw without consequences. What adds to this is that
victims and offenders take part in mediation on an informed basis.390 This
supposes that offenders are aware of their position vis à vis the victim,
especially concerning the latter’s vulnerability, and that they act accordingly.
The offender’s willing and conscious consent to participate in mediation
indicates that he accepts the responsibility to contribute to the process and
not to impede its success.391 Consequently, an offender who bears malice
against the victim or wants to harm the victim for other reasons does not
pass muster for victim offender mediation. This naturally also applies to an
offender who commits another crime against the same victim during the
mediation. In addition to information about the implications of
participation, the parties should also be given information about the
confidential nature of mediation, and about the issues that are consequently
subject to secrecy.392
In conclusion, the three main characteristics of victim offender mediation
all aim at facilitating a proper course and satisfying conclusion of a
mediation process, by ensuring that victims and offenders participate for the
right reasons and with the right attitude.
Offender behaviour as discussed above, is likely to cause a frustration or
termination of a mediation, and to cause harm to the victim.393 If the
offender commits another crime against the same victim during mediation,
the victim will once again suffer a crime at the hands of the same
perpetrator, but this time in the context of a procedure that supposedly
390 Paragraph 10 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 13(b) of the Basic Principles. See
further Chapter 3.2.3.
391 As follows from the voluntary nature of their participation, the parties can withdraw
from the process at any time without consequences. However, as a result of the
responsibility they took upon themselves by agreeing to participate, a termination of the
victim offender mediation due to the offender adopting an uncooperative or
unreasonable attitude should not be allowed to pass.
392 This might ultimately also include confidentiality guidelines developed in this book.
393 This should naturally be avoided, as also follows from the United Nations’ Handbook
on Restorative Justice Programmes, which states that the interests of the victim should
be protected in all restorative processes, and that it is important to ensure that re
victimisation does not occur (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on
Restorative Justice Programmes, New York: United Nations 2006, p. 59).




offers a safe environment for the two parties to meet. Such an event
understandably causes an unacceptable violation of the essential idea of
mediation. The same applies to the situation where offenders reveal
information about future crimes. Divulging such information to the victim,
who will then realise that others will be victimised, and suffer a similar
experience, can cause serious distress to the victim. Such offender behaviour
cannot be regarded as behaviour that is to be expected from an offender who
has consciously and voluntarily agreed to take part in victim offender
mediation. t rather seems to counteract th mediation require ents that
enable and safeguard participation on this basis. Neither the victim nor the
other mediation participants should therefore be denied the possibility of
reporting such events. Additionally, the observance of the principle of
confidentiality in this respect does not serve the aim of this rule to provide a
safe environment for the communication between the victim and the
offender. It rather creates an opportunity for the offender to harm the victim
with impunity. Observing secrecy would then create immunity for the
offender, instead of facilitating
Disclosing information about additional crimes seems to be consistent
with the main characteristics of victim offender mediation. The second step
concerns the compatibility of disclosure with the fundamentals of criminal
and civil law. This aspect will be discussed below.
If mediation information is submitted in court, the notion of fair proceedings
should be observed; disclosing such information should not endanger the
fairness of judicial proceedings. The main characteristics of criminal and
civil law in this respect were discussed in Chapter Four. They primarily offer
guarantees to the offender during a criminal trial, or to the parties in civil
litigation.
The essentials of criminal law that were identified are the right to a fair
trial, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right against self
incrimination, the right to a public hearing, and the presumption of
innocence. None of these rights opposes the admissibility of information
about additional crimes in court. Nevertheless, they do lay down conditions
on how the information is adduced. For example, if victims decide to
disclose in court that they were threatened by the offender during
mediation, the right to adversarial proceedings may mean that the offender
should be given the opportunity to cross examine the victim. Furthermore, if
the exception to the principle of confidentiality for information regarding
additional crimes is commonly accepted, it is important that this exception is
included in the information that victims and offenders receive prior to a
mediation. The offender (and the victim) will be aware that committing
another crime or disclosing information about future crimes will not be
subject to confidentiality and can be used in subsequent criminal
proceedings.
Consequently, the essentials of criminal law do not oppose adducing
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information about additional crimes, since submitting such information in
court does not violate these essential requirements.
The relevant characteristics of civil law are the right to a fair hearing, the
right to adversarial proceedings, the right to an oral hearing, and the right to
a public hearing. If a mediation is followed by civil litigation, for example, to
secure financial compensation, these rights must be honoured to safeguard
procedural fairness. Information about additional crimes that the victim may
want to furnish as evidence is thus only admissible in civil court if these fair
hearing requirements are observed.
The above mentioned essentials of civil law are not incompatible with the
use in court of information about additional crimes. Nevertheless, they may
lay down conditions on how the information is adduced. The right to
adversarial proceedings entails, for example, that the parties must be able to
react to each other’s claims and assertions. This implies that the offender
should be allowed to respond if the victim furnishes information from the
mediation as evidence.394
From this it follows that the essentials of criminal and civil law do not
obstruct the admissibility of information about additional crimes as
evidence. What remains to be considered is how the disclosure of such
information in court relates to limitations on the use of relevant information
during criminal or civil proceedings.
In criminal law, limitations on the use of information are scarce. To
facilitate the fact finding process, the criminal justice authorities have many
investigation methods at their disposal, and there are few exceptions. The
three existing limitations (see Chapter 4.3.5) are the restricted use of coercive
powers, the privilege to refuse to testify, and the exclusionary rule. From
these exceptions follows that a) restrictions on the fact finding process can
be made by law, b) some persons are allowed to refrain from giving
testimonial evidence, and c) wrongfully obtained evidence can under certain
circumstances be excluded.
None of these restrictions are relevant here. Since the mediation process
does not concern gathering information by means of the exertion of coercive
powers, the corresponding limitation does not apply. The same goes for the
privilege to refuse to testify, as the current issue concerns the question
whether certain information (about the offender’s behaviour in mediation) is
admissible in court. It is irrelevant whether someone can refuse to provide
such testimonial evidence. Thirdly, the exclusionary rule does not give cause
for a reconsideration of making an exception to the confidentiality rule; as
the information concerned has been obtained neither unlawfully nor in
394 Naturally, such information may also be presented by offenders who are a party in
related civil litigation. However, since this concerns information about offenders
committing or planning other crimes, it is not likely that they themselves will adduce
this information in court.
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violation of fair trial requirements,395 the exclusionary rule does not affect
the permissibility of such information in court.
Civil law also has few limitations on gathering information that can be
relevant to civil litigation. The three limitations that follow from Chapter
4.4.4 concern the privilege to refuse to testify, the restricted conclusive force
of the statements of party witnesses, and the exclusionary rule.
The privilege to refuse to testify and the exclusionary rule do not apply
here for the same reasons as mentioned above regarding criminal law. The
issue of the admissibility of a certain type of information makes the limited
conclusive force of party witness statements irrelevant.
The limitations on the use of relevant information in court are therefore
not at odds with the admissibility of information about additional crimes in
criminal or civil proceedings.
The conclusion must be that the offender committing another crime or
divulging information about other or future crimes during mediation may
constitute grounds for making an exception to the principle of
confidentiality. This implies that the mediation participants are allowed to
disclose such information after the mediation has been concluded. They can
adduce this information as evidence in court, since this would not be
inconsistent with either the essentials of criminal and civil law or the
existing limitations on the use of relevant information.
6.2.3 Victim Offender Mediation as Part of Regular Court Proceedings
The second mediation type concerns victim offender mediation that is used
as part of regular court proceedings. Although the seriousness of the offence
may require that the offender is tried, concurrent referral to mediation can
still benefit both the victim and the offender. It offers victims an opportunity
to express themselves, and to try to come to terms with the crime and the
offender through a dialogue with the latter. Similar possibilities to do so
during the actual court proceedings are scarce, if not non existent.
Furthermore, mediation offers offenders the possibility to explain
themselves, to make amends, and to accept and act on their responsibilities.
For these reasons, victims and offenders should not be denied the option of
participating in victim offender mediation, due to behaviour of the other
party that frustrates the mediation process, such as the behaviour of the
offender concerning additional crimes.
The current modality of mediation will be followed by a criminal trial, and
a successful mediation result may have a positive effect on the outcome of
the criminal proceedings. This raises the question whether failed mediation
should have adverse consequences. According to the United Nations Basic
395 This may lead to the exclusion of evidence (ECtHR 12 May 2000, App. No. 35394/97,
paras. 34ff. (Khan v. the United Kingdom)).
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Principles, this should not be the case; a failure to reach an agreement must
not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.396 If, for example, the victim
withdraws for reasons that have nothing to do with reprehensible behaviour
of the offender, this indeed seems a justifiable position. After all, if failure to
reach an agreement would in all cases have consequences, it would
undermine essential victim offender mediation requirements concerning
confidentiality and voluntariness; the court would then have to examine the
background of all mediation failures, and this would understandably harm
mediation confidentiality as well as diminish the appeal of taking part.397 In
such cases, it would be best to simply resume the criminal proceedings after
the mediation has failed. The outcome of the mediation can then no longer
have a positive effect on the outcome of the trial, but the failure should not
have additional negative consequences either, so as not to endanger the
victim’s and the offender’s freedom to withdraw from the mediation
process. However, conscious and reprehensible offender behaviour, such as
committing another crime or disclosing information regarding other crimes,
is an altogether different situation. The distress and harm such behaviour
can cause to the victim and to the mediation process may justify the
disclosure of the information concerned and its subsequent use in evidence
as a form of compensation. Disclosing information in court may then induce
the court to let the offender’s behaviour influence the outcome of the
criminal trial negatively.
This section will discuss whether behaviour of the offender concerning
additional crimes justifies such consequences in the context of victim
offender mediation that is used as part of regular court proceedings. Is
making an exception to the principle of confidentiality compatible with the
fundamentals of victim offender mediation, and do the fundamentals of
criminal and civil law allow the use of such information as evidence in
court?
What was observed above regarding diversionary mediation generally also
applies to the compatibility of making an exception with victim offender
mediation fundamentals. The decision of offenders to participate in victim
offender mediation implies that they commit themselves to contribute to the
procedure and to approach the victim accordingly.398 Committing another
crime against the victim or disclosing information about other crimes causes
a significant violation of this assumption, and is harmful to the victim as
396 Paragraph 16 of the Basic Principles. See also D. van Ness, ‘Proposed Basic Principles on
the Use of Restorative Justice: Recognizing the Aims and Limits of Restorative Justice’,
in: A. von Hirsch et al. (eds.), Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or
Reconcilable Paradigms?, Oxford: Hart 2003, pp. 171 172. Van Ness states that a lack of
agreement should be treated as an ‘interlude’ in the criminal justice process, and that
that process should be resumed if the attempt to reach an agreement in mediation fails.
See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 35.
397 See also Van Ness 2003, p. 172.
398 This goes for the victim too, of course.
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well as the mediation process. Observing the principle of confidentiality
would protect the offender rather than aid the mediation procedure.
Consequently, the mediation essentials do not oppose the disclosure of
information regarding additional crimes, in spite of the confidentiality rule.
Given this conclusion, the question arises whether the information
concerned is admissible as evidence in court. This depends on the
compatibility of the main features of criminal and civil law with adducing
the information concerned as such.
As the current type of victim offender mediation is in all cases followed by
criminal proceedings, the observance of the right to a fair trial is of great
significance. The fundamentals of criminal law concerning diversionary
mediation do not obstruct the admissibility of information regarding other
crimes. This also applies here. The right to adversarial proceedings demands
that certain procedural safeguards are honoured. Furthermore, it remains
important that the mediation participants are sufficiently informed about the
implications and scope of confidentiality. As long as these requirements are
met, submitting the information concerned as evidence does not infringe the
fairness of the criminal proceedings.
The same goes for the main features of civil law. If the victim and the
offender become involved in civil litigation – for example, because the issue
of financial compensation has not been solved during the mediation or the
criminal proceedings399 – behaviour of the offender that has frustrated the
mediation process may be relevant. For the information concerning the
offender’s behaviour to be admissible, the implications of the right to
adversarial proceedings should be observed. For instance, the parties should
be allowed to react to the evidence that is furnished by the other party.
According to the fundamentals of criminal and civil law, information from a
mediation concerning additional crimes is therefore admissible during
subsequent judicial proceedings. This may, however, be different if the
existing limitations on gathering and using relevant information in criminal
and civil law give cause for reconsideration.
The three criminal law exceptions do not oppose to the admissibility of
information concerning additional crimes in court, for the reasons
mentioned above regarding diversionary mediation. The same goes for civil
law limitations.
In conclusion, the mediation participants are allowed to disclose information
concerning other crimes when a mediation is part of regular court
proceedings. As such disclosure is not inconsistent with either the main
features of criminal and civil law or the existing limitations on gathering and
using relevant information, the information concerned can be used as
399 See further Chapter 8.2.1.2.
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6.2.4 Victim Offender Mediation after Conviction and Sentencing
The third modality of victim offender mediation concerns mediation that
takes place after the offender has been convicted and sentenced. As this type
of victim offender mediation will not be followed by criminal proceedings
that deal with the same crime, the question whether information pertaining
to other crimes can be used as evidence during criminal proceedings that
follow a mediation is irrelevant here. This does not mean that a crime
committed during the mediation cannot be the focus of a new criminal trial;
the principle of confidentiality should not deny victims the opportunity to
report a crime against them to the police. In such cases, the victim’s report
may occasion the prosecution of the new offence. This situation should be
distinguished from the use of the information concerned during the criminal
trial that dealt with the crime that gave cause for the start of the mediation.
Furthermore, the current type of victim offender mediation can still result in
civil litigation, for example, if the issue of financial compensation has not
been addressed by the criminal court or in mediation.
If a mediation following conviction and sentencing is ended due to
offender behaviour concerning other crimes, this may have drawbacks for
the victim and violate the essentials of the mediation process. Furthermore,
failure of this type of mediation implies that the victim has fewer
opportunities to be heard; since the criminal trial that deals with the central
crime has been concluded, all that remains for the victim is to take the case
to civil court. The victim should therefore not be denied the opportunity to
take part in victim offender mediation at this stage. Because of this, and due
to the harmful consequences of the offender’s behaviour concerning other
crimes for the victim and the mediation process, the mediation essentials do
not obstruct making an exception to the principle of confidentiality here.
Secondly, the admissibility of such information as evidence in court
should be assessed. Since the judicial proceedings that can follow the current
type of mediation are of a civil nature (apart from the possibility that a new
criminal trial is started, see above), only the features of civil law, and the
civil limitations on gathering and using relevant information, should be
taken into account here. They do not prejudice the permissibility of the
information concerned, for the reasons mentioned above regarding the other
types of victim offender mediation. This implies that committing another
crime during mediation or disclosing information about other crimes during
mediation, can be adduced as evidence in civil litigation that followed a
mediation that took place after the conviction and sentencing of the
offender.
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6.2.5 Résumé
Victims and offenders should take part in victim offender mediation on an
informed and voluntary basis; they must be aware of the implications of
their participation prior to the mediation. A decision to participate means
that the parties are conscious of their own role within the process and of the
position of the other party, and that they intend to contribute to the success
of the procedure. Victim offender mediation is also facilitated by a
confidential environment, which enables a free exchange of information
between the victim and the offender. However, situations may arise that
damage the relationship between the victim and the offender in such a way
that it is impossible to continue the mediation. Consequently, the process is
terminated. Such situations can be caused by behaviour of the offender. The
most striking example is that of the offender committing another crime
against the same victim during mediation or revealing information about
other crimes during mediation. The question how to respond to such cases
has been the central focus of this section.
The harm caused by offender behaviour can be remedied by allowing the
disclosure of the information concerned. Since this implies an exception to
the principle of confidentiality, what should first be considered is whether
making such an exception is consistent with the main essentials of victim
offender mediation. Secondly, it should be established whether the
information concerned can be used as evidence in criminal and civil court.
To answer this question, the compatibility with the main features of criminal
and civil law must be assessed. Thirdly, it should be regarded whether
existing limitations on gathering and using relevant information in criminal
and civil law give reason to keep the information concerned out of court.
These questions have been examined for each of the three types of victim
offender mediation, the conclusion being that the information regarding
additional crimes can be disclosed by the mediation participants in spite of
the principle of confidentiality. Furthermore, the information can be used as
evidence in subsequent criminal or civil proceedings. For the third modality
of victim offender mediation, information can only be adduced as evidence
in civil litigation, since the offender has been convicted at the start of the
mediation.
6.3 Confessional Statements by the Offender
6.3.1 Overview
Victim offender mediation aims at dealing with a crime that has taken place
and its aftermath. During mediation, the victim and the offender discuss
their needs and feelings pertaining to the crime, explain how it has affected
them, and try to reach some form of understanding. Consequently, the
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primary focus of mediation is not on the exchange of legally relevant
information. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that the question of the
offender’s guilt, or of his acknowledgement of having committed the crime,
will be addressed. Offenders may, for example, explain their motives in the
course of the dialogue with their victims. Such utterances may constitute
statements that can be considered a confession. This section discusses the
level of confidentiality that should apply to confessional statements made in
the context of mediation.
According to international regulations, it is currently not a precondition
for mediation that offenders confess to having committed the crime for
which they have been referred to mediation.400 The Council of Europe
Recommendation and the United Nations Basic Principles both state that it
will suffice if the victim and the offender acknowledge the basic facts of a
case prior to the mediation.401 Acknowledging basic facts separates the
criminal event(s) from the notion of legal guilt; the presumption of
innocence is not violated, and parties can reach the general agreement on the
facts that is required for mediation to function properly.402 The participation
of offenders in mediation and their acknowledgement of the basic facts
should therefore not be used as evidence of admission of guilt in subsequent
legal proceedings.403 The presumptio innocentiae requires that the court must
not be biased against offenders because they have agreed to participate in
mediation.404
However, the distinction between the acknowledgement of basic facts and
an admission of guilt may come across as artificial in practice. Realistically,
the offender’s acknowledgement of basic facts often implies an admission
that he has committed the crime concerned. Victim offender mediation
presupposes that the victim and the offender have been identified, and
mostly deals with relatively simple offences, such as robbery or theft. An
acknowledgement of the basic facts (e.g., that the offender appropriated the
victim’s handbag) then often amounts to an admission of the offender that
he has committed the crime (of, in the above example, robbery).
In addition, victim offender mediation focuses on enabling victims to
express their needs and feelings, and on offenders to accept and act on their
responsibilities.405 It seems impossible for offenders to accept responsibility
400 Although some domestic mediation programmes do require this, for example, Austria,
Denmark, Poland, and Slovenia. See also K. Lauwaert, Herstelrecht en procedurele
waarborgen, Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2008, pp. 98ff.; and Chapter 3.2.1.
401 Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 8 of the Basic Principles.
402 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 28; and Van Ness 2003, pp. 168
169. See also Lauwaert 2008, p. 100.
403 The second part of Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 8 of the Basic
Principles.
404 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 28; Van Ness 2003, pp. 168 169;
and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 34.
405 M. Schiff, ‘Satisfying the Needs and Interests of Stakeholders’, in: G. Johnstone & D. van
Ness (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice, Cullompton: Willan Publishing 2007, p. 231.
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without at least acknowledging that they have contributed to the occurrence
of the crime.406 After all, taking and acting on responsibility without
admitting to being responsible seems impossible. When offenders
acknowledge the basic facts at the start of a mediation, they also implicitly
recognise their responsibility for these facts. In other words, the participation
of offenders in mediation entails that they admit to having contributed to the
occurrence of the basic facts. Furthermore, offenders who truly believe that
they are innocent are unlikely to agree to take part in victim offender
mediation. Nor indeed should they.407 After all, it is improbable that they
will be able and willing to properly acknowledge the victim and provide
compensation. In such cases, an offender’s interest would be better served
by his appearing in court and requesting to be acquitted. This state of affairs
detracts from the ability of offenders who believe that they are innocent or
not responsible for the offence charged to participate in mediation in a
meaningful way. It therefore seems unadvisable to confront victims in a
victim offender mediation with offenders who are unwilling to accept
responsibility for what has happened.408
Although the recognition of the basic facts in many cases implies an
admission of guilt, it remains conceivable that this is not the case; for
example, if a rape victim meets the offender, they may agree on the basic fact
that there was sexual intercourse, but disagree on the question whether this
happened against the will of the victim. In such a case, acknowledging basic
facts is not the same as confessing to a crime.409 This may, in fact, be a topic
for the parties to discuss in mediation, and the offender may admit during
these discussions that he was aware of the victim’s resistance, thereby
effectively confessing having sexually assaulted the victim against the
latter’s will.
A confession made by the offender during mediation may have evidential
value in judicial proceedings following a mediation. Due to their procedural
position in such proceedings, offenders are allowed to withdraw confessions
made in the context of mediation afterwards. Offenders have a right to be
heard and to make a statement in court. This statement can contradict
previously made confessional statements. The offender’s position is similar
to that of a suspect during a police interrogation; statements made during
406 See also J. Braithwaite & S. Mugford, ‘Conditions of Successful Reintegration
Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders’, British Journal of Criminology 1994 2, p.
146.
407 This also follows from the assumption that offenders participate in victim offender
mediation because they want to take direct responsibility for their actions (M.S.
Umbreit, R.B. Coates & B. Vos, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice
and Research’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, p. 286).
408 To circumvent these issues, some national mediation programmes require that offenders
admit that they have committed the offence charged, or that sufficient evidence to
charge them is available.
409 However, it remains questionable whether rape victims should be confronted with
offenders who are unwilling to admit that they assaulted the victim.
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such interrogations can also be withdrawn afterwards. However, an
important difference with the withdrawal of a statement made to the police
is that the court is able to take cognizance of the withdrawn police
statement. It can still be used as evidence; in such instances, it is up to the
court to assess how both statements should be weighed, taking into account
both the offender’s statement in court and the earlier statement included in
the paper file of the case.
However, according to the current interpretation of the principle of
confidentiality, all matters that are discussed in mediation should in
principle remain secret. Consequently, the court is unable to take a previous
confession, made in the context of mediation, into consideration and
compare it to the new statement entailing a withdrawal. This also follows
from the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, which states
that a confession of guilt by the accused in the context of mediation should
not be used as evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings on the same
matter.410 If the intended scope of the confidentiality rule were to be
honoured, victims would consequently be unable to tell the court that the
offender confessed to having committed the crime during the mediation that
preceded the judicial proceedings.411 This may understandably not be to the
victim’s advantage.412
Victim offender mediation focuses on restoring the criminal harm that has
been done to the victim. The victim’s participation in mediation should
therefore not add to his or her distress.413 The interpretation of the required
acknowledgement of basic facts and other confessional statements may
cause such additional grief. The advocated extent of the principle of
confidentiality implies that the victim is unable to tell the court that the
offender confessed to having committed the crime during mediation. Also,
during mediation a victim can be confronted with an offender who does
recognise the facts of a case, but is not ready to take responsibility for what
has happened (see the earlier example of rape).414 Furthermore, the
distinction between the acknowledgement of facts and the acceptance of
guilt can be incomprehensible to victims – they may not fully understand
the mediation process, considering that they are generally lay persons in
legal affairs. Victims may be unable to understand how an offender can
410 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 28.
411 The same situation occurs if the offender exercises the right to remain silent during a
criminal trial and thus refuses to repeat the confessional statement concerned, since
none of the other mediation participants will then be able to disclose the offender’s
statements from the mediation.
412 Since an insincere apology has been found to cause secondary victimisation, the
withdrawal of a confession may have a similar effect.
413 In all restorative processes, it is important that re victimisation does not occur (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 59).
414 Empirical studies show that victims take part in mediation to hold the offender
accountable and to share their pain with the offender (Umbreit, Coates & Vos 2004, p.
286). Especially the first motive for victim participation will be endangered if an
offender is unwilling to bear responsibility.
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participate in mediation and try to make amends, without being willing to
bear responsibility for what has happened afterwards in court. Their limited
comprehension may cause victims to feel frustrated and distressed,415
especially if they are also unable to tell the court about the offender’s
confession in mediation.
Given these considerations, are statements of the offender made in the
context of victim offender mediation and constituting a confession
justifiably subject to confidentiality, or should it be possible to disclose them
in court after the mediation has ended?
6.3.2 Victim Offender Mediation as a Diversionary Measure
Referring a case to diversionary mediation is generally considered to serve
the interests of the victim and the offender best. The mediation enables
victims to talk about their experiences pertaining to the crime, while their
opportunities to do so during regular proceedings are limited. Furthermore,
the offender will no longer be prosecuted if the mediation ends successfully.
The benefits of mediation for both the victim and the offender urge that their
possibilities to fruitfully participate in the procedure must not be
endangered without good cause. A lack of understanding of the procedure,
feelings of secondary victimisation, or other incidents that could add to the
distress or frustrate the procedure should therefore be avoided.
In the case of diversionary mediation, a failed mediation process will lead
to the continuation of the criminal trial. Confessional statements of the
offender made during the mediation can then become relevant in the light of
the criminal justice process, since they may affect the provability of the
charge against the offender. For example, if the offender in mediation
confessed to breaking into the victim’s house, this statement could be
relevant to the assessment of the offender’s guilt of burglary. If the offender
withdraws such a confession or invokes the right to remain silent, the court
would be unable to consider the statements concerned in view of the
advocated interpretation of the principle of confidentiality. This situation
may not be beneficial to the victim. Formulating an exception to the
confidentiality rule, allowing the disclosure of mediation information
concerning confessions, could be a remedy for the harm and distress that
may be caused by the offender’s withdrawal of a confession.416 This may
415 Victims’ lack of understanding of the mediation process (or aspects of it) should be
avoided whenever possible, especially considering that a general lack of understanding
is regarded by mediators as one of the primary reasons for a refusal to participate in
mediation (D. Ruth Heffelbower & J. Montanez, ‘Victim Offender Mediation Refusals: A
Study of Mediator Perceptions’, 2005, pp. 13 14, <http://peace.fresno.edu/docs/VORP%
20refusals.pdf>).
416 Victims would then be enabled to bring the confessional statements of the offender to
the attention of the court, and are thus empowered to take action against the offender’s
withdrawal of a confession after a mediation.
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also make the mediation procedure more comprehensible and transparent to
its lay participants. In the example mentioned above, the victim could then
disclose to the court that the offender admitted burgling the victim’s house,
even if the offender withdrew this confession after the mediation; the victim
would no longer feel frustrated by the court being unable to take notice of
this confession.
Making an exception to the confidentiality rule must be compatible with
the fundamentals of victim offender mediation and with the essentials of
criminal and civil law to enable the use of the information concerned in
court. The existing limitations on the use of relevant information in criminal
and civil law should also be taken into account.
Before the start of a victim offender mediation, victims and offenders are
required to acknowledge the basic facts of a case. As described above, in
many cases this boils down to offenders confessing to having committed the
crime charged. There are no procedural rules that oppose the withdrawal of
statements to that effect by the offender (see above). However, such a
withdrawal seems inconsistent with the idea behind mediation, since the
basic facts requirement is a conditio sine qua non for the start of a victim
offender mediation and an essential element of the offender’s acceptance of
responsibility. The same is true if the basic facts recognition in itself does not
constitute an admission of guilt, but the offender makes a confession in the
course of the mediation (see the example of rape above). A withdrawal of
such a confession is also at odds with shouldering responsibility, another
necessary element of victim offender mediation. It conflicts with the idea
behind mediation itself; it seems impossible for an offender to truthfully
apologise to the victim, or to assent to, for example, the performance of
community service as part of the mediation agreement, without accepting
responsibility for what has happened, and thus recognising a measure of
guilt. As a result, a victim may understandably suffer adverse effects of a
previous confession being retracted.
An aspect that reinforces the inconsistency of withdrawing a confession
made in the context of mediation with the fundamentals of mediation is the
voluntary nature of the parties’ participation. Participating offenders have
consciously decided to take part – and thus voluntarily acknowledged the
basic facts – and have consequently committed to contribute to reach an
agreement with the victim. Accepting a degree of guilt is a necessary
element of this. Denying of this acceptance of guilt or responsibility later on
is therefore also incompatible with the voluntariness standard; if offenders
are unwilling to acknowledge the basic facts or admit guilt, they should
rather refrain from taking part or opt out.
The above holds especially true in view of the requirement that victims
and offenders receive sufficient information about the implications of
engaging in mediation. This implies that they know what is expected of
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them during the mediation and what their respective roles are.417 Offenders
should realise before they make the decision to participate that they will be
expected to take responsibility – which implies ad least a partial admission
of guilt – during the mediation process. They should also acknowledge the
victim’s fragile and vulnerable position. Since a withdrawal of confessional
statements may likely harm the victim, this cannot be regarded as consistent
with the mediation requirement regarding information, and as a result, it
does not stand in the way of making an exception to the principle of
confidentiality.
In sum, the above mentioned mediation requirements do not resist
allowing disclosure of confessions made by the offender in the context of
mediation; since subsequent withdrawal of such statements can generally be
considered to violate these requirements, allowing disclosure may, in fact,
offer a remedy for the injurious impact of retraction on the victim.
Next, the effectiveness of the remedy of making an exception to the
confidentiality rule depends on the admissibility of such information in
court. The disclosure of mediation information in court must therefore not
violate the right to fair proceedings of the parties involved.
In Chapter Four (Section 3), various fair trial requirements that apply to
criminal law were discussed. The participation of an offender in mediation
must not be regarded as evidence of guilt during subsequent proceedings,418
since the presumptio innocentiae requires that the guilt of the accused be
established on the basis of lawful evidence, and that the court not be
prejudiced against the issue of the defendant’s guilt prior to the proceedings.
The offender’s consent to participate in mediation should therefore not be
regarded as an admission of guilt, and the acknowledgement of basic facts
or a confession made in the course of mediation is not indisputable; the
offender should be allowed to withdraw confessional statements made in
mediation after the process has been concluded.419 This also follows from the
essential focus of criminal law on the fact finding process and the
clarification of what has happened; as much relevant information as possible
should be brought to the attention of the court (including the withdrawal of
417 Schiff 2007, p. 231.
418 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 28.
419 If the offender’s consent to take part in victim offender mediation (implying their
acknowledgement of basic facts) were to be considered a waiver of the right to be
presumed innocent, it would be impossible for offenders to withdraw such statements
afterwards, and these would be indisputable in subsequent judicial proceedings.
However, Lauwaert has rightly observed that it is impossible for offenders to waive the
presumptio innocentiae (Lauwaert 2008, pp. 107ff.). It should be considered ‘an
established part of the rule of law’, and consequently cannot be waived, since this
would ‘erode the substance of the legal order that guarantees third parties’ rights’ (S.
Rixen, ‘Victim Related Mediation Procedure ‘Without Prejudice to the Rights of
Offenders’: Realizable?’, Panopticon 1993 1, p. 54. On this topic in general, see also pp.
53 55.). As a result, mediation participation of offenders cannot lead to conclusions
regarding the question of legal guilt.
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a previous statement by the alleged offender). The fact that the criminal law
essentials allow offenders to withdraw previous confessions, however, does
not imply that these essentials oppose the disclosure of confessions by other
mediation participants. Since such withdrawals may violate mediation
essentials and disadvantage the victim (see above), allowing the victim to
disclose the offender’s confessions made in mediation may be a remedy. As
long as the procedural requirements that follow from the right to adversarial
proceedings are met, the features of criminal law do not oppose adducing
such information. If the offender persists in his or her withdrawal, it is up to
the court to establish the truth.
If the victim and the offender become involved in civil litigation after a
diversionary mediation, for example, regarding a claim for financial
compensation if the mediation has failed or if the criminal court has not
addressed this issue, the use of confessional statements can also be relevant
to substantiate such a claim. For this information to be admissible in court, it
must not violate the main characteristics of civil law. These characteristics do
not oppose the disclosure of the basic facts or the confessional statements in
court, as long as the necessary procedural requirements are observed.
The admissibility of mediation information in criminal and civil court can,
however, be invalidated by the existing limitations on gathering and using
relevant information in criminal and civil law.
For reasons mentioned in Chapter 6.2.2, these limitations do not ban
confessional information from court. The limitation regarding the restricted
use of coercive powers in criminal law does not apply, since the information
concerned has not been gathered using such powers. The exclusionary rule
is irrelevant because the confessional statements that can be disclosed have
not been obtained illegally. The same goes for the other criminal and civil
law limitations, since they concern the ability of individuals to submit
information in court, instead of the type of information that can be adduced,
which is what is discussed in this chapter.
As a result, the limitations on gathering and using relevant information in
criminal and civil law do not oppose making an exception to the principle of
confidentiality in the current context.
In conclusion, the acknowledgement of basic facts and confessional
statements by the offender are both admissible as evidence in criminal or
civil proceedings following a diversionary mediation, as long as the
necessary procedural requirements are met.420 The offender remains free to
withdraw such statements after the mediation has ended. However, the
other mediation participants should be allowed to disclose this information
420 The confessions concerned pertain to the crime the mediation focuses on. If the offender
confesses other crimes during a mediation, these statements should also be open for
disclosure, as they can be categorised under the exception pertaining to other crimes
(see Section 6.2).
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in court to remedy the harmful effects of the offender’s withdrawal.
6.3.3 Victim Offender Mediation as Part of Regular Court Proceedings
Victim offender mediation that is used as part of the regular court
proceedings will in all cases be followed by a criminal trial. The result of the
mediation can then be taken into account by the criminal court. Victims have
considerably fewer opportunities to express themselves during court
proceedings; it is therefore important that their participation in mediation is
ensured as fully as possible. Considering that victim offender mediation has
real benefits for the victim and the offender, the parties should not be denied
the opportunity to take part. This also means that their involvement in
mediation does not add grief. Especially victims should not be confronted
with new negative experiences that exacerbate their crime induced
anxieties.421 Such drawbacks may, for example, result from their
incomprehension of the mediation process caused by the offender
withdrawing a confession after the mediation has been concluded (see
above). According to the advocated extent of the principle of confidentiality,
victims would be unable to report such issues. These considerations are of
special relevance here, because the current type of mediation will, as a rule,
be followed by a criminal trial. The question of the offender’s guilt will be a
significant aspect of these proceedings, and confessional statements can
understandably play a role in answering this question. Negative effects of
the victim being unable to disclose such issues will be inevitable, since the
current type of mediation is bound to be followed by criminal proceedings.
Should an exception be made to the current interpretation of the
confidentiality rule in order to remedy the drawbacks of the secret nature of
confessions in mediation? Whether making such an exception is compatible
with the fundamental features of mediation itself will be examined below.
What will also be discussed is whether information which originates from a
mediation that is part of regular court proceedings, can be used as evidence
in subsequent legal proceedings.
As said before, the main mediation requirements concern the
acknowledgement of basic facts, the voluntary nature of the parties’
participation, and their being sufficiently informed prior to the mediation.
The discussion of these features regarding diversionary mediation mutatis
mutandis also applies here. The fact that offenders make a free and informed
decision to participate in victim offender mediation and acknowledge the
basic facts of a case prior to mediation implies that they consciously agree to
bear responsibility for what has happened, and to treat victims accordingly.
Due to the nature of the cases that qualify for mediation, the basic facts
recognition will in many cases include a confession; if not, it is likely that the
421 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 59.
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offender confesses to having committed the crime as part of the dialogue
between the parties. In this way, offenders show that they are willing to take
responsibility for what they have done to the victim and the harm they have
caused. Consequently, not only is it inconsistent with these mediation
fundamentals for offenders to withdraw confessional statements afterwards
(although they are allowed to do so), such withdrawals may also
disadvantage victims. The main mediation requirements therefore do not
oppose making an exception to the advocated extent of the principle of
confidentiality.
The admissibility of confessional information in criminal and civil court –
and thus the ‘effectiveness’ of allowing the mediation participants to
disclose this information – depends on the compatibility of making an
exception with the essential features of criminal and civil law.
For reasons mentioned above, criminal law fundamentals enable offenders
to recant previously made statements. This goes for statements made during
a police interrogation, and also for those made in mediation. However, the
features of criminal law do not resist the disclosure of such information later
on in court by others; as the court also takes notice of an earlier confession
made by the police, there is no rule of criminal law that bars the court from
taking a confessional statement made in mediation into consideration. As a
result, confessional statements originating from mediation can be submitted
as evidence by the other mediation participants (in accordance with usual
procedural requirements).
Confessional statements made during a victim offender mediation that is
used as part of regular court proceedings can also be presented in civil
litigation, on condition that the required procedural rules are followed. It
should be noted, however, that it is unlikely that this type of victim offender
mediation is followed by civil proceedings, since there will always be a
criminal trial. Civil proceedings will often focus on financial compensation,
which is an issue that may also be addressed by the criminal court and
during the mediation itself. Nevertheless, if, for example, the parties have
not reached agreement on this topic during mediation, or the criminal court
considers the claim for damages too complicated, the victim may need to go
to civil court to obtain compensation.
Information about confessional statements can be classified as belonging to
the relevant facts and circumstances the court can take into account in legal
proceedings. If the existing limitations on the gathering and use of these
facts and circumstances apply here, they may be an impediment to making
an exception to the confidentiality rule.
The existing limitations in criminal law are the restricted exertion of
coercive powers, the privilege to refuse to testify and the exclusionary rule.
These limitations do not apply here, for the same reasons that were
mentioned above pertaining to diversionary mediation. This also goes for
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the civil law limitations (privilege to refuse to testify, restricted conclusive
force of party witness statements, and the exclusionary rule).
The restrictions to the use of relevant facts and circumstances therefore do
not oppose the use of information from confessional statements as evidence
in court.
In conclusion, the offender’s acknowledgement of basic facts prior to
mediation or his confession during mediation of having committed the
crime should also be admissible in criminal or civil proceedings if the
preceding mediation was part of regular court proceedings.
6.3.4 Victim Offender Mediation after Conviction and Sentencing
The third modality of victim offender mediation is when the offender has
been convicted and sentenced. This type of mediation is not followed by a
criminal trial; the offender has already been found guilty by the court, and
has been sentenced accordingly before the start of the mediation.
Nevertheless, if the issue of financial compensation has not been resolved in
mediation or in criminal proceedings, a civil action can be brought after the
mediation has ended, and information from the mediation may then be
relevant. In this context, the information would pertain to the offender’s
guilt, namely the acknowledgement of the basic facts, or confessional
statements made in the course of the mediation.
The conviction of the offender before the start of the mediation implies
that the question of guilt has already been answered. Disclosure of the
offender’s confession during mediation would only confirm the criminal
court’s finding. Observing confidentiality would seem meaningless.
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that the offender’s conviction renders the
disclosure of confessional statements made in mediation futile:
confidentiality could be adhered to in order to motivate offenders to
participate. However, an exception for confessional statements is unlikely to
prevent offenders from taking part in the current type of mediation, since
the offender’s guilt has already been established in open court. As making
an exception to the confidentiality rule is therefore unlikely to cause
problems, and since accepting this exception for this type of mediation
would provide a uniform regulation applying to all modalities of victim
offender mediation, confessions made in the context of mediation should
also be open to disclosure in civil court if the mediation follows the
conviction and sentencing of the offender. Additionally, this does justice to
the general feature of civil law that parties in civil proceedings are
essentially free to substantiate their claims as they see fit. The victim and the
other mediation participants should therefore be allowed to furnish
confessional mediation information in civil proceedings. Naturally, the
requirements that follow from the right to adversarial proceedings should be
observed.
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6.3.5 Résumé
The principle of confidentiality as it is currently interpreted generally
applies to everything that is said and done during a victim offender
mediation. This means that confessional statements, either resulting from the
acknowledgement of basic facts or from further communication during the
mediation session(s), should remain secret. In addition, the
acknowledgement of basic facts at the start of a mediation must not be used
in evidence in court – the acknowledgement is disconnected from the
recognition of guilt. This state of affairs can cause problems in practice. The
distinction between the acknowledgement of basic facts and the recognition
of guilt may be beyond the victim’s understanding. In addition, the victim
may experience frustration or distress at being unable to report confessions
made by the offender in the course of mediation, especially since the
offenders are able to withdraw such statements after the mediation has
ended.
The acknowledgement of basic facts often constitutes a confession. If this
is not the case, the offender is likely to confess during the mediation to
having committed the crime; after all, admitting some degree of guilt is a
necessary element of accepting responsibility, which is essential to victim
offender mediation. A withdrawal of confessional statements is therefore not
consistent with the main mediation requirements; consequently, these
requirements do not exclude making an exception to the principle of
confidentiality for such statements. Such an exception is also consistent with
the features of criminal and civil law, and the information concerned is
admissible in criminal or civil court. The existing limitations on gathering
and using legally relevant information do not apply.
As a result, confessional statements made by the offender, either resulting
from the acknowledgement of basic facts or from the communication in
mediation, can be disclosed and adduced as evidence in judicial proceedings
(regarding the third modality of victim offender mediation, in civil
proceedings only, since the offender has already been convicted and
sentenced by the criminal court prior to mediation).
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed two areas of conflict regarding the principle of
confidentiality, both pertaining to the offender. The first one concerns
committing another crime or divulging information about other crimes
during the mediation. The second one relates to confessional statements
made in the context of mediation. According to the current interpretation of
the principle of confidentiality, all information of these two kinds should
remain secret. However, the current scope of the confidentiality rule is likely
to cause problems, especially for the victim. Therefore, for both situations
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the question has been whether these drawbacks justify an exception to the
principle of confidentiality, allowing the victim and the other mediation
participants to disclose the information concerned and remedy the harm
caused by these problems. To assess the viability of making an exception
two questions have been addressed: is making an exception compatible with
mediation fundamentals, and is the information concerned admissible as
evidence in court?
The conclusion is that exceptions to the confidentiality rule can (and
should) be made for both areas of conflict. Behaviour of the offender
concerning other crimes and confessional statements made in the context of
mediation should be open to disclosure and used as evidence in subsequent
criminal or civil proceedings.
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7 Outcome Related Issues: Implementation
Failure
7.1 Introduction
A successful victim offender mediation will in most cases result in a
mediation agreement laying down the conditions for the offender to fulfil in
order to compensate the victim for the harm caused by the crime. These
conditions may be duties the offender has to perform after the conclusion of
the mediation, or obligations he met during the mediation (for example, an
apology during the mediation). The fulfilment of the mediation agreement
can be considered the offender’s ultimate acknowledgement of
responsibility for the crime, and of his resulting duty to compensate the
victim. Compliance with the agreement is a crucial success factor for
mediation,422 and a failed implementation of the agreement may cause the
victim to feel frustrated, deceived, and disillusioned. If the failure follows
from the communication in mediation, the current interpretation of the
principle of confidentiality requires that the reasons for the failure remain
secret. However, the drawbacks for the victim that result from an
implementation failure are grounds for reassessing the level of
confidentiality that should apply. This chapter will discuss the appropriate
scope of the principle of confidentiality in the context of implementation
failures. Following an overview, this issue will be examined in the light of
the three mediation modalities, and the main findings will be summarised in
the conclusion.
7.2 Overview
During a victim offender mediation, the victim and the offender can
mutually express their needs and feelings. As part of this exchange, the
victim may indicate how the offender can compensate the material and
immaterial damage he or she suffered. If the offender is willing to make
amends, the parties can lay down their arrangements in the mediation
agreement.
The parties are free to include all sorts of commitments in the agreement.
The Council of Europe Recommendation and the United States Basic
Principles only require that the agreement is reached voluntarily, and that it
contains reasonable and proportional obligations.423 The required
voluntariness of the agreement follows from the mediation standard
422 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes,
New York: United Nations 2006, p. 61.
423 Paragraph 31 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 7 of the Basic Principles.
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concerning the parties’ voluntary participation.424 Since the voluntary nature
of the participation of the victim and the offender implies that they can
withdraw from the mediation at any time, they should also be able to do so
at the time of the agreement being concluded. Their consent to the
agreement should consequently be free given of pressure. The voluntary
nature of reaching an agreement distinguishes mediation from processes
that impose obligations, such as judicial proceedings, or alternative
procedures such as arbitration.425 Such processes usually culminate in a
decision that coerces a party to fulfil a particular duty, or that inflicts a
punishment – the consent of the party concerned is not required.
The required reasonableness and proportionality of the mediation
agreement also point at some relationship between the offence and the type
of obligation that the offender has to fulfil.426 The burden imposed on the
offender and the seriousness of the offence should correspond.427 For
example, the mediation agreement should not oblige the offender to pay
excessive damages. In addition to these general requirements, parties are at
liberty to include different types of conditions in the agreement in order to
allow for the multiplicity of consequences that victims may experience as a
result of the crime.428 A common condition in the agreement is the payment
of restitution or compensation,429 but a verbal or written apology, the
performance of community service, or promises about future behaviour and
contact are not uncommon either.430
In the previous chapters, it was explained that during the mediation
offenders should accept and act on their responsibilities. This also follows
from the offender entering into an agreement with the victim. The fulfilment
of the conditions laid down in the agreement demonstrates the offenders’
424 D. van Ness, ‘Proposed Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice: Recognizing
the Aims and Limits of Restorative Justice’, in: A. von Hirsch et al. (eds.), Restorative
Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms?, Oxford: Hart 2003, p.
168.
425 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 33; and Van Ness 2003, p. 168.
426 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation p. 33; and Van Ness 2003, p. 168.
427 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation p. 33; and Van Ness 2003, p. 168.
The nature of victim offender mediation brings along that the main relationship in this
respect is that between the damage suffered by the victim and the compensation
provided by the offender. The obligations in the mediation agreement should not be
excessive in proportion to the material and immaterial harm caused. (K. Lauwaert,
Herstelrecht en procedurele waarborgen, Apeldoorn/Antwerp: Maklu 2008, pp. 182ff.).
428 I. Aertsen, Slachtoffer daderbemiddeling. Een onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van een
herstelgerichte strafrechtsbedeling, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven 2004, pp. 127ff.; and
Lauwaert 2008, pp. 189 190.
429 For example, more than 90 percent of the mediated cases in the United States and
Canada resulted in restitution agreements (M.S. Umbreit, R.B. Coates & A.W. Roberts,
‘The Impact of Victim Offender Mediation: A Cross National Perspective’, Mediation
Quarterly 2000 3, p. 224).
430 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 43; and J. Blad, ‘De betekenis van de
overeenkomst’, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2007 2, p. 11.
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ultimate willingness to make amends. By fulfilling these conditions, the
offender both recognises the victim and the harm the victim suffered at his
hands and he acknowledges his accountability. Generally, offenders tend to
fulfil the obligations that result from mediation agreements. Studies indicate
that the compliance rate of offenders who participate in restorative
programmes is substantially higher than that of offenders exposed to other
arrangements.431 The offender’s fulfilment of the agreement contributes to
the victim’s achievement of closure. For example, the payment of
compensation by the offender can convince the victim that the offender
accepts responsibility for the damage caused. Moreover, the victim can
experience a sincere apology from the offender as a recognition of the harm
caused.432
The offender’s compliance with the mediation agreement has a positive
effect on the victim’s wellbeing. However, the opposite is also true. A failed
implementation of the agreement can cause the victim to feel frustrated and
distressed, and can even lead to secondary victimisation.433 Apologies that
the victim regards as insincere tend to impede the victim’s ability to forgive
the offender434 and may worsen the trauma of secondary victimisation.435
431 Up to 81 percent of the offenders that participated in mediation, against 58 percent of
those that were ordered to pay restitution by the court (M.S. Umbreit, R.B. Coates & B.
Vos, ‘Victim Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and Research’, Conflict
Resolution Quarterly 2004 1/2, pp. 290 291; and Umbreit, Coates & Roberts 2000, p. 225).
Similar percentages resulted from a study into restitution compliance in restorative
practices in the Netherlands (Blad 2007, p. 11; and Y.M. Hokwerda, Herstelrecht in
jeugdstrafzaken, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2004, p. 176). See also J. Latimer,
C. Dowden & D. Muise, ‘The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta
Analysis’, The Prison Journal 2005 2, p. 137.
432 C.D. Schneider, ‘What It Means to Be Sorry. The Power of Apology in Mediation’,
Mediation Quarterly 2000 3, pp. 265 and 269. The acceptance of responsibility by the
offender is generally considered a central element of an effective apology (C.J. Petrucci,
‘Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an
Additional Component in the Legal System’, Behavioral Science and the Law 2002, pp.
349ff.). Receiving an apology from the offender may also contribute to the victim’s
ability to forgive the offender (M.E. McCullough, E.L. Worthington & K.C. Rachal,
‘Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships’, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 1997 2, pp. 321 and 332ff.).
433 The United Nations Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes points out that victims
may be concerned about the lack of consequences imposed on offenders who fail to live
up to their commitment or terms in the agreement, and that they may be pressured into
failing to reveal that the offender has not complied with the negotiated agreement
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 68).
434 R.F. Baumeister, J.J. Exline & K.L. Sommer, ‘The Victim Role, Grudge Theory, and Two
Dimensions of Forgiveness’, in: A.L. Worthington (ed.), Dimensions of Forgiveness,
Philadelphia: Templeton 1998, pp. 100ff.
435 A. Pemberton, F.W. Winkel & M.S. Groenhuijsen, ‘Op weg naar slachtoffergerichte
theorievorming in het herstelrecht’, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2006 1, p. 57; A.
Opdebeeck, G. Vervaeke & F.W. Winkel, ‘Bemiddeling in het strafrecht’, in: P.J. van
Koppen et al. (eds.), Het Recht van Binnen, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, pp. 941 942; and R.A.
Baron, ‘Attributions and Organizational Conflict: The Mediating Role of Apparent
Sincerity’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1988 1, pp. 125ff.
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Failure to implement a mediation agreement can lead to the resumption or
continuation of the criminal justice process, depending on the type of victim
offender mediation that preceded the criminal trial (diversionary mediation
or mediation as part of regular court proceedings). If the reasons behind the
implementation failure trace back to the communication in mediation, the
principle of confidentiality as currently interpreted applies: the reasons for
the failure should be subject to secrecy and should not be disclosed.
Furthermore, the United Nations Basic Principles state that a failure to
implement a mediation agreement should not be used as a justification for a
more severe sentence in subsequent criminal proceedings.436 The case should
be referred back to the restorative programme or to the criminal justice
process,437 and a decision as to how to proceed should be taken without
delay. The principle of confidentiality is the main inspiration for this
provision. However, if the offender deliberately refuses to comply with the
agreement, it is questionable whether a restorative programme can repair
the agreement or inspire a new agreement between the victim and the
offender.
Implementation failures could only be used as aggravating circumstances
by the court if the court finds fault with the offender in approaching the
execution of the agreement. This may compel the court to examine how the
agreement came about and what transpired in mediation.438 Such an
examination can violate mediation confidentiality. It has therefore been
proposed to consider an implementation failure simply as an incentive to
resume the criminal justice proceedings.439 This would also avoid undue
interference of the judicial system with restorative programmes.
The approach advocated by the Basic Principles seems to be acceptable if
offenders cannot be blamed for the implementation failure. Some factors
may make it impossible for them to fulfil their obligations. For example,
offenders may loose their job and may consequently be unable to pay the
agreed restitution. The offender may also have agreed to perform
community service with an agency of the victim’s choice, but the agency
concerned later appears not to need or want the offender’s services.440
Although offenders should act carefully and proactively in such cases – they
may offer their services to a similar organisation, preferably in consultation
with the victim and/or the mediator – they should not be held accountable
for implementation failures that are beyond their control. Such failures
should indeed merely be considered an incentive to resume the criminal
justice proceedings, and should not be used as a justification for a more
severe sentence.441
436 Paragraph 17 of the Basic Principles.
437 ‘where required by national law’, see Paragraph 17 of the Basic Principles.
438 See also Van Ness 2003, pp. 172 173.
439 Van Ness 2003, pp. 172 173.
440 See also Van Ness 2003, p. 172.
441 Cf. Chapter 6.2.3.
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However, an implementation failure may also be caused by reprehensible
behaviour of the offender. For example, offenders may refuse to pay
damages as contractually agreed, or to write the victim the promised letter
of apology. The approach to such failures advocated by the Basic Principles
leaves the victim empty handed. A failure to comply with the contractual
obligations means that the victim will no longer be compensated because of
reprehensible offender behaviour. Such behaviour may induce the court to
impose a harsher punishment; the offender’s informed and conscious
decision to participate in mediation, combined with the freedom to
withdraw without consequences, implies that an offender who chooses to
participate in mediation and nevertheless frustrates the procedure itself or
its completion may be facing a more severe sentence.442 However, the
current scope of application of the interpretation of the principle of
confidentiality to all communication in media ion dictates that the reasons
for the implementation failure cannot be disclosed afterwards. The court is
therefore unable to establish fault on the offender’s side for the failure of the
agreement and to take the implementation failure into account in sentencing.
Furthermore, the ban on disclosure means that victims are unable to express
in court their distress and frustration at the failed agreement. As a result,
victims may experience feelings of secondary victimisation (see above), and
no longer gain from their participation in mediation.
The problems caused by adhering to the current interpretation of the
principle of confidentiality give cause for reconsidering the level of
confidentiality that should apply. This will be examined below for each of
the three types of victim offender mediation, focusing on agreement failures
caused by reprehensible offender behaviour.
7.3 Victim Offender Mediation as a Diversionary Measure
In the case of diversionary mediation, a failure of the process leads to the
resumption of the criminal trial, and the impossibility to implement the
mediation agreement implies that the case is referred back to the criminal
justice officials. Even though the reasons behind the implementation failure
should remain confidential given the current interpretation of the principle
of confidentiality, they may be relevant to court proceedings. As has been
explained, keeping these issues secret can have serious drawbacks for the
victim. Furthermore, a failure to carry out the mediation agreement implies
that the victim has no opportunities left to obtain material or immaterial
compensation in an out of court procedure. Making an exception to the
principle of confidentiality and allowing disclosure of information about an
implementation failure could remedy these defects. It would, for example,
enable the victim to bring to the attention of the court that the offender failed
442 See also Chapter Six.
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to pay the instalments they agreed on during the mediation, or refused to
stay away from the victim. Allowing disclosure of the intentional violation
of these conditions would give the court the opportunity to take these issues
into consideration.
Additionally, a failed implementation of a mediation agreement may also
become the focus of civil litigation. This is most likely if the failed agreement
included the payment of damages. If the offender fails to comply with the
agreement and the victim decides to bring a civil action, the victim can base
the claim on the offender’s failure to perform the contract. To substantiate
such a claim (by explaining the process of the realisation of the agreement),
the victim may understandably need to present information from the
mediation. If the duties in the agreement concern the payment of a small
sum in compensation, or writing a letter of apology, it is unlikely that a
failure will lead to civil litigation; the possible benefits for the victim would
be outweighed by legal costs. The offender’s failure to fulfil such obligations
may, however, come to bear on criminal proceedings, and can be taken into
account by the criminal court in determining the severity of the sentence (see
above). The criminal court may also award damages, if the victim joins the
proceedings as injured party.
For the information concerned to be legally admissible, disclosure must be
compatible with the fundamentals of victim offender mediation, and of
criminal and civil law.
Compliance with the main mediation characteristics indicates that the victim
and the offender commit to bringing the mediation to a favourable
conclusion. They should be thoroughly informed prior to the mediation, and
they can withdraw from the procedure at any time. The victim and the
offender are aware of the consequences of their decision to take part, and
they accept these implications willingly. In other words, the victim and the
offender are devoted to reaching an agreement at the end of the mediation
and to fulfilling the resulting conditions; compliance with the agreement is
part of the parties’ commitment to contribute to the success of mediation.
This also follows from the acceptance of responsibility by the offender,
which is mostly inherent in the acknowledgement of the basic facts. Taking
responsibility extends to the fulfilment of the obligations in the agreement –
the ultimate recognition of victims and their needs. A deliberate violation of
these conditions implies a violation of the main mediation requirements,
especially since offenders have the opportunity to withdraw from the
mediation at any time, if they cannot reach an agreement with the victim. As
a result, the mediation requirements do not stand in the way of making an
exception to the principle of confidentiality, if the offender imputably fails to
comply with the agreement; such an exception would rather serve to
denounce the violation concerned. Besides, the principle of confidentiality
should not somehow protect the offender against the revelation of culpable
acts, especially since the failure of the agreement is disadvantageous to the
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victim. Although disclosure of information about an implementation failure
may constitute a serious violation of the principle of confidentiality – it may
compel the court to investigate the background of the failure to establish the
offender’s fault – the breach of the mediation essentials and the
consequences for the victim justify making an exception to this rule.443
Allowing disclosure of information about a failed implementation is
therefore compatible with the main mediation characteristics. However, the
possibilities for the court to investigate the responsibility of the offender for
such a failure depend on the admissibility of this information in court.
The essential features of criminal and civil law identified in Chapter Four
should be observed when submitting information in court in order to
safeguard a correct and fair course of the proceedings.
One of the features of criminal law is its fact finding focus. In most
jurisdictions, the fact finding process covers both the criminal event(s) and
the personal circumstances of the accused. These personal circumstances can
include post delict behaviour, such as the willingness of alleged offenders to
express remorse, or their fulfilment of the duties that result from the
mediation agreement.444 This will allow the criminal court to consider
behaviour of the offender during and after the mediation and to draw
conclusions. If the court holds the offender accountable for the failed
agreement, it may decide to impose a harsher punishment to reflect the
violation of the mediation itself and for the harm the failure caused to the
victim.445 The other essential features of criminal law do not preclude the use
of information about an implementation failure as evidence in criminal
court, but procedural requirements should be observed.
When victim offender mediation is followed by civil proceedings on
account of an implementation failure of the mediation agreement, relevant
information can only be used to substantiate the plaintiff’s claim (or the
defendant’s plea) if the essentials of civil law are observed. The use of the
443 An intermediate stage might be to refer the case back to the restorative programme
concerned in the case of an implementation failure. An example of this practice can be
found in Austria. If offenders fail to pay the agreed financial compensation, the
mediator will contact the offender and inquire about the reasons for the failure to pay in
order to find a solution. If the offender does not respond or remains unwilling to
comply with the agreement, the case will be referred back to the prosecutor’s office for
continuation, and the mediator will inform the victim of the possibilities to claim
compensation in criminal or civil proceedings.
444 Although the accused’s personal circumstances are taken into consideration at different
moments in common law and civil law countries, post delict behaviour can be taken
into account in many. See also Chapter 4.3.1.
445 The assumption being that the implementation failure occurs in time to be notified to
the criminal court. However, the offender may fail to comply with the mediation
agreement after the criminal trial has been concluded. For example, the offender may
start to pay the instalments of the damages as agreed, but cease to do so after a few
months. In such a case, the only way for the victim to enforce the observance of the
agreement is through civil litigation.
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information concerned does not violate these essentials, as long as the
necessary procedural requirements are met.
It follows that the essentials of criminal and civil law do not prejudice for the
evidential use in court of information about an intentional failure to
implement a mediation agreement. This may be different if such information
should be left out of the official deliberations due to criminal and civil law
limitations on the use of relevant facts and circumstances.
The coercive powers put many investigative sources at the disposal of the
criminal justice authorities. Their use is regulated and limited by law.
However, these legal restraints do not resist the use of information that
concerns an intentional violation of the mediation agreement by the
offender. This information has not been obtained by the exertion of these
powers, but stems from a procedure the offender voluntarily participated in.
Consequently, this limitation does not apply here.
The same goes for the privilege to refuse to testify, both in criminal and in
civil law, because this privilege concerns the issue who can disclose
information and not, as in the current context, what information can be
disclosed. This also holds for the civil law limitation of the restricted
conclusive force of statements made by party witnesses. Nor does the
exclusionary rule give cause to block exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality for information about implementation failures.
As a result, the limitations on the use of relevant information in criminal
and civil law do not close off the use of information about a failure to
implement an agreement.
To conclude, when the implementation of an agreement that was reached in
the course of diversionary mediation fails through the offender’s fault,
information about the realisation of this agreement can be disclosed in spite
of the principle of confidentiality and can be used by the court in subsequent
judicial proceedings.
7.4 Victim Offender Mediation as Part of Regular Court Proceedings
If mediation is used as part of regular court proceedings, it will be followed
by a criminal trial irrespective of its outcome. A failure of the mediation
agreement will not determine whether the case goes to criminal court, but
may only affect the severity of the sentence, whereas in the case of
diversionary mediation, the failure of the agreement causes the case to be
referred back to the criminal justice authorities.
In the current context, the offender’s reprehensible refusal to comply with
the agreement can influence the outcome of the ensuing criminal procedure.
As explained, the criminal court can take post delict behaviour into account
when assessing a case, including offender behaviour during or after a
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victim offender mediation. If a mediation that is part of court proceedings is
successfully concluded (including the fulfilment of the obligations that arise
from the agreement), this may have a positive effect on the court’s
sentencing decision in a similar vein to, for example, an expression of regret
by an alleged offender. If the agreement is not executed, the failure should in
principle not be considered an aggravating circumstance. However, if the
offender willingly frustrates the implementation of the mediation
agreement, the court should be able to take this into account (see above).
This implies that information concerning a reprehensible implementation
failure of the mediation agreement can be relevant in criminal court. The
same is true if the mediation is ensued by civil litigation, although the
current type of mediation is unlikely to be followed by civil proceedings
based on the impossibility to carry out the agreement. In the first place, the
agreement may contain arrangements concerning a small amount of
compensation to be paid, or non pecuniary obligations for the offender.
Secondly, if the agreement settles damages and the offender fails to pay
these, the criminal court may address this issue as well. This may be
different if the criminal court is unable to consider the victim’s claim for
compensation, for example, because of its complexity. This, however, seems
unlikely, since the parties successfully tackled the supposed complexity of
the request for damages and reached agreement on the payment of
compensation during the mediation. Nevertheless, if the victim’s only
opportunity to obtain financial compensation is to go to civil court, he may
need to use information about the implementation failure to substantiate his
claim.
Disclosure of information about an implementation failure may offer a
remedy to the victim for the drawbacks caused by the offender’s lack of
willingness to fulfil the obligations from the agreement, and the court
should be able to take this information into consideration. In making this
exception to the principle of confidentiality, the essentials of victim offender
mediation and of criminal and civil law should, of course, be respected.
As explained, the main mediation characteristics presuppose that the
decision of offenders to take part in victim offender mediation is indicative
of their commitment to contribute to the procedure and to comply with the
mediation agreement. An intentional violation of this agreement therefore
infringes the main features of the process. This, in combination with the
drawbacks that an implementation failure has for victims, leads to the
conclusion that the essentials of victim offender mediation are not violated
by making an exception to the confidentiality rule in this context. 446
Nevertheless, for the information concerned to be admissible in court, its
disclosure must not interfere with the essential features of criminal and civil
law. What is said in this context about diversionary mediation mutatis
446 See also Section 7.3.
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mutandis also applies here. This means that the main characteristics of
criminal and civil law do not oppose the disclosure and subsequent use of
the information concerned in court, as long as the required procedural
requirements are sufficiently satisfied.
As for the existing limitations on the use of relevant facts and
circumstances in criminal and civil law, the discussion of these issues
regarding diversionary mediation is also relevant here, and they
consequently do not prevent the use of information about a reprehensible
failure of the offender to comply with the mediation agreement.
In conclusion, the essentials of mediation and of criminal and civil law are
compatible with making an exception to the principle of confidentiality for
information about an intentional implementation failure if the preceding
mediation was part of regular court proceedings. The information concerned
should therefore be open to disclosure in spite of the current interpretation
of the confidentiality rule, and the court should be able to take that
information into account in related judicial proceedings.
7.5 Victim Offender Mediation after Conviction and Sentencing
As this type of victim offender mediation takes place after the offender has
been convicted and sentenced, it will not be followed by related criminal
proceedings. The victim may, of course, claim performance of the agreement
in civil court, but, for the reasons mentioned above, this is unlikely. In
addition, the current modality of victim offender mediation is not usually
focused on reaching an enforceable agreement at the end of the mediation,
but rather on the therapeutic value of the process and on achieving
closure.447 In such cases, there is no legal ground for instituting civil
proceedings concerning an implementation failure. Moreover, if the parties
do arrive at an agreement, it usually does not include the payment of
damages, but other forms of compensation, such as an apology by the
offender. Obviously, a failure to comply with such obligations is not likely to
be the focus of judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, when the outcome of the
current type of victim offender mediation does give cause for civil litigation,
the considerations regarding diversionary mediation and mediation as part
of regular court proceedings apply here as well. The implication is that a
victim who initiates civil litigation to enforce the observance of a mediation
agreement should be allowed to disclose information about a reprehensible
implementation failure, and the court should be able to take this information
into consideration. The opportunity to raise these issues may be crucial,
since the victim has no other remedies to seek justice; the criminal justice
process has been concluded, as has the mediation process.
447 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006, p. 77.
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7.6 Conclusion
A successful victim offender mediation is in many cases concluded with an
agreement between the victim and the offender. This agreement can include
various obligations for offenders in recognition of the needs and feelings of
victims, such as paying compensation, making an apology, or performing
community service. Offender compliance with the agreement can be
regarded as the ultimate acknowledgement of victims and the harm they
suffered.
For various reasons, the implementation of a mediation agreement can
fail. This can understandably have drawbacks for the victim, especially if the
offender consciously and reprehensibly refuses to carry out the duties
concerned. Since the current interpretation of the principle of confidentiality
implies that the victim cannot talk about such issues, it can be argued that
this scope should be reconsidered for reprehensible failures. To this end, the
compatibility of such an exception to the confidentiality rule with the
fundamentals of victim offender mediation has been examined, as has the
admissibility of the information concerned in criminal and civil court. This
has led to the conclusion that information about an intentional
implementation failure by the offender should be open to disclosure and can
be taken into consideration by the court. These findings apply to all types of
victim offender mediation, in both criminal (modalities one and two) and
civil (modalities one, two, and three) proceedings.
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8 Procedural Position of the Mediation
Participants
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapters discussed several frictions between the confidential
nature of victim offender mediation and the essential elements of criminal
and civil law. Three potential exceptions to the current principle of
confidentiality were formulated. An exception should be made for when the
offender commits a new crime against the victim during the mediation, or
reveals information about other crimes. Confessional statements of the
offender, including the acknowledgement of basic facts, and the reasons for
a reprehensible implementation failure of the mediation agreement should
also be open to disclosure. Allowing the mediation participants to disclose
the information concerned aims at relieving the harm caused by these
disruptions.
The current chapter will examine the mediation participants’
opportunities to disclose mediation information in the course of judicial
proceedings. These opportunities are important here, since they influence
the effect of making an exception to the principle of confidentiality. If
mediation information is admissible in legal proceedings, the court can take
it into consideration, and the victim can expose the behaviour of the
offender. In the previous chapters, the admissibility of mediation
information in court was examined as a factor that influences the
advisability of making an exception to the principle of confidentiality.
However, admissibility is only half of the story. The other half concerns the
procedural position of the mediation participants, and their opportunities to
present information in court. The participants in mediation that become
involved in civil or criminal proceedings may find themselves in a difficult
position. On the one hand, the advocated scope of the principle of
confidentiality requires that they keep all mediation communication secret.
On the other hand, the law may stipulate that they make a statement and
provide the requested information. In some cases, they may also have the
right to make a statement. These factors may influence the participants’
chances of bringing information to the attention of the court, and thus the
suitability of information disclosure as an effective remedy.
This chapter will therefore discuss the procedural position of the
mediation participants and their opportunities to submit information in
judicial proceedings. The position of each mediation participant (the victim,
the mediator/professional caregiver, and the offender) will be examined
separately, for both criminal law and civil law. The main findings will be
summarised in the conclusion.
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8.2 The Position of the Victim
8.2.1 Criminal Law
Generally, criminal proceedings will follow a failed diversionary mediation
or mediation sessions that were held as part of regular court proceedings.
Victims who participated in such mediations may become engaged in a
criminal trial,448 and their different role(s) in court may influence their
possibilities to present information.
8.2.1.1 Facilitating the Offender’s Prosecution
Victims can facilitate the prosecution of the offender in two ways,
depending on the applicable legislation. Some jurisdictions (mainly
common law ones) require for certain crimes that the victim presses charges
against the offender, before the latter can be prosecuted. Civil law
jurisdictions generally also recognise the victim’s right to report a crime,
although the public prosecutor’s office can institute proceedings against the
offender of its own accord. In many cases, the victim’s report of the crime
will induce the criminal justice authorities to prosecute the offender.
Although not all jurisdictions require the victim to lodge a complaint, cases
that are referred to victim offender mediation will generally have been
reported by the victim. After all, starting mediation presupposes that the
victim of the crime has been identified, which usually happens through
reporting the crime. In addition, most crimes that qualify for mediation only
come to the attention of the criminal justice authorities because the victim
reports a crime (e.g., assault, or domestic violence).
Some civil law countries additionally allow victims of some crimes to
initiate the offender’s prosecution themselves and apply directly to the
criminal court. Among others, Germany (Privatklage and Nebenklage),449
Belgium (burgerlijke partijstelling),450 and France (partie civile),451 offer victims
this opportunity. If the victim privately prosecutes the offender, the
requested court should give its ruling on the case. The position of victims
who directly apply to the court partly resembles that of the injured party.
They have similar opportunities for advancing information in court to
substantiate their claim for financial compensation (see further Section
8.2.1.2). Additionally, private prosecution provides victims with some extra
powers. The central focus of this section is on the position of victims during
the hearing of the case in court and on their opportunities to furnish
448 Victim offender mediation after conviction and sentencing of the offender will not be
discussed here, since it is not followed by a related criminal trial.
449 Articles 374 et seq. of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung,
StPO) and Arts. 395 et seq. StPO, respectively.
450 Articles 63 et seq. and 182 et seq. of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van
Strafvordering, WvSv).
451 Articles 85 et seq. of the French Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de Procédure Pénale,
CPP).
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mediation information as evidence. The relevant powers in this context are
interrogating the offender,452 making a statement,453 and reacting to the
evidence presented.454 Victims may use these powers to present mediation
information that falls within the scope of the exceptions to the
confidentiality rule, or request the offender to reveal such information,455 if,
that is, the victim prosecutes the offender privately, and the case is
subsequently referred to victim offender mediation, and then followed by a
criminal trial. This, however, is not a likely scenario; it may not be useful to
refer cases to victim offender mediation that involve victims who have
decided to prosecute the offender privately, since it is unlikely that victims
will have come to this decision if their conflict with the offender could have
been more easily resolved otherwise. Also, the institution of proceedings
may damage the relationship between the victim and the offender to the
extent that mediation is no longer an option.
In other respects, the victim’s opportunities to facilitate the prosecution of
the offender are largely irrelevant here. After all, victims will generally lodge
their complaint before the start of a victim offender mediation, and that
moment will then coincide with the crime coming to the attention of the
criminal justice authorities. As a result, the victim’s report or charge is
unlikely to contain confidential information from the mediation. It may,
however, lead to the identification of the offender and thus to the
subsequent referral to victim offender mediation. If the victim’s report needs
further explanation during the hearing of the case, the victim can be
summoned as a witness after the mediation is concluded (see Section
8.2.1.4).
8.2.1.2 Injured Party
In many jurisdictions, victims can join criminal proceedings as the injured
party. As such, the victim can claim damages without starting civil
litigation.456
It is likely that the topic of financial compensation is addressed during the
victim offender mediation that precedes the criminal proceedings. The
victim is therefore most likely to join the proceedings as the injured party
when the mediation has failed or – less probable – when the victim and the
offender have reached an agreement on other issues, but not on the
compensation to be paid. In such cases, the victim can apply to the criminal
court for damages. The damage suffered should be the result of the crime. It
452 For example, Art. 397 in conjunction with Art. 240, para. 2 StPO. The position of
offenders during interrogation will be discussed in Section 8.4.1.
453 For example, Art. 385 StPO.
454 For example, Art. 397 in conjunction with Arts. 257 and 258 StPO.
455 The position of the offender, who participated in mediation, during a criminal trial will
be discussed in Section 8.4.1.
456 In some countries, for example, in the Netherlands, an injured party can only join the
criminal proceedings if its claim is uncomplicated in nature. In other jurisdictions, such
as Belgium, this condition does not apply.
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is therefore unlikely that the victim will substantiate the claim with
confidential information from the mediation, since the damage was caused
prior to the mediation, and confidentiality problems are therefore
improbable. However, if an additional explanation of the claim is needed,
victims can be summoned as witnesses (see Section 8.2.1.4). The implications
of what should happen if they are asked about the contents of the mediation
in that capacity will be discussed below.
8.2.1.3 Victim Impact Statement
The third opportunity for the victim to participate in a criminal trial is by
making a victim impact statement (VIS).457 A VIS can generally be made
orally or in writing, and relates the consequences of a crime for the victim. In
the majority of cases, a VIS is not considered a deposition and the victim is
not sworn in prior to making the statement. If a VIS is challenged, the victim
must usually take an oath, and be heard as a witness (see Section 8.2.1.4).458
The significance of a VIS after the victim and the offender have
participated in mediation can be questioned, since mediation also enables
the victim to talk about the impact and the consequences of the crime.
However, when the mediation has failed, victims may feel strongly about
sharing their experiences with the court – they want to be properly heard. In
such cases, victims may want to include their impressions from the
mediation in the VIS. Should they be allowed to do so? After all, the current
interpretation of the principle of confidentiality seems to be at odds with
disclosure of such issues.
Their informed and voluntary participation in mediation may indicate that
victims should respect mediation confidentiality when issuing a VIS. The
victim determines the contents of the VIS, and, as a result, can decide to
maintain the required level of secrecy. However, since there are three
situations in which it should be possible to bypass the confidentiality rule,
victims should be able to include the information concerned in their VIS,
especially since the VIS is one of the main instruments for victims to express
457 Among others, see J. Chalmers et al., ‘Victim Impact Statements: Can Work, Do Work
(For Those Who Bother to Make Them)’, Criminal Law Review 2007 5, pp. 360 379; J.V.
Roberts & A. Edgar, Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Judicial Experiences and
Perceptions, Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada 2006; A. Pemberton, ‘Het
spreekrecht: vergelding of herstel?’, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2005 3, pp. 34 44; A.
Sanders et al., ‘Victim Impact Statements: Don t Work, Can t Work’, Criminal Law Review
2001 6, 447 458; and R. Morgan & A. Sanders, The Uses of Victim Statements, London:
Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate 1999.
458 See, e.g., M.J. Alink & P.D.J. van Zeben, Getuigen in het Nederlands Strafproces, Nijmegen:
Wolf Legal Publishers 2007, p. 146. Not all jurisdictions offer victims the opportunity to
make a VIS. Also, the conditions mentioned here do not necessarily apply in all cases
and may differ between countries. The same goes for when the VIS is used during the
proceedings. For example, in some countries, victims may issue their VIS during the
investigation at the hearing and prior to the verdict or judgement, while in other
jurisdictions, the VIS is issued during the sentencing stage, after the offender has been
found guilty.
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themselves during the trial phase. This holds especially true for countries
that recognise the guilty plea bargaining. These jurisdictions have different
procedures for accused that plead guilty or not guilty. When they plead not
guilty, their case is submitted to the court for its assessment, but when they
plead guilty, often the prosecution and the defence agree to a lesser charge
or punishment. If such an agreement is reached, the offender is not brought
to trial.459 Cases that have been the subject of victim offender mediation
often involve a confession by the offender (see Chapter 6.3), and it is
therefore likely that plea bargaining will occur. Since the case will then no
longer be the subject of a regular criminal trial, victims will be unable to
advance information about the mediation during the hearing of the case in
court. Issuing a VIS, which can be taken into account during the sentencing
process (including plea bargaining),460 is then the only way for victims to be
heard and to influence the proceedings. The concept of plea bargaining is a
significant element of the criminal justice system in the United States, and
forms of plea bargaining can also be found in other common law
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom.461 Civil law countries generally
do not recognise this concept,462 or a highly restricted version,463 despite the
fact that the organisation of their criminal proceedings may partially
resemble that of common law criminal proceedings (see further Section
8.2.1.4).464
The disclosure of mediation information in a VIS should nevertheless be
limited to the proposed exceptions so as to safeguard the confidentiality of
the remaining contents of the mediation session.
459 For example, regarding the course of events in this respect in the United Kingdom, see J.
Feldman, ‘England and Wales’, in: C.M. Bradley (ed.), Criminal procedure. A Worldwide
Study, Durham: Carolina Academic Press 2007, p. 177; and J.R. Spencer, ‘The English
System’, in: M. Delmas Marty & J.R. Spencer (eds.), European Criminal Procedures,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 163 164 and 179 181; regarding the
United States, see C.M. Bradley, ‘United States’, in: Bradley (ed.) 2007, p. 543; and F.
Tulkens, ‘Negotiated Justice’, in: Delmas Marty & Spencer (eds.) 2002, pp. 661 662.
460 In the United Kingdom, only a written VIS will be accepted at this point (Feldman 2007,
p. 191). In the United States, victims should be consulted by the prosecution as to the
disposition of the case, including plea bargaining (Bradley 2007, p. 546).
461 Feldman 2007, pp. 176 177; Bradley 2007, pp. 543 544; C.H. Brants & B. Stapert, Plea
Bargaining in de Verenigde Staten en in Engeland en Wales, Utrecht: Willem Pompe
Instituut voor Strafrechtswetenschappen 2003; and Tulkens 2002, pp. 664 668.
462 E.g., criminal proceedings in the Netherlands do not distinguish between accused that
plead guilty and those that do not. A confession on its own is considered insufficient for
a conviction. See G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht, Arnhem: Kluwer 2008,
pp. 677 678.
463 Such as the French comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (R.S. Frase,
‘France’, in: Bradley (ed.) 2007, p. 227). Further, e.g., P.J. Delage, ‘La comparution sur
reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité: quand la pratique ramène à la théorie’, Recueil
Dalloz de doctrine de jurisprudence et de législation 2005 29, pp. 1970 1973.
464 As, for example, in Belgium, where lay judges participate in the administration of justice
(as also happens in many common law jurisdictions), but where plea bargaining is not
allowed (C. van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht, strafprocesrecht en internationaal strafrecht,
Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2006, p. 1081).
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8.2.1.4 Witness
The fourth and most significant position of the victim in a criminal trial is
that of a witness. If victims join the process as injured parties or make a VIS,
or if their report is insufficiently clear, they can be requested to testify for the
purpose of clarification. They can also be summoned as witnesses for other
reasons during the hearing of a case, by the public prosecutor, the defence,
or the court. The right of the defence to call witnesses derives from the right
to a fair trial and from the right of the accused to examine or have examined
witnesses against them.465 This right is not absolute; the ECHR allows
domestic courts a measure of discretion to set the conditions for calling
witnesses, as follows from Art. 6, para. 3, under d ECHR, and also from Art.
14, para. 3, under e of the ICCPR.466 These conditions apply equally to the
defence and the prosecution.
Hearing witnesses is one of the main instruments for courts to support the
fact finding process, and people who are called in evidence have few
options to refuse to give testimony. Legislation on witnesses diverges
between countries. This is partly due to the differences between jury systems
and non jury systems. Most common law jurisdictions recognise the option
of trial by jury and therefore generally require that evidence is produced in
the presence of the court during such proceedings; witnesses should
therefore be heard during the actual hearing of the case. Some civil law
countries also allow lay persons to participate in the administration of
justice, mostly on a bench that comprises both professional and lay judges.467
These courts mostly deal with severe crimes.468 In civil law countries with
some form of lay justice, it is also considered important that evidence is
produced during the hearing of the case in lay procedures. Civil law
jurisdictions that do not recognise lay judges469 often rely on the information
that has been gathered during the preliminary investigation. In such cases,
465 Cf. Art. 6, para. 3, under d ECHR and Art. 14, para. 3, under e ICCPR.
466 See also P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 2006, pp. 648 649; and Chapter 4.3.2.1.
467 Such as the Belgian Hof van Assisen (Van den Wyngaert 2006, pp. 594 599), the French
Cour d’Assises (W. Roumier, L’Avenir du Jury Criminel, Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit
et de Jurisprudence 2003), and the German Amtsgericht and Landgericht (T. Weigend,
‘Germany’, in: Bradley (ed.) 2007, pp. 263 264; S.H.E. Janssen & M.T. Croes, Niet
rechterlijke actoren in de rechtspraak van Nederland, Denemarken en Duitsland, The Hague:
WODC 2005, pp. 20 21; and R. Juy Birmann, ‘The German System’, in: Delmas Marty &
Spencer (eds.) 2002, p. 298).
468 For example, the Belgian Hof van Assisen generally deals with crimes which carry a
penalty of over twenty years (Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 595). An exception to the
tendency that lay justice in civil law countries is reserved for serious crimes is the
German Amtsgericht, which has jurisdiction over crimes for which the sentence
anticipated by the public prosecutor is more than two years (Weigend 2007, p. 263;
Th.A. de Roos, Is de invoering van lekenrechtspraak in de Nederlandse strafrechtspleging
gewenst?, Tilburg: Universiteit van Tilburg 2006, p. 55; Janssen & Croes 2005, pp. 20 21;
and Juy Birmann 2002, p. 306).
469 Such as the Netherlands (De Roos 2006; Janssen & Croes 2005, pp. 8 11; and J.R. Spencer,
‘Introduction’, in: Delmas Marty & Spencer (eds.) 2002, p. 13).
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the court generally uses records of witness statements to the police. Civil
law jurisdictions which do use lay justice for specific crimes also generally
rely on previously gathered information in other proceedings which do not
involve laymen.470 The differences between these systems understandably
influence the position of witnesses.
A summoned witness is in principle obliged to give testimony. In many
jurisdictions, witnesses have a legal duty to appear before the court and to
answer the questions asked truthfully. A violation of this duty is in some
cases punishable by law. Furthermore, certain coercive powers can be
exerted to enforce witnesses to show up in court, or to make a statement.
This type of legislation is common to civil law countries. It can, for example,
be found in the Netherlands (Articles 213, 221, 287, and 294 of the Dutch
Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, WvSv),471 Belgium
(Arts. 80 and 157 of the Belgian WvSv)472 and Germany (Arts. 51 and 70
StPO).473 In common law countries, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, the obligation of witnesses to appear and to make a statement
depends on their competence and their compellability. The witnesses’
competence concerns their ability to give testimony; in general, all persons
are considered to be competent, unless special regulations apply. Competent
witnesses can normally be compelled to testify. Failure to comply with an
order to appear as a witness or to answer the questions asked can lead to
imprisonment, or a charge of contempt of court.474 Consequently, witnesses
in all systems can be obliged to make a statement, and they can be punished
for failing to comply with a request to do so.
Although the obligation to appear as a witness is a factor common to
many jurisdictions, it is not absolute. People who are called in evidence can
refuse to make a statement if they can invoke a privilege. A victim can –
under certain circumstances – refrain from making a statement based on
relational grounds, for example, if the offender is the partner, ex partner or a
close relative of the victim. Victims can also abstain from giving testimony if
this will lead to self incrimination, or to incrimination of one of the persons
the relational privilege applies to.
470 E.g., E. van Fraechem & P. Traest, ‘Is er een toekomst voor de juryrechtspraak?’, Jura
Falconis 1999 2000, pp. 95 104.
471 See, e.g., Alink & Van Zeben 2007, p. 31; and G.P.M.F. Mols, Getuigen in strafzaken,
Deventer: Kluwer 2003, pp. 235 259.
472 See, e.g., R. Verstraeten, Handboek Strafvordering, Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu 2005, pp.
428 431 and 936 939.
473 See, e.g., U. Eisenberg, Beweisrecht der StPO. Spezialkommentar, Munich: C.H. Beck 2006,
pp. 285 349.
474 See, e.g., P. Murphy,Murphy on Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, pp. 472
474; P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2004, pp. 222 228; and S. Seabrooke & J. Sprack, Criminal Evidence and Procedure: the
Essential Framework, London: Blackstone Press Limited 1999, pp. 20 22.
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In conclusion, victims who are called as witnesses, should in principle
appear before the court and truthfully answer the questions asked. This
implies that they should also respond to questions about the contents of a
preceding victim offender mediation.475 There is no conflict with the
principle of confidentiality; as long as this rule is not incorporated in
legislation as well, it cannot overrule a legal obligation.
In Chapter Three, the codification of the confidential nature of victim
offender mediation on national level was discussed. There are, however, few
countries that have laid down this rule in legislation. In a number of
countries, victim offender mediation has no legal basis whatsoever. In other
countries, the confidentiality requirement is often included in lower ranking
regulations, such as ministerial directives,476 or guidelines issued by
organisations that are involved in victim offender mediation.477
The Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering,
WvSv) is one of the few examples of national legislation that includes a
provision on the confidential nature of victim offender mediation. It requires
the secrecy of documents drawn up during the mediation session, and of
statements of the parties. Consequently, mediation information cannot be
used in subsequent criminal (or civil/administrative/arbitral) proceedings. If
the information is disclosed notwithstanding, the court must disregard it.
Furthermore, mediators cannot be summoned as witnesses, nor can they
disclose any information that they have learned by virtue of their
profession.478 The Belgian law furthermore states that the victim and the
offender can reach an agreement on the disclosure of particular information.
Consequently, there is no room for the parties to disclose information
without the approval of the other party. This means that under Belgian law
they may currently be unable to disclose information to which one of the
three exceptions to the confidentiality rule applies, especially since it is
improbable that both parties will agree on the disclosure of such issues; for
example, it is likely that offenders will try to prevent victims from revealing
475 In principle, the questioning of witnesses should be limited to the observation of
witnesses in relation to the offence. It may be argued that questions pertaining to the
contents of mediation cannot be designated as such, since they do not pertain to the
question whether the offender has committed the crime concerned. The witness may
refuse to answer questions about mediation information for this reason. However, it is
not up to witnesses to assess the admissibility of the questions asked; this is generally
left to the discretion of the court. Furthermore, it may be difficult in practice to
determine whether the mediation information that is requested from the witness can
play a role in answering the question of the offender’s guilt. In addition, if witnesses are
examined in relation to a situation justifying an exception to the principle of
confidentiality, they should be free to answer these questions, since this information
should be open to disclosure. For these reasons, it will be assumed that the questioning
of witnesses can include questions regarding a preceding victim offender mediation.
476 For example, Poland and Norway (see Chapter 3.5.2 and references there).
477 For example, the Recommended Ethical Guidelines issued by VOMA (see Chapter
3.5.2).
478 Art. 555, para. 3 WvSv.
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that they have committed another crime during the mediation.
The Belgian law does not provide further specifics about the position of
the victim or the offender during hearings. It does not specify which legal
duty should prevail, if one of the parties is requested to make a statement
about the contents of the mediation; the obligation to give testimony, or the
statutory duty to observe secrecy (apart from contractually approved
information). It can, however, be assumed that Art. 555 WvSv as a lex
specialis prevails over the general provisions on witnesses.
The fact that a legal obligation to give testimony is a factor common to many
jurisdictions precludes the victim from refusing to answer questions about
the contents of a preceding victim offender mediation, since mediation
confidentiality has generally not been incorporated in legislation. Victims
can be obliged to reveal what the parties discussed in mediation, such as the
offenders’ reasons for committing the crime. Such information can be
considered an important aspect of mediation – after all, mutual
understanding often starts with comprehending the other person’s motives –
but may incriminate the offender when it is revealed in court. Consequently,
the absence of a legal basis for the principle of confidentiality may
negatively impact on the appeal for the offender to take part in mediation.
A solution to this problem would be to include the principle of
confidentiality in legislation. Statutory protection of the secret nature of
mediation information would comprise an exception to the general
obligation to testify, and the mediation participants would then be able to
observe the secrecy of the mediation contents if requested to give testimonial
evidence. The victim would be able to refuse to answer questions about the
context of the mediation. Legal incorporation of the confidentiality rule
would also prevent the statutory obligation to give testimony from being
misused to submit mediation information in court. For example, the
prosecution would no longer be able to question the victim about the
offender’s behaviour during the mediation, if that behaviour does not relate
to the three exceptions.479 Another advantage of incorporating the
confidentiality rule in legislation is that it would end the current ambiguous
situation regarding the status of mediation information; it would be clear to
all persons involved that the secrecy of the matters discussed in mediation
should in principle be observed. Furthermore, a statutory duty to respect the
confidentiality of the mediation process would recognise the general nature
of this principle and its importance for the success of victim offender
mediation. The final reason is that the legal confidentiality of mediation
information would imply a limitation on one of the main features of criminal
law, namely the fact finding process. The obligation to give testimony partly
follows from the main objectives of criminal law; the elucidation of the facts
479 That is, unless the victim and the offender agree on the disclosure of further
information.
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and circumstances pertaining to a crime. Enabling mediation participants
not to disclose mediation information would restrict the fact finding process.
Given its fundamental importance for criminal law, this limitation should
have a foreseeable and clear basis in legislation.
However, securing the confidentiality of the contents of mediation in
legislation is but the beginning. After all, such a course of action does not
reflect the justifiability of breaching mediation confidentiality in three
situations, namely if the offender commits another crime during the
mediation or reveals information about other crimes, if the offender makes
confessional statements during the mediation, or if the implementation of
the mediation agreement fails due to reprehensible behaviour of the
offender. In the previous chapters, it was argued that disclosure of
information about these three situations is necessary to remedy the impact
they have on the victim and the mediation procedure. These exceptions were
identified after careful consideration of the interests involved.
Circumvention of confidentiality should therefore be limited to these
situations in order to prevent erosion of the confidentiality principle. For
these reasons, it is crucial to include the above mentioned exceptions in
legislation as well. Current legislation, such as in Belgium, does not suffice,
since it only guarantees mediation confidentiality, without acknowledging
that there may be exceptions.480
Codification of the principle of confidentiality and its exceptions would
enable victims called as witnesses to refuse to give testimony about
mediation issues despite the legal obligation to testify. Additionally, it
would give victims the opportunity to disclose the issues the exceptions
pertain to in court if they come up during questioning. For example, when at
trial the offender withdraws a confession made in the course of a mediation,
the prosecution can approach the victim as a witness and question him or
her about the offender’s previous admission of guilt. Victims can then reveal
the confessional statements concerned to the court, and may thus challenge
the offender’s withdrawal of a confession in court.
The issue of codification of mediation confidentiality also raises the question
how a violation of such legislation should be dealt with. If mediation
information is wrongfully disclosed in court, the most obvious way of
repairing this is to leave the information concerned out of the official
deliberations. As a result, the court cannot make use of this information to
substantiate its decision. A disadvantage of this measure is that the court in
charge of the case will generally rule on the wrongfulness of the disclosure
itself.481 Consequently, it cannot be excluded that the court takes notice of
these matters and is influenced by them. However, rejecting the information
480 Apart from the possibility that the victim and the offender can agree on the disclosure of
certain issues (Art. 555, para. 1 WvSv).
481 Cf. the remarks made in Chapter 4.3.5.3 about the exclusion of unlawfully obtained
evidence in criminal law.
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concerned is the only way of dealing with wrongful disclosure of mediation
information, without terminating the proceedings at hand. Under certain
circumstances, the court may compensate the party that is disadvantaged by
the wrongful disclosure; for example, the court can mitigate the sentence to
be imposed on the offender, if the victim reveals too much of the mediation
contents.482 Nevertheless, in view of the above, prevention of the wrongful
disclosure of mediation information is paramount. Codification of the
confidentiality principle and its exceptions will ensure the highest degree of
clarity possible about what mediation information can and cannot be
divulged in court.
8.2.1.5 Admissibility of Witness Statements
The main reason for making exceptions to the principle of confidentiality is
to offer the victim a remedy for the drawbacks that are caused by the
behaviour of the offender. For instance, when the victim experiences distress
through suffering another crime during the mediation,483 the corresponding
exception enables the victim to denounce this event during the hearing and
bring it to the attention of the court. From this it follows that it is important
that the victim has an effective opportunity to disclose the information about
the offender’s behaviour. Victims should have a position during court
hearings that allows them to make a statement that can be taken into
consideration by the court. The victim’s opportunities to do so as the
reporter of the crime, the injured party and the maker of a VIS were
discussed above. Furthermore, the discussion of the victim’s position as a
witness included the issue of how the principle of confidentiality and its
exceptions should be positioned vis à vis the legal obligation to give
testimony. The next step is to examine the use of the victim’s deposition
regarding the mediation contents as evidence.
In general, the contents of a witness statement must concern facts or
circumstances that witnesses have observed or experienced themselves.484
This includes sensory perceptions, such as when the witness sees the
offender stabbing another person. Furthermore, witnesses can testify about
their state of mind (e.g., fear or shock) at a particular moment. A special
category of observations is formed by verbal or written statements of others
to the witness, or in the presence of the witness. In a way, it could be argued
that the witness perceives another person as making a statement, and that
such a statement can be part of the witness’s deposition. However,
testimonial evidence about statements made by third parties is not
admissible in all cases. Under certain circumstances, such statements can be
qualified as ‘hearsay’, and as such can be deemed inadmissible in court.
482 Or award damages to the party injured by the wrongful disclosure.
483 See Chapter 6.2.1 and references there.
484 For example, see Art. 71 of the Belgian WvSv, Art. 342 of the Dutch WvSv, and Art. 69 of
the German StPO.
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Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in jury trials, and thus in most
common law countries. In most civil law jurisdictions, third party
statements are accepted as evidence in non lay procedures, both orally (e.g.,
a witness testifies about what another person has told him or her) and in
writing (e.g., the record of a witness statement as taken down by the police).
The admissibility of hearsay evidence in both legal systems will be discussed
in more detail below.
Whether a deposition containing a third party statement (hereafter: the
original statement) should be considered hearsay depends on the question
for what purpose the original statement is tendered by the witness. The key
issue is whether the witness statement solely concerns an observation of the
witness, or whether the deposition is focused on the actual contents of the
original statement; if the original statement is relevant for a purpose other
than proving the truth of some fact asserted in it, it is not hearsay
evidence.485 The following categories of non hearsay statements and
examples will illustrate this. The first concerns the situation that the original
statement has legal effect or significance, and that making the statement has
legal consequences.486 In addition, if an original statement is furnished to
prove that it was made, or was made on a particular occasion, or in a
particular way, it is also admissible.487 For instance, the observation of a
witness that the alleged offender uttered a threat may be used as evidence
that the defendant is guilty of threat of violence.488 The fact that the
threatening statement was made has a legal consequence, namely a charge
of menace. Moreover, the statement is put forward solely to prove that it
was made, and in a particular (i.e., threatening) manner. Another category of
non hearsay statements includes statements that are produced as evidence
of the state of mind of another person.489 The witness may, for example, state
his view that the accused acted as if he was guilty, because he offered an
explanation for his behaviour which later proved false.490
Statements that can be qualified as non hearsay statements are generally
admissible in common law and civil law countries. Insofar as information
pertaining to the exceptions to the confidentiality rule can be qualified as
such, victims have the opportunity to disclose this information as part of
their testimony. The offender committing another crime during the
mediation will generally fall into this category. If the offender physically
attacks the victim during the mediation, the victim can testify to this event
because he or she experienced the offender’s attack. When the offender
485 Murphy 2005, pp. 208 209; and Roberts & Zuckerman 2004, p. 586.
486 Murphy 2005, pp. 211 212.
487 Murphy 2005, p. 212.
488 Cf. the situation that the witness observed the alleged offender stabbing another man;
this may be used as proof that the defendant is guilty of manslaughter.
489 Murphy 2005, pp. 212ff.
490 Cf. the situation that the witness saw the accused blush on being asked to explain his
behaviour; this concerns a sensory perception of the witness.
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commits a ‘verbal’ offence, such as uttering a threat, the victim can bear
witness to this, since the offender’s utterance constitutes the victim’s
perception of the fact that the offender is guilty of menace. As a result,
information about committing another crime against the same victim during
the mediation is generally admissible as evidence in court. However,
revelations of the offender regarding other crimes should in most cases be
considered hearsay. The same goes for the second exception, pertaining to
confessional statements made by the offender in the course of mediation.
The possibilities for victims to disclose such statements in their deposition
will be discussed below. The third exception concerns information about an
intentional implementation failure of the mediation agreement. Insofar as
this information concerns sensory perceptions of the victim, it is admissible
as evidence. This can, for example, include the victim’s observation that the
offender has not paid the agreed compensation instalments. It may also
involve the victim’s perception of the behaviour of the offender in mediation
during the negotiations about the mediation agreement. The offender’s
expression, but also his tone of voice during the negotiation (a statement
made on a particular occasion, or in a particular way) can be relevant factors.
However, as the following example illustrates, borderline cases may occur. If
the offender, at the time of the conclusion of the mediation agreement,
friendly addresses the victim by saying: ‘I will gladly pay EUR 500’, this
statement is admissible as evidence of the offender’s approving state of
mind. However, the statement should be considered hearsay evidence if it is
disclosed to prove that the offender was aware of the fact that he had to pay
the victim EUR 500, since the statement is then used to prove a fact that is
asserted in it. Furthermore, it is possible that the statements of the other
mediation participants, such as the mediator or a professional caregiver, are
used in the investigation into the backgrounds of an implementation failure.
Under certain circumstances, these statements can also be considered
hearsay, and for the same reasons.
Another category of non hearsay statements consists of statements that
quote an original statement that was made in the course of the
proceedings.491 Consequently, if the victim quotes statements of the offender
made earlier during the criminal trial, the victim’s testimony is admissible.
Summarising, the victim has an effective opportunity to submit
information about the offender having committed another crime during the
mediation, and, in some cases, information about an intentional
implementation failure of the agreement as non hearsay statements in both
civil law and common law jurisdictions. The admissibility of the
information pertaining to the three exceptions that should be considered
hearsay will be discussed below.
Out of court statements that do not fall into the categories mentioned above
491 Murphy 2005, pp. 207 208.
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should be considered hearsay. Hearsay evidence consists of a repetition of
out of court statements, which the witness learned from another person.
These statements concern ‘any representation of fact or opinion made by a
person by whatever means’,492 and can be made orally and in writing. In the
context of victim offender mediation, the out of court statement that is
repeated will mainly have been made orally. The confidential nature of
victim offender mediation indicates that usually only the persons that were
present during the session can disclose its contents. If they report on the
contents of the mediation, this will usually require that they reproduce
statements of the other participants. For example, if the victim challenges the
offender’s withdrawal of a confession during the court hearing and discloses
the relevant confessional statements of the offender, the victim will repeat
statements the offender made during the session. Furthermore, if the victim
denounces an implementation failure of the agreement, the court may
request the mediation participants to reproduce statements of the other
participants.
The admissibility of testimonial evidence that can be qualified as hearsay
differs between countries. This may affect the opportunities for the victim to
submit information regarding the three exceptions to the confidentiality rule
as proof, and to experience a breach of the mediation confidentiality as a
true remedy for the harm suffered.
Hearsay evidence is essentially inadmissible in common law jurisdictions.
Proceedings in common law are mainly conducted orally. The production of
proof is generally left to the defence and the prosecution; as a rule, the court
has no control over the issues debated.493 Because of this, the direct
questioning and cross examination of witnesses is considered a significant
aspect of criminal proceedings. Admitting hearsay statements as evidence is
therefore considered unacceptable, since the evidence concerned might be
assessed incorrectly, because the reliability of the original statement cannot
be verified494 – the maker of the original statement has not made his or her
statement on oath. Although witnesses that present the hearsay statement
may be telling the truth about what they observed, this does not guarantee
the veracity of the original statement.495 For these reasons, countries such as
the United States and the United Kingdom in principle forbid the use of
hearsay statements as evidence. This general ban on hearsay evidence
(hereafter: the hearsay rule) has been elaborated on in legislation and case
law, and there are many exceptions. These will be addressed below insofar
492 Roberts & Zuckerman 2004, p. 585.
493 See, e.g., Murphy 2005, pp. 2 and 76ff.; and Seabrook & Sprack 1999, pp. 8ff.
494 A. Rodrigues & C. Tournaye, ‘Hearsay Evidence’, in: R. May et al. (eds.), Essays on ICTY
Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Hague: Kluwer Law
International 2001, pp. 292 293.
495 See, e.g., Roberts & Zuckerman, pp. 596 598; and A.L. T. Choo, Hearsay and Confrontation
in Criminal Trials, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996, pp. 11 43.
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as they apply to the disclosure of mediation information in court.
One of the main exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to confessions.496 A
‘confession’ in this respect concerns ‘any statement wholly or partly adverse
to the person who made it, whether made to a person in authority or not and
whether made in words or otherwise’.497 Statements made by the offender
that reflect badly on him can be qualified as such, and are admissible as
evidence in spite of the hearsay rule. The main reason for this is that it is
generally assumed that no one voluntarily makes false adverse statements
about themselves. From this it follows that the offender should not be
pressured, threatened or coerced in making a confession.498
Confessional statements that the offender makes in mediation, such as the
acknowledgement of basic facts, can be categorised under this exception to
the hearsay rule. After all, confessional statements are generally adverse to
the offender. The voluntary nature of the offender’s participation in
mediation and his freedom to withdraw from the process at any time,
presuppose most confessions are made voluntarily. Victims should therefore
be able to include these matters in their testimony as an effective
opportunity to submit these matters in court. In addition, revelations about
other crimes may also qualify as a confession in many cases, and victims
should therefore be allowed to furnish these matters in court as well. For
example, if an offender admits during mediation that he has robbed other
victims in the past, this can be considered an adverse statement. The same
goes for an offender’s revelation – in the course of the negotiations about
damages – that he is evading tax by working for undeclared payment.
Summarising, victims can disclose information pertaining to the first two
exceptions to the confidentiality rule in court. Statements constituting
another crime are admissible as non hearsay evidence, and statements about
previous or future crimes and confessions can be categorised under the
general exception to the hearsay rule pertaining to confessions. In addition,
information pertaining to the third exception, an intentional implementation
failure of the mediation agreement, can be part of the victim’s deposition
insofar as these statements concern direct observations of the victim, such as
his not having received a letter of apology, or the offender’s perceived
consent to the agreement.
However, the statements that may be disclosed as the result of an
implementation failure can, under certain circumstances, also qualify as
hearsay evidence (see above). The prosecution or defence may question the
victim about the position of the mediator during the negotiations about the
496 The exception to the hearsay rule concerning confessions is so common that such
statements are sometimes considered non hearsay evidence. However, as this is not the
case in all common law countries – the admissibility of confessions should be regarded
as an actual exception to the hearsay rule – it will be discussed here. See also Murphy
2005, p. 271.
497 Murphy 2005, p. 283.
498 Murphy 2005, pp. 280 286; and Roberts & Zuckerman 2004, pp. 449 457.
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agreement, or about whether the offender was aware of the conditions to be
included in the agreement. The questioning may then focus on the contents
of the statements, and may thus be qualified as hearsay – in which case they
are inadmissible in court. The defence or the prosecution can then decide to
hear the offender,499 the mediator, or the professional caregiver,500 to obtain
the information concerned firsthand. In general, it is likely that the mediator
and the professional caregiver will be available for questioning during the
criminal trial. However, if, for example, the mediator is untraceable or
deceased, the hearsay statement may, under additional conditions, be
admissible.501
Information pertaining to the implementation failure exception is thus
generally inadmissible in court, if it is or must be considered hearsay. If the
offender is requested to make a statement on the hearsay deposition of the
victim and refuses to testify, the information concerned cannot be furnished.
Nevertheless, as the mediator and the professional caregiver can usually be
heard, and information about an implementation failure is in many cases
admissible as non hearsay evidence, the victim has a reasonable opportunity
to disclose information regarding this exception in court under common
law.
The use of hearsay evidence is also recognised in the majority of civil law
countries, where it is generally referred to as de auditu evidence. The main
source of evidence for the criminal court in these jurisdictions consists of the
file of the case in proceedings that do not involve lay persons. Among other
things, the case file contains the official records of the depositions of
witnesses, who are usually heard during the preliminary investigation.
Investigating officials file written reports of their interview findings. During
the hearing of the case, the court is responsible for the appraisal of the
evidence produced and has the power to summon witnesses.
The record of witness statements in the paper file can be qualified as de
auditu evidence; it constitutes a reproduction of what the investigating
official has observed during the interview. Generally, such statements are
admissible as evidence in civil law systems, although their conclusive force
can be restricted.502 The reliability of de auditu evidence is guaranteed by the
499 However, the offender then may invoke his right to remain silent (see further Section
8.4.1).
500 The procedural position of the mediator and the professional caregiver will be discussed
in Section 8.3.1.
501 On this type of exceptions to the hearsay rule, see Murphy 2005, pp. 228ff.; and Roberts
& Zuckerman 2004, pp. 623ff.
502 This does however not mean that the use of de auditu evidence was accepted without
any resistance in civil law countries. In case law, some correctional measures have been
developed. For example, the reasons stated in the judgement should meet strict
requirements. On the discussion about the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the
Netherlands, see, e.g., J.F. Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk bewijsrecht, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri
2008, pp. 104ff.
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power of the court to call the maker of the original statement if it considers
this necessary.503
The ECtHR does not oppose the use of de auditu evidence, although it has
stated in the Lüdi case that all evidence should in principle ‘be produced in
the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial
argument’504 in order to protect the accused’s right to call and examine
witnesses.505 However, the Court has accepted the use of out of court
statements that were obtained during the preliminary investigation, as long
as the defendant has had an ‘adequate and proper opportunity to challenge
and question a witness against him’.506 The opportunity to cross examine
must be offered when the ‘original’ witness gives testimony, or at a later
stage of the proceedings. Whether these conditions are complied with
should be assessed in the light of the overall proceedings, and of the specific
features of the domestic legislation applicable. If the accused was not given
an adequate and proper opportunity to examine the witness, the conviction
cannot be based solely on the out of court statement.507 Other evidence
corroborating the de auditu evidence is then required.508 Most civil law
jurisdictions have adopted the ECtHR’s approach. For example, in
Belgium,509 Germany,510 and the Netherlands,511 de auditu evidence can be
used. However, if the defendant has been unable to hear the witness who
made the original statement, the de auditu statement needs to be supported
by other proof.512
An exception to the practice explained above is lay justice in civil law
countries, such as the Belgian Hof van Assisen and the French Cour d’Assises
(see above). In such proceedings, it is usually required that evidence is
produced in the presence of the court. This is therefore common practice in
the majority of criminal trials in civil law countries which use lay justice to
503 Rodrigues & Tournaye 2001, p. 293.
504 See the judgement of the ECtHR of 15 June 1992, App. No. 12433/86, para. 47 (Lüdi v.
Switzerland).
505 See also Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, p. 645.
506 See, e.g., the Kostovski case of the ECtHR of 20 November 1989, App. No. 11454/85, para.
41 (Kostovski v. the Netherlands); and, more recently, ECtHR 2 July 2002, App. No.
34209/96, para. 44 (S.N. v. Sweden).
507 Again, see the Kostovski judgement of 20 November 1989, App. No. 11454/85, para. 41
(Kostovski v. the Netherlands); and, more recently, the ECtHR 20 September 1993, App.
No. 14647/89, para. 44 (Saïdi v France). See also Rodrigues & Tournaye 2001, pp. 294 295
and references there.
508 Van Dijk et al. (eds.) 2006, pp. 645 646 and references there.
509 Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 1080.
510 L. Meyer Gossner & J. Cierniak, Strafprozessordnung, Munich: C.H. Beck 2008, pp. 972
973.
511 Corstens 2008, pp. 682ff.
512 See, e.g., Alink & Van Zeben 2007, pp. 39ff.; Eisenberg 2006, pp. 293 296; Corstens 2008,
pp. 682 690; and Verstraeten 2005, pp. 876 877 and 945. The main reason for allowing de
auditu evidence to support other evidence was to enable the use of statements of
anonymous witnesses without violating basic rights of the accused.





                                                 
deal with a large number of crimes, such as Germany.513 Although the case
file may play a larger role in civil law jurisdictions than in lay proceedings
in common law jurisdictions,514 it is generally required that witnesses are
heard directly by the lay court, since often only the professional members of
the bench take notice of the paper file,515 or previous witness depositions are
removed from the file before it is put at the bench’s disposal.516 Furthermore,
the remarks made above about the hearsay rule in common law generally
also apply to lay proceedings in civil law countries.
Consequently, de auditu evidence is admissible in the majority of civil law
countries, as far as non lay proceedings are concerned. This enables the
victim to submit information about other crimes the offender reveals during
the mediation, and about confessional statements. The same goes for
information about an intentional implementation failure, insofar as this must
be qualified as hearsay. However, for the depositions concerned to be used
in court, the defence should have an adequate and proper opportunity to
challenge the victim’s testimony by questioning the maker of the original
statement. The court can also order such a hearing. In many cases, the maker
of the original statement will be the offender (in the case of the exception
regarding the information about further crimes, confessional statements, and
possibly regarding the implementation failure). In such cases, the offender
can be questioned or make a statement about the victim’s deposition.517 If
the original statement reproduces statements of the mediator or the
professional caregiver, these persons can subsequently be
8
All three types of victim offender mediation can be followed by civil
proceedings. In most cases, such proceedings will be initiated by the victim
to obtain financial compensation. Diversionary mediation is most likely to be
followed by civil proceedings if the parties have not reached an agreement
on the payment of compensation, or if the offender has failed to comply with
the mediation agreement, and the criminal court has not awarded
compensation, for example, due to the complexity of the victim’s claim. A
victim offender mediation that is part of regular court proceedings can be
followed by civil litigation on the same grounds. Again, this is most likely
when the mediation has failed, but also if the parties reached an agreement
513 De Roos 2006, pp. 56 57; and Janssen & Croes 2005, p. 21.
514 Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 639; and M. Bonnieu, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and
the Cour d’Assises: Is France Ready for Adversarial Procedure?’, Revue internationale de
droit penale 2001 1/2, p. 564.
515 E.g., this is the case in Germany (Weigend 2007, p. 254; Janssen & Croes 2005, p. 21; and
Juy Birmann 2002, p. 298).
516 E.g., this is the case in Belgium (Van den Wyngaert 2006, p. 1096). See also B. Pesquié,
‘The Belgian System’, in: Delmas Marty & Spencer (eds.) 2002, p. 120.
517 The position of the offender in criminal proceedings will be discussed in Section 8.4.1.
PART THREE – CONFIDENTIALITY FRICTIONS
156
e were not
warded during the mediation and the preceding criminal trial.
s
b
’s options to furnish evidence as a
p
                                                 
on other issues (such as a letter of apology from the offender), but were
unable to settle the payment of damages. No criminal trial will follow
mediation that takes place after conviction and sentencing. However, since
this type of mediation generally does not focus on obtaining financial
compensation, it is unlikely that it will be followed by civil proceedings. The
victim may nevertheless still want to claim damages, if thes
a
8.2.2.1 Party (Witness)
The primary position of the victim in civil litigation which follows a victim
offender mediation is that of a party. In most cases, victims will act as
plaintiffs, for example, when they submit a claim for compensation.518 The
features of civil law (see Chapter Four) indicate that victims will be
responsible for substantiating their claims, if they sue the offender for
damages. Substantiating their claim may require information from the
mediation. For example, the amount of compensation requested may be
influenced by the attitude of the offender during the mediation. If the
offender has not cooperated properly, victims could increase their claim on
account of the added distress they suffered through the offender’
ehaviour. The victim may then need mediation information to prove this.
The claimant bears the burden of proof. Among other things, the evidence
furnished can consist of documentary evidence, expert evidence, and
testimonial evidence. In the current context, the latter category is the most
important, as it enables the victim to submit witness statements about the
contents of the mediation. Apart from the mediator and the professional
caregiver, the main parties that can provide this information are the victim
and the offender. If the victim and the offender act as parties in civil
litigation, their procedural position as witnesses differs in some respects
from that of regular witnesses. The victim
arty witness will be discussed below.519
Parties that appear as witnesses can give testimony that substantiates their
own claims, or that refutes the claims of the other party. Party witnesses can
make a statement of their own volition, or can be called by the opposing
party. The option for parties in civil proceedings to appear as party
witnesses is common, if relatively new, to most jurisdictions. Currently,
most Western countries allow parties to testify.520 Civil law jurisdictions that
have codified this concept include Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France,
and the Netherlands. Austria adopted the party witness option as early as
1895, when it was introduced as a means of proof in civil cases. In Germany,
party oaths could only be taken to either confirm or deny a statement. Later
518 Nevertheless, the following generally applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant in
civil proceedings.
519 The offender’s position in civil proceedings will be discussed in Section 8.4.2.
520 C.H. van Rhee (ed.), European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia
2005, p. 189.
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on, the German legislator extended the scope to party witnesses. In
Switzerland, a party witness statement is generally admissible, although the
regulations concerned may differ between cantons. French legislation also
includes provisions on the opportunity for parties to appear as witnesses, or
to summon the other party. The Netherlands accepted the use of party
witness statements as evidence in 1988. In common law countries, such as
the United Kingdom an
civil proceedings.521
In principle, the regulations that apply to regular witnesses mutatis
mutandis also apply to party witnesses. Witnesses who are called in the
course of civil proceedings have a duty to appear before the court and to
truthfully answer the questions asked; this also goes for party witnesses.
Such legislation can, for example, be found in the Netherlands (Articles 164,
165, 173, 177, and 179 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, Rv)), Belgium (Arts. 926 and 934 GW),522 and
Germany (Articles 390, 391, and 395 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
(Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO)).523 In common law countries, the rules on the
competence and comp
party witnesses.524
The main objection to the use of party witness statements is that their
reliability can be challenged. After all, in most cases the testimony of parties
serves to substantiate their own claims. For that reason, the testimonial
evidence of party witnesses is subject to a number of special regulations. In
the first place, all of the jurisdictions mentioned above restrict the conclusive
force of the party’s statement: it can only be used as secondary evidence and
needs to be supported by other proof.525 If victims act as party witnesses,
they need additional evidence to support their statements, for example, by
calling the mediator or the professional caregiver as a witness.526 Secondly,
party witnesses cannot invoke the privilege to refuse to testify on relational
grounds. The privilege to refuse to testify to prevent self incrimination and
the professional privilege remain in full force. As a result, victims who act as
521 Van Rhee (ed.) 2005, pp. 261ff.
522 See also J. Laenens, K. Broeckx & D. Schreers, Handboek gerechtelijk recht,
Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 2004, pp. 509ff. Arts. 992 1004 of the Belgian GW
determine that parties are allowed to give testimony, and that the provisions concerning
regular witnesses are equally applicable in that respect.
523 See also A. Baumbach et al., Zivillprozessordnung, Munich: C.H. Beck 2008, pp. 1478ff.
Regarding the parties’ possibility to testify according to German law, see Arts. 445 et seq.
ZPO, and furthermore Baumbach et al. 2008, pp. 1584ff.
524 See also A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006,
pp. 121 124 and 147 150. On testimonial statements of the parties in common law
countries, see, e.g., Van Rhee (ed.) 2005, pp. 261ff.; and Murphy 2005, pp. 447 478.
525 This may, however, be different in the case the subsidiary nature of the party statement
causes an infringement of the principle of equality of arms (cf. the Dombo judgement of
the ECtHR of 27 October 1993, App. No. 14448/88 (Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands);
and Van Rhee (ed.) 2005, p. 251).
526 See further Section 8.3.2.
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party witnesses can only refuse to give testimony if this would expose them
(or others the relational privilege applies to) to prosecution.527 A third
peculiarity of party witnesses is that they are generally not liable to
punishment if they violate the statutory duty to appear before the court and
to make a statement. However, the court may draw adverse inferences from
a party’s absence and its refusal to testify.528 Party witnesses are also
actionable for perjury; if they agree to appear as witnesses, they should
therefore comply
In civil proceedings, the opportunity for victims to make a statement as
party witnesses allows them to present information in court. The question
arises what opportunities they have to submit mediation information in this
position. Unless indicated otherwise, what is to follow applies equally to
victims that make a party witness statement of their own accord
ictims who are summoned by the other party as party witnesses.
If victims give testimony of their own accord, they initially control the
mediation information recorded in their deposition, allowing them to
observe the principle of confidentiality to the extent necessary. However, it
is likely that victims want to substantiate their claims with mediation
information. For example, if the offender threatened the victim during the
mediation, the victim may demand a larger amount of compensation from
the offender. To substantiate the resulting claim accordingly, the victim will
then need to prove to the court that the offender actually threatened him or
her, and he or she will therefore need to disclose the mediation information
concerned. As long as victims need mediation information relating to the
proposed exceptions to the principle of confidentiality – information about
other crimes, confessional statements of the offender, or an intentional
implementation failure – they should be allowed to include this information
in their testimonies.529 To realise and safeguard the victim’s opportunities to
do so, it would be advisable to include the confidentiality rule and its
exceptions in legislation. This would increase clarity about what mediation
information is open to disclosure in court, an
cret nature of other mediation information.
The legal incorporation of the confidentiality principle would also enable
the victim being questioned by the opposing party to refuse to answer
further questions a out the mediation. After all, party witnesses are legally
obliged to give testimony. The statutory protection of mediation
527 The professional privilege to refuse to testify is generally not applicable here, since the
victim will usually not participate in victim offender mediation in the performance of
his profession.
528 For example, see Van Rhee (ed.) 2005, p. 242.
529 Additionally, victims can include mediation information in their statement if the parties
agree on such disclosure.
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obligation.530 The reasons mentioned in Section 8.2.1 are additional grounds
for including the exceptions to the principle of confidentiality in legislation.
The third reason for legal incorporation of the confidentiality rule and its
exceptions pertaining to civil proceedings is to avoid forum shopping. If the
principle of confidentiality were laid down in legislation on criminal law,
the statutory incorporation pertaining to civil law will prevent civil
proceedings from being abused to obtain mediation information. Otherwise,
one of the mediation parties may start civil litigation to be able to question
the other party about the contents of the preceding mediation, since
mediation confidentiality is not protected under civil law. Consequently, the
principle of confidentiality and its exceptions should be equally guaranteed
in both criminal and civil law. The remarks in Section 8.2.1 about penalising
a violation of the proposed legislation equally apply here.
Including the confidentiality rule and the proposed exceptions in
legislation would enable the victim to disclose mediation information
pertaining to the three exceptions as a party witness. However, for the
victim to feel heard,531 it is also important that the information concerned is
admissible as evidence and can be considered by the court.
8.2.2.2 Admissibility of Witness Statements
As is the case in criminal law, the victim’s deposition during civil litigation
should concern facts or circumstances that the victim has personally
observed or experienced.532 The discussion of this issue pertaining to
criminal law mutatis mutandis also applies here.
In common law jurisdictions, the concept of hearsay is also recognised in
civil law. The same categories of non hearsay evidence can be identified. As
a result, the victim is able to furnish proof of the fact that the offender has
committed another crime (even if this is a ‘verbal’ offence). Such evidence
should not be considered hearsay, since the threatening statement has legal
consequences and can also prove that it was made, or made in a particular
manner. The same goes for the offender’s reprehensible non compliance
with the mediation agreement; insofar as these events concern sensory
perceptions of the victim of the offender’s failure, they are admissible in
court.
Other revelations of the offender, about other crimes, confessional
statements, or an intentional implementation failure, can under certain
circumstances be qualified as hearsay. The same goes for statements made
by the mediator and the professional caregiver and reproduced by the
victim. In common law countries, such statements are generally
530 The fact that party witnesses will not be punished for a violation of this duty, does not
mean that party witnesses do not have to comply with this obligation. Furthermore, the
court can draw adverse inferences from the party’s refusal to appear or answer
questions – these may adversely affect the victim’s case.
531 See Chapter 6.2.2 and references there.
532 For example, see Art. 163 of the Dutch Rv and Art. 396 of the German ZPO.
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inadmissible as evidence in criminal proceedings. However, such evidence is
commonly permitted in civil court.533 This does not imply that other
limitations to its admissibility or value are abandoned; in the first place, the
admissibility of hearsay statements remains dependent on the competence of
the maker of the original statement to appear as a witness.534 The offender
can generally be considered to be competent, unless he is a minor.535
Secondly, the civil court may attach varying value to hearsay evidence, to
prevent a violation of the parties’ right to adversarial proceedings and cross
examination. The opposing party should have had the opportunity to
question the original witness, or should be allowed to do so after the hearsay
evidence has been furnished.536 For example, the offender, as the opposing
party, should be able to question the mediator or the professional caregiver
at some point in the proceedings, if the victim uses statements of these
professionals as hearsay evidence.
In the third place, the original witness should be questioned if possible,
instead of presenting his or her statement as hearsay evidence.537 In criminal
law, this may be unfeasible, since the prosecution may be unable to question
offenders about a hearsay statement of the victim, if they invoke their right
to remain silent. As a result, the offender cannot be obliged to make a
statement in this context. However, this is different under civil law. In civil
proceedings, the victim can call the offender as a party witness, and the
offender is obliged by law to make a statement, unless this would lead to
self incrimination.538 Except for the latter situation, the offender can thus be
questioned directly about the crime and the mediation process. This will
enable victims to question offenders about, for example, whether they felt
comfortable with the mediation agreement when it was being concluded.
This may substantiate the victim’s claim that the offender intentionally
violated the mediation agreement, and that its failure was not caused by the
fact that the offender was forced to agree with unreasonable conditions. In
such cases, the victim should call the offender as a party witness, instead of
furnishing the latter’s statements as hearsay evidence.
Nevertheless, in the case of confessional statements by offenders it is likely
that offenders will incriminate themselves when they make a statement
about these issues. The victim may then present the offender’s utterances as
hearsay evidence, and may try to substantiate their claim by questioning the
mediator or the professional caregiver.539 The same goes for the offender’s
revelations about other crimes. Then, the fourth situation that can influence
533 Murphy 2005, pp. 264 265.
534 Keane 2006, pp. 342 343.
535 Keane 2006, p. 124.
536 Keane 2006, pp. 347 348.
537 Murphy 2005, pp. 266 267.
538 Offenders can therefore refuse to answer questions that would render them liable to
being prosecuted.
539 On the position of the mediator and the professional caregiver in civil proceedings, see
further Section 8.3.2.
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the weight attached to such hearsay evidence may become important; it
concerns the question whether the maker of the original statement had an
interest in making this statement if it were untrue. After all, this may affect
the reliability of the victim’s testimony. However, since information about
confessional statements or other crimes is likely to be adverse to the
offender’s case, it is unlikely that the offender’s original statements were
false.540 For that reason, it is unlikely that the victim’s hearsay evidence will
be qualified as unreliable.541
It follows that, in common law countries, evidence pertaining to
committing another crime during the mediation, and to an intentional
implementation failure, is admissible in civil court as long as it can be
qualified as non hearsay evidence. The victim can therefore present this
evidence as a party witness. Furthermore, hearsay evidence is in principle
admissible in civil litigation, unless the maker of the original statement can
be heard about the issue at hand. This will generally not be a problem in this
context, since the victim can call the offender as a witness or party witness,
and the offender should subsequently give the required testimony, unless
this would lead to self incrimination. Generally, the offender can be
questioned directly about an implementation failure. The second situation
will mainly occur in the case of confessional statements or information about
other crimes. Nevertheless, such statements can in many cases be considered
adverse to the offender’s case, and their reliability is therefore unlikely to be
challenged. Furthermore, victims may summon the mediator or professional
caregiver to substantiate the victims’ depositions. Naturally, it remains at the
court’s discretion to assess the truth of the witness statements.
In civil law countries, the use of de auditu evidence is generally accepted in
civil proceedings;542 the witness’s observation of a statement made by a third
person is usually considered to be part of the facts and circumstances that
the witness experienced or perceived.543 Nevertheless, the civil court is free
to weigh the evidence that is produced by the parties. The importance that is
consequently attached to de auditu statements may therefore depend on the
factors mentioned above concerning common law. For the reasons stated
there, it is unlikely that these factors have a negative effect on the reliability
of the evidence concerned. The victim should, however, summon the
original witnesses (the offender, mediator, or professional caregiver) rather
540 Cf. the exception to the hearsay rule of criminal law concerning confessional statements;
such hearsay statements are admissible since it is unlikely that someone will make a
false statement that may have an adverse effect on their case.
541 Even so, the court should assess the reliability of the victim’s statements in the light of
the relevant circumstances (see also Murphy 2005, pp. 288ff.).
542 Although some civil law countries deploy lay judges to a limited extent in civil
proceedings (e.g., the German Arbeitsgericht consists of one professional judge and two
lay judges (Janssen & Croes 2005, pp. 23 24)), this does not influence the admissibility of
hearsay evidence in such proceedings.
543 Cf. Art. 163 of the Dutch Rv and Art. 396 of the German ZPO.
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than submit their statements as de auditu evidence. As a result, the victim is
able to furnish information about the three intended exceptions to the
principle of confidentiality in civil law.
8.3 The Position of the Mediator and the Professional Caregiver
8.3.1 Criminal Law
Apart from the victim, the mediator and the professional caregiver can also
become involved in criminal proceedings that follow a failed diversionary
mediation, or a mediation that was part of regular court proceedings.544 In
such proceedings, the role of the mediator and the professional caregiver
will mainly be a minor one.
The mediator and the professional caregiver can participate in a criminal
trial as experts and as witnesses. As such, they can submit information in
court as evidence. The guiding role of mediators in mediation, as well as
their impartial and independent position, implies that they should maintain
a certain distance vis à vis the parties and the case. From this it follows that
mediators should in principle not furnish mediation information of their
own accord, but only when they are obliged by law to do so. This also goes
for professional caregivers, due to their supporting role during the session.
The procedural position of the mediator resembles that of the professional
caregiver to a large extent. What will be said below about the mediator
therefore equally applies to the professional caregiver, unless indicated
otherwise.
In the course of criminal proceedings, mediators can be requested to give
their expert opinion. In this capacity, they can be asked to give their view on
a particular matter based on their expertise. Experts who are approached by
the court and consent to give their opinion are obliged to cooperate and to
provide the services requested. Among others, this holds true for
Germany,545 the Netherlands,546 and the United Kingdom.547 In this respect,
the expert’s position is different from the witness’s, who cannot refuse to
make a statement (unless a privilege to refuse to testify applies). Despite
some differences, the position of the expert to a large extent resembles that
of the witness. One of these differences is that hearsay statements submitted
544 The third type of victim offender mediation is not applicable here, for reasons specified
earlier.
545 Eisenberg 2006, pp. 496ff.
546 Nijboer 2008, p. 237.
547 Murphy 2005, pp. 346 347.
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by an expert are initially admissible as evidence in lay proceedings.548
In the context of a criminal trial that follows a victim offender mediation,
it is not very likely that the mediator and the professional caregiver will be
approached as experts; the mediation information they may be able to
provide is not related to their special expertise, but to the fact that they were
professionally involved in the mediation concerned. However, mediators
may in theory be asked for their expert view, for example, on the course of
events during the mediation, or on whether there were sufficient
opportunities for the parties to come to an agreement. Professional
caregivers may be asked for their opinion about the party they have
supported, depending on their area of expertise. For instance, probation
officers who assisted the offender during the mediation can be asked for
their expert view on the offender’s rehabilitation potential, and on the risk of
recidivism.
Due to the similarities between the position of the expert and that of the
witness, the following mutatis mutandis also applies to the mediator and the
professional caregiver that act as experts.
The mediator and the professional caregiver can also be called as witnesses
in criminal proceedings. The regulations pertaining to witnesses discussed
in Section 8.2.1 then apply. If mediators are called as witnesses, and are
questioned about the contents of the mediation, they should only disclose
mediation information that pertains to the three exceptions.
Hearing the mediator as a witness is most likely to follow the testimony of
the victim that included the disclosure of the mediation information
concerned. For example, if the victim stated that the offender threatened him
or her during the mediation, the mediator may subsequently be questioned
to confirm or disprove the victim’s assertion. Also, the mediator may be
heard if the offender claims wrongful disruption of the mediation process,
following the investigation of the court into the victim’s allegation that the
offender intentionally failed to comply with the mediation agreement. In
such cases, the defence may react to the victim’s claim by asserting that the
offender was induced by unfair means to consent to the mediation
agreement, and was consequently unable to fulfil the resulting obligations.
The mediator may then be asked to shed light on the course of events. If the
mediator is called as a witness before the victim has testified, or if the victim
chose not to mention the fact that, for example, the offender talked about
other crimes during the mediation, the mediator should in principle not
disclose this information. After all, the main rationale behind the exceptions
to the confidentiality rule is the drawbacks such statements can have for the
548 The reason for this is that experts usually include their findings in a written report. If
such reports were considered inadmissible hearsay, the expert report would in many
cases be excluded, for example, when the report contains a reproduction of the expert’s
examination of the offender. See also Murphy 2005, pp. 341ff. On the admissibility of
expert evidence in general, see also Roberts & Zuckerman 2004, pp. 305ff.
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victim, and allowing disclosure aims at remedying these disadvantages.
When the victim apparently does not need to make use of this remedy, since
he or she does not disclose the information concerned and thus gives
priority to observing the confidentiality rule, the mediator should not
overrule this decision. This also follows from the mediator’s impartial and
independent position vis à vis the mediation parties.
The mediator who is called as a witness, has a legal duty to appear and to
make a statement. A conflict between the mediation’s confidential nature
and the obligation to give testimony may be resolved by including the
principle of confidentiality and its exceptions in legislation (see further
Section 8.2.1). The mediator would then be able to refuse to testify about
issues that are outside the scope of these exceptions. The same goes for
mediators who have agreed to give their expert view on the case; they
would also be able to withhold their professional opinion regarding such
issues. Furthermore, the legal incorporation of the required level of secrecy
of mediation information may prevent mediators from being requested to
include information in their report for the criminal justice authorities that
should remain confidential (see below).549 The hearsay rule applies equally
to mediators that appear as witnesses.
It follows that mediators may reveal that offenders committed another
crime during the mediation, or that they revealed information about other
crimes. Confessional statements of the offender and statements about an
intentional implementation failure may also be disclosed (see Section 8.2.1).
The position of professional caregivers may differ from that of mediators,
since they may have been awarded a legal privilege to refuse to testify. If
this is the case, professional caregivers are able to refuse to give testimony
about matters they have learned in the course of their professional duties in
order to guarantee their accessibility and reliability.550 The professional
caregiver, who assists the victim or the offender during the mediation, may
have been granted the privilege. For example, probation officers have been
awarded the legal privilege, insofar as offering assistance to their clients is
concerned. However, they cannot refuse to give evidence about issues that
pertain to the part of their job that concerns gathering information to
produce a report, or to inform the authorities.551 Probation officers that
assisted the offender during the mediation may therefore refrain from
making a statement if they are called as witnesses during court hearings.
Nevertheless, many professionals that can be present during a victim
549 However, this does not alter the fact that the criminal justice authorities should observe
the requirement to only be informed of the steps taken and the outcome of the
mediation. If one of the exceptions occurs, it should primarily be discussed in court.
550 See Chapter 4.3.5.2.
551 F.J. Fernhout, Het verschoningsrecht van getuigen in civiele zaken, Maastricht: Gianni 2004,
pp. 232 233.
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offender mediation have thus far not been granted a legal privilege. For
example, victim support volunteers and social workers cannot refuse to give
testimony based on a privilege.552
If privileged professional caregivers are questioned about mediation
information pertaining to the situations the exceptions apply to, the issue
arises whether they should invoke their privilege. Such circumstances may,
for example, occur if an offender committed another crime during the
mediation, and the probation officer who assisted the offender during the
session is interviewed about this event. The decision to ignore the privilege
is left to the discretion of the professionals. They should weigh the
consequences of disclosure against those of maintaining secrecy. Since the
principle of confidentiality should only be breached in situations that cause
serious harm to the victim and the mediation process, professional
caregivers may decide to disclose such matters in court in spite of their legal
privilege. What adds to this is that the statement of the professional
caregiver may be necessary to substantiate a claim of the victim that one of
the exceptions to the principle of confidentiality applies. However, if the
victim chooses not to present such information, the professional caregiver
should exercise restraint, for the reasons mentioned above.
It has been questioned whether mediators should be awarded a legal
privilege to refuse to testify, so they may observe the confidential nature of
victim offender mediation. Nevertheless, few jurisdictions have adopted
such regulations pertaining to the power of the mediator in penal cases;553 in
most cases, the mediator does not qualify for a legal privilege. After all, in
many cases, mediators do not have to comply with mandatory legal
qualifications to practise their profession, nor are they subject to sector
related disciplinary law. The title of mediator is generally not protected by
law. Furthermore, although mediators should receive training, training
programmes are scarcely standardised or obligatory. Finally, the voluntary
nature of the participation of the victim and the offender in mediation
indicates that the mediator’s clients – the victim and the offender – are not
obliged to seek the assistance of the mediator.
Consequently, it is questionable whether the mediator should be awarded
a legal privilege to refuse to testify, based on the criteria that were discussed
in Chapter 4.3.5.2. Another reason not to grant the privilege to the mediator
is that this may deprive the victim of the opportunity to prove that one of
the exceptions to the confidentiality rule applies. For example, it is possible
that an offender confessed during the mediation to the victim of rape that he
was aware of the latter’s unwillingness to have sexual intercourse, but
withdraws this confession during the court hearing, or invokes his right to
remain silent. If the victim then submits the offender’s confession in court,
552 See Chapter 4.3.5.2.
553 An example can be found in Art. 555 of the Belgian WvSv, which states that mediators
cannot disclose information they have learned in the performance of their profession.
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since it can be categorised under the confessional statements exception, the
mediator’s statement may be necessary in order to substantiate the victim’s
assertion. In this respect, the mediator’s position differs considerably from
that of the privileged professional caregiver; the latter offers assistance to
one of the parties, and can as a result assist that party by either invoking or
ignoring the privilege. However, if the mediator could invoke a legal
privilege, situations as mentioned here may give rise to a conflict of
interests, due to the mediator’s impartiality vis à vis the parties. After all,
refusing to give evidence may disadvantage the victim, while leaving the
privilege aside may support the case against the offender. It is therefore
advisable to seek another way to guarantee the observance of mediation
confidentiality to the extent necessary. Including the principle of
confidentiality and its exceptions in legislation may be such a solution.
Statutory incorporation would constitute a uniform and clear arrangement,
applying to all mediation participants equally.
The Council of Europe Recommendation identifies two additional duties for
the mediator to provide mediation information. In the first place, Paragraph
30 of the Recommendation requires the mediator to convey any information
about imminent serious crimes, which may come up in the course of the
mediation, to the appropriate authorities or to the persons concerned.
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, this
allows the mediator to comply with obligations resulting from national
law.554 After all, domestic law in many cases demands that citizens report
crimes that they have knowledge of, for example, if these crimes endanger
national security.555 The proposed exception to the principle of
confidentiality regarding other crimes also concerns such serious and
imminent crimes, but additionally pertains to less serious crimes and crimes
that happened prior to the mediation; the mediator’s reporting duty which
follows from the Recommendation would thus be extended to such events
by the exception. If mediators are asked whether such issues occurred, they
will be free to report these. However, if victims do not present information
involving the exceptions of their own accord, the mediator should exercise
restraint, unless the other crimes the offender talks about concern ‘imminent
serious crimes’. Mediators must then observe their duty to report such
issues; after all, the rationale behind the mediator’s reporting duty is to
prevent serious harm or damage,556 and it should therefore be complied
with, even if the victim remains silent about such issues.557
554 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 33. See also Chapters 3.5.2 and
6.2.1.
555 For example, such legislation can be found in the Netherlands (Corstens 2008, p. 79),
and Belgium (Verstraeten 2005, pp. 63 64).
556 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 32.
557 This also goes for the other mediation participants, insofar as the national statutory duty
to report serious crimes applies to them.
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The second obligation for the mediator to disclose mediation information
follows from Paragraph 32 of the Council of Europe Recommendation,
which stipulates that the mediator should inform the criminal justice
authorities about the steps taken during the mediation, and about the
outcome, to enable the authorities to decide on how to proceed. The
mediator will usually comply with this requirement prior to the court
hearing of a case. The report should not reveal the contents of the mediation
session, nor should it express any judgement on the parties’ behaviour
during the process. Consequently, the mediator will generally not encounter
problems regarding the principle of confidentiality in this respect. However,
if the criminal justice officials request for additional information (for
example, to build a stronger case against the offender), the relationship with
the mediator may become strained; the mediator should after all observe the
principle of confidentiality to the extent necessary, but is also dependent on
the authorities for the referral of cases.558 It is therefore essential to provide
clarity on what exceptions to the confidentiality rule should be allowed.
8.3.2 Civil Law
The mediator and the professional caregiver can become involved in civil
litigation that is started after a victim offender mediation has ended. It is
most likely that these proceedings are initiated by the victim to sue the
offender for compensation. All types of victim offender mediation can be
followed by a civil action, if the damages were not settled in mediation or by
the criminal court.559 The assisting and guiding position of the mediator and
the professional caregiver during the mediation implies that their role in
civil court will be a minor one. They will mainly offer supporting evidence
of the parties’ claims pertaining to the contents of the preceding mediation
session.
Because of the nature of their involvement in mediation, and due to the fact
that the civil proceedings will in most cases focus on a claim for
compensation, the mediator and the professional caregiver are unlikely to
act as parties in civil litigation that follows a victim offender mediation.
Consequently, the main procedural positions of both professionals are those
of experts and witnesses.
The mediator and the professional caregiver can be requested to give their
expert opinion by the parties in civil proceedings. If they honour the request
to state their views, they are obliged to cooperate. This holds true for
Belgium,560 the Netherlands,561 Germany,562 and the United Kingdom.563
558 In this respect, see also K. Lauwaert, Herstelrecht en procedurele waarborgen,
Apeldoorn/Antwerp: Maklu 2008, pp. 235 237 and 305ff.
559 In this respect, see Section 8.2.2.
560 Arts. 962 991bis of the Belgian GW.
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Hearsay statements made by experts are generally admissible.564 In other
respects, the position of the expert in civil proceedings to a large extent
resembles that of the witness. The discussion of the latter’s position below
therefore mutatis mutandis also applies to the expert.
Experts are generally requested to state their views on particular matters
based on their expertise. Both the mediator and the professional caregiver
can be approached as experts (cf. the examples mentioned in Section 8.3.1).
In civil law, it is more likely that the mediator and the professional caregiver
are summoned as witnesses, rather than acting as experts, for the same
reasons as mentioned above regarding criminal law.
The position of the mediator and the professional caregiver as witnesses is
therefore the most important in the context of civil law. As parties, the
victim and the offender can summon them to give testimony in the process
of taking evidence. If the parties disclose information from the mediation as
party witnesses, they may even rely on the possibility to hear the
professional caregiver or the mediator to support their assertions, because of
the restricted conclusive force of party testimonies. For example, victims
may need the mediator’s deposition to confirm the allegation that offenders
have committed another crime, especially since it is probable that offenders
cannot be questioned about this, as they can invoke a privilege to refuse to
testify based on the right against self incrimination. Offenders can, for
instance, question the probation officer that assisted them during the session
to prove that they did their best to reach an agreement with the victim, but
that the victim adopted an unreasonable attitude, which caused the
mediation to fail. Due to the assisting and guiding role of the mediator and
professional caregiver during the mediation, they should in principle
exercise restraint in disclosing mediation information (see also Section 8.3.1
regarding criminal law). In civil proceedings, however, these professionals
will only disclose mediation information at the request of the victim or the
offender, since they cannot present information of their own volition in civil
court.
The regulations that apply to the position of the mediator and the
professional caregiver as witnesses were largely discussed in Section 8.2.2
pertaining to the role of the victim in civil proceedings. They are in principle
under a legal obligation to give testimony. To enable these professionals to
respect the confidential nature of the victim offender mediation, it would be
advisable to include the principle of confidentiality in legislation. In
addition, to guarantee that they can disclose information pertaining to the
three exceptions, and thereby substantiate the claim of the victim that one of
the exceptions occurred, the possibility to talk about other crimes,
561 Arts. 194 200 of the Dutch Rv.
562 Arts. 402 414 of the German ZPO. See also Baumbach et al. 2008, pp. 1527ff.
563 Murphy 2005, pp. 346 347; and Keane 2006, pp. 572ff.
564 Murphy 2005, pp. 340 341.
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confessional statements, and intentional implementation failures, should
also be safeguarded legally. Furthermore, the statutory recognition of the
confidentiality rule and its exceptions enhances clarity and uniformity, and
avoids forum shopping.
Section 8.2.2 discussed the admissibility of depositions of witnesses and
party witnesses pertaining to mediation information in civil proceedings.
The remarks made there equally apply to the testimonies of the mediator
and the professional caregiver. As a result, information about another crime
having been committed during the mediation, and some information about
an implementation failure is generally permitted as non hearsay evidence.
Information about confessional statements of the offender, about other
crimes, and the remaining issues concerning an implementation failure, are
also admissible despite the fact that they may be qualified as hearsay
evidence. However, it remains important that the victim or the offender
requesting the mediator or professional caregiver to provide such
information attempts to summon the maker of the original statement. Due to
the nature of the exceptions to the principle of confidentiality, this will in
most cases be the offender; however, since offenders can in some cases
invoke a privilege to refuse to testify based on the right against self
incrimination, victims may have to rely on the mediator and the professional
caregiver to support their claim. Naturally, the party who furnishes hearsay
evidence of previous statements of the mediator or professional caregiver
should preferably question these professionals directly.
The mediator and the professional caregiver that are requested to give
testimony are in principle obliged to make a statement. If the principle of
confidentiality and its exceptions were incorporated in legislation, they
could observe mediation confidentiality to the extent necessary and
consequently abstain from answering questions that are outside the scope of
these exceptions. However, some professional caregivers may be awarded a
legal privilege to refuse to testify, allowing them not to give testimony about
matters they learned in the course of their duties.565 As a result, the
possibilities for victims and offenders to take evidence regarding the
mediation contents from the professional caregiver who supported them
may differ according to the professional caregiver’s ability to invoke a
privilege. This also depends on whether professional caregivers who are
awarded a privilege are obliged to invoke their privilege. As is the case in
criminal law, this decision is generally left to the discretion of the
professional. This means that they should assess the effects of giving
testimony vis à vis the consequences of refusing to do so. Since the proposed
exceptions to the principle of confidentiality concern situations that have
severe drawbacks for the victim, professional caregivers may, in such cases,
565 The remarks that have been made in this respect regarding criminal law (Section 8.3.1)
also apply here.
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decide to make a statement in spite of their privilege, especially since their
statement may be necessary to substantiate the victim’s claims. For example,
if the victim testifies as a party witness that the offender has threatened him
or her during the mediation, the offender may refuse to make a statement
about this event so as not to incriminate himself. The mediator and the
professional caregiver are the only ones that can offer the necessary support
of the victim’s allegation, also because a party witness statement has a
restricted conclusive force.
In Section 8.3.1 on criminal law, it was already mentioned that it has been
questioned whether mediators should be granted a legal privilege based on
their profession. Although the mediator who mediates in civil disputes is
granted a legal privilege in a few countries,566 the mediator who was
involved in a victim offender mediation, and who is subsequently called as a
witness during related civil proceedings, is in most cases not awarded the
privilege. The reason for this is that the mediator generally does not have to
comply with mandatory legal qualifications. Nor is he subject to sector
related disciplinary law. Furthermore, uniform training programmes for
mediators are scarce, and not always compulsory.
It therefore remains questionable whether mediators in penal cases should
be granted a privilege regarding their involvement in civil proceedings. If
the principle of confidentiality and its exceptions were included in
legislation, awarding such a privilege might be unnecessary; the statutory
right to refuse to disclose mediation information in court if it exceeds the
proposed exceptions would enable the mediator to observe mediation
confidentiality. Incorporating the confidentiality rule in legislation would
also prevent victims from being unable to substantiate their claims that one
of the exceptions occurred. After all, if mediators were granted a privilege,
they might suffer a conflict of interests if victims were to ask them to furnish
evidence about the behaviour of offenders during the mediation, because of
the mediator’s impartial and independent position during the session. A
legal provision concerning the type of mediation information that is open to
disclosure would avoid this situation, and would provide a uniform and
566 For example, in Belgium (see above) and the United States. The American Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA) awards the mediator a privilege and requires that federal States
safeguard this in their legislation (Art. 4 UMA, and P.D. Johnson, ‘Confidentiality in
Mediation: What Can Florida Glean from the Uniform Mediation Act?’, Florida State
University Law Review 2003 3, p. 492). An example of this can be found in Article 1121 of
the California Evidence Code. In other countries, such as France, the mediator can only
be questioned if the parties agree to this (N. Baas,Mediation in civiele en bestuursrechtelijke
zaken, The Hague: WODC 2002, p. 33; and M. Pel, La médiation judiciaire in Frankrijk.
De wettelijke regeling in Frankrijk vergeleken met de projectmatige aanpak in
Nederland’, Tijdschrift voor Mediation 2001 2, p. 30). Nevertheless, awarding the legal
privilege to mediators in civil disputes remains a topic of discussion (among others, see
M. Pel & M.A. Vogel, Mediation en vertrouwelijkheid, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 2005, pp.
81ff., and pp. 150ff. on the topic of awarding the legal privilege to mediators in civil
cases in the Netherlands and the United States, respectively). See also Chapter 4.4.4.1.
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clear arrangement that applies to all participants in victim offender
mediation. This would furthermore prevent inequality pertaining to the
position of the professional caregivers that offered assistance during the
mediation, since not all of them are awarded a legal privilege.
8.4 The Position of the Offender
8.4.1 Criminal Law
If diversionary mediation fails, or if the offender participated in victim
offender mediation as part of regular court proceedings, the offender will be
brought to trial after the mediation has ended.567 Criminal proceedings aim
at establishing the offender’s legal guilt or innocence; as a result, it should be
noted that the offender should really be considered the alleged offender or
the accused during the preliminary investigation and the hearing of the case
in court.
The previous chapters examined the compatibility of making exceptions to
the principle of confidentiality with the main features of criminal law –
which largely concern the rights that follow from the notion of a fair trial.
Breaching the confidentiality rule in the three situations identified proved to
be consistent with the concept of a fair trial, as long as the necessary
procedural requirements are met. These requirements influence the
offender’s position pertaining to furnishing information during a criminal
trial. For example, the right to an oral hearing and the right to defend oneself
in person entitle the alleged offender to make a statement in court.568
Consequently, offenders are able to disclose mediation information of their
own volition and to react to the disclosure of such issues by the victim (for
example, offenders may want to rebut the victim’s claim that they have
intentionally frustrated the implementation of the mediation agreement).569
The offender’s right to speak is not absolute; it can be restricted on appeal,
and by national law (for example, offenders can be prosecuted if their
statements include matters that constitute an offence). Another fair trial
requirement that affects the offender’s position in court is the right to remain
silent, which can be deduced from the right against self incrimination.570
Offenders cannot be forced or obliged to make a statement that may support
the criminal charge against them. Under certain circumstances, the court can
567 Since the third modality of mediation takes place after conviction and sentencing, this
type of victim offender mediation will not be followed by criminal proceedings.
568 See Chapter 4.3.2.2 and references there.
569 Or by one of the other mediation participants. The opportunity to react to statements
made by the other mediation participants also follows from the right to adversarial
proceedings (Chapter 4.3.2.1).
570 See Chapter 4.3.2.3 and references there.
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draw adverse inferences from the offender’s decision to remain silent. The
court can also take a cooperative attitude of offenders into consideration,
such as their demeanour towards the victim.
Consequently, the offender has the opportunity to choose whether or not
to make a statement in criminal court, which can include mediation
information. With regard to the disclosure of information from a mediation,
the right to remain silent allows offenders to observe the principle of
confidentiality; since they cannot be obliged to make a statement, they
cannot be compelled to disclose mediation information. The right of speech
allows offenders to present any information they want. The question arises
whether the offender can be restricted in exercising this right with regard to
the disclosure of mediation information.
The first situation to be discussed concerns the disclosure of information by
the victim pertaining to the three proposed exceptions; information about
another crime, a confessional statement by the offender, or an intentional
implementation failure. The right to a fair trial allows offenders to react to
the victim’s assertions that these situations occurred; they may either
confirm, or refute the statement of the victim. Offenders can also exert their
right to remain silent. For example, if the victim claims that the offender
threatened the victim during the mediation, the offender can decide to
neither confess nor deny this allegation for strategic reasons. Such a
response does not prejudice the confidentiality of the preceding mediation,
since the offender does not make a statement about mediation issues. In
addition, problems regarding the confidentiality rule are not to be expected
if the offender confirms the victim’s claims; if the offender confesses to
threatening the victim, this will in principle not cause the disclosure of
mediation information that should remain secret. However, it is likely that
the offender will want to rebut the victim’s allegations. After all, the
exceptions mainly concern offender misconduct, and their disclosure may
well have an adverse effect on the offender’s case and may increase the
sentence. If offenders want to challenge the victim’s allegations, they may
need information from the mediation that does not concern the three
exceptions. For example, if a victim states that he has been threatened by the
offender during the mediation, the offender may refute this statement by
saying that he was provoked to do so by the victim, because the victim said
that he would make sure that everyone would know what the offender did
to him. Technically, such a statement by the victim cannot be categorised
under one of the exceptions. It should therefore be questioned whether the
offender should be allowed to substantiate the rebuttal of an allegation of
the victim with mediation information that exceeds the intended exceptions
to the principle of confidentiality; that is, if the victim is right in arguing that
one of the exceptions has occurred.
Making exceptions to the confidentiality rule – and thereby allowing
disclosure of the information concerned – aims at offering a remedy for the
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harm that is caused by the occurrence of the situations that these exceptions
relate to. The effectiveness of allowing disclosure in violation of the principle
of confidentiality depends on the court’s possibilities to take this information
into consideration. The main features of criminal law should be observed
and the necessary procedural requirements should be met. Among other
things, this means that offenders have the right to properly defend
themselves against allegations of the victim that pertain to events that
occurred during the mediation, as also follows from the right to adversarial
proceedings. Consequently, the offender should be allowed to raise any
objections to a claim that one of the exceptions occurred, even if this means
that mediation information that exceeds these exceptions is disclosed in
court. This additionally applies if offenders are requested by the court to
give their opinion about the victim’s claim; since the occurrence of an
exception can influence the sentencing decision of the court, it should be
able to investigate the victim’s claim that this is the case. In the course of
such an investigation, the court may need information that is outside the
scope of the exceptions, for example, when the court investigates the
victim’s claim that the offender intentionally violated the mediation
agreement. The court should then be able to look into the realisation of the
agreement, and question the offender accordingly. Offenders should then be
able to include all mediation information in their statement that is relevant
to dispute the victim’s allegation.
The second situation pertains to offenders disclosing information of their
own accord. The right to an oral hearing and the right to defend oneself
entitle the offender to make a statement in criminal proceedings. Offenders
are free to include information regarding the exceptions in their statement,
as the victim is. However, as the information that is open to disclosure
mainly concerns issues that may have an adverse effect on the offender’s
case, it is unlikely that an alleged offender will reveal that an exception has
occurred. Apart from this, the question remains whether the offender should
be allowed to talk about mediation information which does not pertain to
the exceptions.
The disclosure of such information may benefit the offender’s position in
court. One of the main reasons for offenders to participate in victim offender
mediation may be that it gives them the opportunity to show their goodwill
with an eye to remission. A successful mediation may induce the court to
take these results into consideration regarding their sentencing decision.
Offenders may therefore have an interest in disclosing to the court that the
behaviour of the victim terminated the mediation procedure. If they can
demonstrate that they genuinely attempted to compensate the victim,
offenders should not be denied the benefits of taking part in mediation if the
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victim has behaved in a way that frustrated the session.571 This is also
connected to the voluntary nature of the parties’ participation; to ensure that
no pressure is exerted on the victim to participate in mediation, the
consequences for the offender of a refusal by the victim should not be
substantially greater than the consequences of participating in victim
offender mediation would be.572 The same should apply to the victim’s
ability to withdraw from the mediation process at any time without
consequences; offenders should then also remain able to enjoy the benefits of
mediation, as long as they can prove that they have sincerely tried to make
amends. Offenders should therefore be allowed to argue in court that the
termination of the procedure was not their fault, even if this entails the
disclosure of mediation information outside the scope of the exceptions. The
same is true if the disclosure of other information from the mediation may
have evidential benefits for the offender. For example, if the victim and the
offender were involved in a bar fight, the victim may also be to blame for
what has happened. When the victim admitted this during the mediation,
the offender should be allowed to refer to this admission in court, if this
demonstrably benefits his procedural position in court. Allowing offenders
to disclose relevant mediation information of their own accord also
facilitates the fact finding process, which is one of the main features of
criminal law.
However, this does not mean that this approach may not have drawbacks.
The category of information the offender may present in this context cannot
be delineated clearly. There is a risk that the information presented by the
offender gives rise to an endless debate about whose fault it was that the
mediation failed, whether the offender made a serious attempt to
compensate the victim, and so on. Nevertheless, available alternatives have
disadvantages of their own. The above mentioned problem may be avoided
by denying any effect of the outcome of a mediation on the severity of the
sentence or the amount of damages, except for a possible negative effect due
to the occurrence of the proposed exceptions. This would render the
disclosure of additional information by the offender useless, but it would
also eliminate the appeal for offenders to participate in mediation, since its
result would no longer have the potential to mitigate the outcome of a
criminal trial. Another option is to assume that only a mediation that
resulted in an agreement can have a positive effect on the court’s sentencing
571 An example of this can be found in Germany. Article 46a of the German Criminal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) states that the perpetrator is entitled to a reduced sentence if he
has completely or substantially made restitution for his act or earnestly strived to make
restitution (the original German text reads ‘seine Tat ganz oder zum überwiegenden Teil
wiedergutgemacht oder deren Wiedergutmachung ernsthaft erstrebt’).
572 Cf. the European Forum for Victim Services in its Statement on the Position of the Victim
within the Process of Mediation (2004). According to the European Forum, the above
implies that, if a diversion from the criminal justice process is considered, an alternative
diversionary measure should be available to ensure that the victim is not pressured into
taking part.
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decision. However, victims might not feel free to withdraw from the
mediation process, since by aborting the process they would deprive the
offender of the beneficial effects of a successful mediation. The proposed
solution of allowing offenders to present additional mediation information if
this evidently furthers their case seems to remove these obstacles for the
most part. Nevertheless, in view of the above, it is crucial that the court
closely monitors whether the information revealed by offenders in this
context actually benefits their procedural position, and that it intervenes
when the debate seems to spiral out of control. Otherwise, the general
confidential nature of victim offender mediation as well as the defined
exceptions to this rule are at risk of being undermined. If the court is of the
opinion that the information presented by offenders cannot in any way
further their position in the proceedings, it can decide to leave this
information out of the official deliberations (see further Section 8.2.1).
Apart from the above, it remains possible that the victim and the offender
agree on the disclosure of particular mediation information. For example,
the defence may want to stress the offender’s cooperative attitude during the
mediation, and tell the court that the offender gave the victim flowers at the
end of the mediation. If the mediation ended successfully, the victim may
agree to this. In such cases, this information can be furnished in court, even
though it may go beyond the proposed exceptions to the confidentiality rule.
If the defence submits evidence, the hearsay rule applies in equal manner.573
8.4.2 Civil Law
If a victim offender mediation is followed by civil litigation, the offender is
most likely to act as a party in such proceedings. The most probable
situation is that the offender is sued by the victim for damages. Again, civil
proceedings may follow all types of victim offender mediation, but are most
likely to be initiated if the topic of compensation is not settled during the
mediation or in criminal proceedings, and the amount claimed is substantial.
Since such proceedings will be started by the victim, the offender is most
likely to become involved in civil litigation as the defendant. The procedural
positions of the defendant and the plaintiff are largely similar with regard to
their options to furnish information in court. The following explanation will
therefore briefly recapitulate the implications of the offender’s position as a
party for his options to submit mediation information. A detailed discussion
of these issues can be found in Section 8.2.2 pertaining to the victim.
An offender who becomes a party in civil proceedings can give testimony as
a party witness. Party witnesses are generally subject to the same regulations
573 See Section 8.2.1. On the subject of hearsay evidence tendered by the defence, see also
Murphy 2005, pp. 197ff.
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as regular witnesses, and if they are called to testify they will be obliged to
appear before the court and to make a statement. Although violation of this
duty is not punishable, the court may draw adverse inferences from a failure
to comply with this obligation. Offenders should therefore observe this
statutory duty, both when they give testimony as a party witness of their
own accord and when they are summoned by the victim.
If offenders are summoned as a party witness by the opposing party (the
victim), they are obliged to give testimony. This implies a significant
difference from their position in criminal proceedings; under civil law they
can consequently be required to make a statement under oath, whereas
under criminal law, offenders have a right to remain silent. Only when
making a party witness statement carries the risk of self incrimination, they
can decline to give evidence.574 Since victims should attempt to hear the
original maker of a statement instead of furnishing hearsay evidence, if they
claim that one of the exceptions occurred, it is likely that the offender will be
called as a party witness. In individual cases, it may then be important for
offenders to carefully consider whether they should invoke this privilege to
refuse to testify, assuming that they can. Facts or claims that are not
challenged by the parties should be accepted by the civil court (see also
Chapter 4.4.1). The question arises what should happen if, for example, the
victim claims that the offender has attacked him or her during the
mediation, as a ground for claiming more compensation. The offender may
then turn down the request from the victim to give testimony about this
issue, so as not to incriminate himself. However, the civil law principle that
undisputed facts or claims should remain unchallenged may imply that the
court should then decide to accept the victim’s allegation as a certainty, since
it is not rebutted by the offender. This may be a reason for the offender not
to invoke the privilege, but to make a statement concerning the victim’s
assertion. Moreover, it may be significant for the offender to react to the
claim of the victim, because the victim’s statement in principle has limited
conclusive force due to the victim’s position as a party witness; if the
victim’s claim is refuted, the victim will need other evidence to support his
or her statement, and may additionally have to summon the mediator or the
professional caregiver as a witness.
To enable the testifying offender to observe the confidential nature of
victim offender mediation to the extent necessary, it would again be
advisable to include the principle of confidentiality and its exceptions in
legislation. However, there are two situations in which the offender should
be allowed to disclose additional information. In the first place, the offender
should be able to react properly to a claim by the victim that one of the
intended exceptions has occurred. This follows from the right to adversarial
proceedings, which requires that the parties should be given sufficient
574 See, e.g., Keane 2006, pp. 624 637.
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opportunity to react to each other’s claims and assertions. A violation of this
right could endanger the fairness of the proceedings, and thus the
admissibility of the information concerned. The offender must therefore be
able to react to allegations made by the victim, even if this reaction includes
the disclosure of mediation information that exceeds the proposed
exceptions. For example, the victim may claim that the offender has failed to
pay the compensation the parties agreed upon in mediation, and that the
offender thus intentionally violated the agreement. The offender may then
argue that he considers the amount of compensation to be too high, but that
he felt compelled to accept it during the mediation, due to the intimidating
attitude of the victim during the session.
The second situation pertains to the disclosure of mediation information of
the offender’s own accord. As was discussed regarding criminal law,
offenders should be able to denounce behaviour of the victim that frustrated
the mediation, when they themselves have adopted a constructive attitude
during the session. This is important to allow the victim to participate in
victim offender mediation, or to withdraw from the process without
consequences. The discussion of obstructive victim behaviour may well
explain why offenders, for example, accepted a level of compensation they
ultimately objected to, and therefore failed to pay. If this caused the victim to
go to court, the offender should be able to talk about these issues, even
though they cannot be considered to constitute one of the proposed
exceptions in all cases. Although such information can no longer influence
the court’s sentencing decision, it may influence the decision of the court on
the level of compensation the offender has to offer.
The discussion of the admissibility of mediation information as hearsay
and non hearsay evidence in Section 8.2.2 equally applies here. If offenders
want to furnish proof about previous statements of the victim, they should
rather summon the victim as a party witness than furnish the latter’s
statements as hearsay evidence.
Apart from the above mentioned possibilities, the offender and the victim
can also disclose mediation information that is outside the scope of the three
exceptions, if they agree on the disclosure of such issues.
8.5 Conclusion
The previous chapters addressed several exceptions that should be made to
the current confidential environment of victim offender mediation. These
exceptions concern the situation that the offender commits another crime
during the mediation or discloses information about other crimes,
confessional statements by the offender, and information about an
intentional implementation failure of the mediation agreement. Due to the
drawbacks that these situations may have for and the harm they may cause
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to the victim and the mediation process, the mediation participants should
be enabled to disclose these issues in criminal and civil proceedings. To
guarantee the effectiveness of allowing disclosure, it is also important that
the court can take these matters into consideration. Therefore, the mediation
participants should have the opportunity to present such information in
court. Additionally, this information should be admissible. These issues
have been discussed in this chapter.
The victim, the mediator, the professional caregiver, and the offender may
all have different positions in criminal or civil court, and their opportunities
to participate in such proceedings influence their ability to submit
information pertaining to the proposed exceptions to the confidentiality rule.
The victim has an effective opportunity to present the information that
pertains to the exceptions to the principle of confidentiality during criminal
proceedings. The various procedural positions of the victim can fulfil during
a criminal trial – facilitating the offender’s prosecution, injured party, maker
of a VIS, and witness – mean that the victim can disclose information from a
mediation concerning the three exceptions to the confidentiality rule. If plea
bargaining is involved, the most important way for victims to be heard is to
issue a VIS; this enables them to tell their story, even if the offender is not on
trial. If it does come to a trial, the most important role of the victim is that of
a witness. Although victims in this position are dependent on others to ask
them about what happened in mediation, it is likely that the prosecution will
ask them about the mediation, especially if one of the proposed exceptions
has occurred; this may help the case against the offender. Victims can
generally include the information pertaining to these exceptions in their
testimonies, and the criminal court can subsequently take this information
into account. To enable the victim to limit the disclosure of mediation
information to these issues, it is advisable to codify the principle of
confidentiality and the exceptions, thereby ensuring greater clarity and
uniformity.
The mediator and the professional caregiver can participate in a criminal
trial as experts and witnesses. Due to the nature of their involvement, their
position as witnesses is the most important here. As such, they can present
mediation information in court. To enable the mediator and the professional
caregiver to observe the principle of confidentiality, and to disclose
information that pertains to the three exceptions, mediation confidentiality
should be included in legislation to the extent necessary. This will also
prevent problems pertaining to the legal privilege to refuse to testify.
Offenders have two main options for furnishing mediation information in
criminal court. In the first place, they can rebut the victim’s claim that one of
the exceptions to the confidentiality principle occurred. In such cases, the
offender may submit information that is outside the scope of these
exceptions. The same applies if offenders produce proof of their own accord;
mediation information that exceeds the exceptions can then be disclosed, as
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long as this demonstrably benefits the offender’s position in court.
As a party in civil litigation against the offender, the victim can present
information pertaining to the intended exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality as a party witness, either at the request of the other party, or
of his own volition. The information concerned can subsequently be taken
into account by the civil court. To enable the victim to observe mediation
confidentiality to the extent necessary, it is advisable to incorporate the
principle of confidentiality and its exceptions in legislation.
The mediator and the professional caregiver in civil proceedings can act as
experts and as witnesses. Both positions allow them to submit mediation
information in court if asked to do so. Their position as witnesses is the most
important in this respect. To enable the mediator and the professional
caregiver to observe the principle of confidentiality, it is proposed that the
confidentiality rule and its exceptions be laid down in legislation. This will
offer them a clear and uniform basis to substantiate the parties’ claims that
one of the exceptions occurred, and prevent problems pertaining to a legal
privilege.
Offenders are also most likely to act as parties and can subsequently
appear as party witnesses. In that capacity, they can either be requested to
give testimony by the victim, or make a statement of their own accord.
Offenders in this context would also benefit from codification of the
confidentiality rule and its exceptions. Furthermore, offenders should be
allowed to furnish mediation information that is outside the scope of these
exceptions, so as to rebut the victim’s claim that one of the exceptions
occurred, or to prove to the court that the failure of the mediation was not
their fault.
In conclusion, the mediation participants can be considered to have an
effective opportunity to disclose mediation information in court, regarding
one of the intended exceptions. Making exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality seems to be a proper way of offering a remedy for the harm
that is caused by the situations these exceptions pertain to. Codification of
the principle of confidentiality and its exceptions can be argued to be a
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9 The Scope of the Principle of Confidentiality
9.1 Introduction
The research presented in this book investigated one of the main features of
victim offender mediation, the principle of confidentiality. Confidentiality is
a generally acknowledged critical success factor for the procedure. It offers
victims and offenders a possibility to freely share their cares and concerns in
order to try and come to terms with each other and the crime that has
happened.
The recognition of the significance of the secret nature of the mediation
process has led to the incorporation of the confidentiality standard in
international protocols, which offer a set of guiding principles for victim
offender mediation. According to the wording of these international
documents, all things said and done during the mediation should remain
secret.575 This broad scope of confidentiality was chosen as the starting point
of this research to determine whether strict secrecy of all mediation
information is a tenable and realistic requirement. The research showed that
absolute secrecy can in some cases be counterproductive. Particular frictions
may arise, which can have severe drawbacks for the mediation participants
and erode the process itself. When this happens, the observance of
mediation secrecy can and should be questioned. Specific conflict areas may
necessitate breaching confidentiality and were therefore identified as
possible exceptions. In this way, the research endeavoured to throw light on
the advisable scope of the confidential character of victim offender
mediation and to translate this into concrete limitations on the
confidentiality rule in the form of clear exceptions. In so doing, the research
formulated an answer to the central question to what extent, and on what
grounds, exceptions should be made to the private nature of victim offender
mediation.
The frictions that arise from the premise that all mediation information is
subject to secrecy occur in two areas: the social environment of the
mediation participants and their involvement in judicial proceedings that
follow the mediation. As a result, making exceptions implies that the
participants are either allowed to disclose mediation information to out of
court third parties, or submit mediation information in court. The reasons
for permitting disclosure differ accordingly, as do the possible consequences
of revealing the information concerned. The conclusions pertaining to both
areas will therefore be discussed separately below. With this, the current
chapter will give an overview of the main research findings, and answer the
575 Except for when the parties agree to disclose particular issues, or when domestic law
requires disclosure (Paragraph 2 of the Recommendation and Paragraph 14 of the Basic
Principles).
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central research question.
9.2 Confidentiality and Out of Court Disclosure
The friction that pertains to the out of court setting concerns the issue that
the participants in mediation are unable to share their experiences with their
social environment. This environment consists of all third parties that may
potentially be addressed regarding mediation contents, because the
participants want to talk to them, or because they have their own interests in
receiving mediation information. These third parties are divided into three
categories: the family and friends of the participants, the media, and a third
category which consists of a variety of institutions. The type of victim
offender mediation concerned is of little significance in this context and they
were therefore discussed collectively. Consequently, only the first part of the
research framework developed in Chapter Four – concerning the main
features of victim offender mediation – was taken into account.
The main reasons for requiring that mediation participants do not talk
about their mediation experiences to third parties correspond to the general
grounds for advocating the confidentiality of victim offender mediation
communication: maintaining the appeal of taking part and facilitating the
exchange of information between victims and offenders. Furthermore, it
prevents information from being in the public domain and assuming a life of
its own. Despite these advantages of observing confidentiality, frictions
occur if mediation participants are forbidden to talk to any third parties.
Social studies have demonstrated that sharing significant information with
supportive others, for example, close friends and relatives, has a positive
effect on the health and wellbeing of individuals.576 Victims and offenders
may conceivably experience their encounter in mediation as an important
and agitating event, and they may feel isolated if they are unable to talk
about what happened during the session with people close to them. In the
victim’s case, this may even cause feelings of secondary victimisation.
Prohibiting the parties in mediation to discuss the process with their family
and friends can therefore have a negative impact on their overall wellbeing.
For these reasons, it may be a disincentive to participate; although mediation
secrecy safeguards the appeal of participation, it can also be
counterproductive if it is carried too far. Furthermore, participation in
mediation should at the very least not add to the parties’ distress. As victims
and offenders can be considerably disadvantaged by a general ban on
disclosure to their social environment, such a ban should not be absolute.
Victims and offenders should be allowed to talk to their friends and family
about their mediation experiences.
Due to the nature of the involvement of the mediator and the professional
576 For references, see Chapter Five.
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and non professional caregiver, the above does not apply to these
participants. For the non professional caregivers, this follows from their
modest involvement and their readiness to support one of the parties. The
professional character of the participation of the mediator and the
professional caregiver implies that they should observe mediation
confidentiality by virtue of their professional involvement, unless they have
a legal duty to disclose particular information. Of course, they are allowed to
discuss a mediation they were involved in with their superior(s) or co
worker(s), if this is considered necessary in the terms of professional quality
assurance. In addition, it can neither be excluded, nor can it be verified, that
professionals talk to some people close to them about the mediation (this
also applies to the non professional caregiver). Nevertheless, the general
rule must be that the mediator and the professional and non professional
caregiver are not allowed to talk to their social environment about the
mediation.
None of the participants in victim offender mediation should be able to
talk about what happened in mediation to the media. The revelation of such
information by victims and offenders is most likely to be inspired by
motives such as frustration or vengefulness. A ban on talking to third parties
inspired by such motives will not have the same drawbacks that a ban on
disclosure to family and friends may have. On the contrary, acting on
vengefulness is believed to have negative consequences for the overall
wellbeing of individuals.577 It is also inconsistent with the objective of
victim offender mediation, to reach an agreement based on acknowledging
the needs and feelings of the other party. The parties should therefore not be
allowed to share their experiences with the media. For the reasons
mentioned above, the same goes for the professional and non professional
caregiver and the mediator.
The third category of potential recipients consists of a variety of
institutions that are part of the environment of the mediation participants,
such as schools, sports clubs, and insurance companies. For various reasons,
they may be interested in receiving mediation information. Victims and
offenders can agree that some issues are open to disclosure to these
institutions. If they do not, the decision to reveal information is left to the
discretion of the party concerned (in most cases the victim). An aggrieved
party may seek redress through civil litigation. The mediator and the
professional and non professional caregiver should honour the confidential
nature of victim offender mediation.
577 For references, see Chapter Five.
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9.3 Confidentiality and Disclosure in Court
The frictions that pertain to the legal setting were discussed in Chapters Six,
Seven and Eight. Making an exception to the principle of confidentiality
because of the consequences of these frictions implies that the participants in
victim offender mediation are allowed to disclose mediation information in
judicial proceedings. As this requires conformity with both mediation
fundamentals and essentials of criminal law and civil law, the entire
research framework (see Chapter Four) should be taken into account.
The first issue concerns the reasons that necessitate making an exception.
The first ground is that participation in mediation should not add grief to
the parties’ distress. If the premise that all mediation information is
confidential has severe drawbacks, a remedy should be sought. Such a
remedy can be offered by leaving the rule that causes these drawbacks aside.
In this context, this entails the formulation of exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality. Consequently, some mediation information should be open
to disclosure in court.
Exceptions can only be considered effective if they truly offer the persons
harmed an opportunity to be and feel heard. Exceptions must therefore be
compatible with the main characteristics of victim offender mediation. After
all, breaching the confidentiality rule should not subvert the process itself
without good reason. The measure of allowing disclosure was therefore
tested against the relevant mediation characteristics.
Secondly, the effectiveness of the remedy of permitting disclosure
depends on whether the information concerned can be submitted in court. It
should be admissible under criminal and civil law, and should therefore not
violate the essential features of these concepts. This enables the criminal and
civil court to take notice of the behaviour of the offender and to draw the
conclusions it sees fit. In the research framework, this aspect was divided
into two parts, consisting of the main features of criminal law and civil law,
and of the current limitations on the use of information in these areas.
The final step pertains to the possibility of the mediation participants to
furnish information in court. For the court to be able to pay attention to the
issues that can be disclosed, these issues should not only be admissible, but
they should also actually be advanced. The examination of the effectiveness
of making exceptions was therefore concluded with a discussion of the
procedural position of the mediation participants.
The steps mentioned above were examined for all three types of victim
offender mediation (diversionary mediation, mediation as part of regular
court proceedings, and mediation after conviction and sentencing).
9.3.1 Identification of the Frictions
Based on the idea that victim offender mediation – and its standards –
should at the very least not have additional drawbacks for its participants,
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three situations were identified that could necessitate making an exception
to the confidentiality rule. The nature of the identified frictions indicates that
the victim will generally be the disadvantaged party.
The first situation pertains to other crimes. This can concern another crime
the offender commits during the mediation against the same victim.
Naturally, this will be a very harmful and distressing event for the victim.
Furthermore, offenders may reveal information about other (past and
future) crimes. The knowledge that others may soon be victimised may
disturb the victim. According to the advocated extent of the principle of
confidentiality, the victim is currently unable to disclose such issues in court.
The second category of mediation information that should possibly be
open to disclosure concerns confessional statements of the offender. Prior to
the mediation, victims and offenders should acknowledge the basic facts of a
case. In many cases, this acknowledgement will imply a confession by the
offender. It is also possible that acknowledging the basic facts does not
constitute an admission of guilt, but that other statements of the offender in
the course of the mediation do. The offender is free to withdraw a previous
confession during judicial proceedings that follow a mediation.
Understandably, this may lead to feelings of frustration and
incomprehension on the victim’s part. Furthermore, the withdrawal of a
confession made in mediation does not correspond to the rationale of the
process. The confidentiality of such statements should therefore be
questioned.
The third situation concerns a failure to implement the mediation
agreement, due to intentional and reprehensible behaviour of the offender.
The fulfilment of the obligations in the agreement can be considered the
ultimate recognition of the victim and the harm suffered. The failure of the
offender to comply with the agreement can cause the victim to feel
frustrated and distressed, and even to suffer feelings of secondary
victimisation. The mediation participants should therefore possibly be able
to furnish information regarding an intentional implementation failure in
court.
The identified frictions add to the parties’ distress, especially so for the
victim. A remedy could be offered by allowing the victim and the other
mediation participants to reveal the situations concerned and the
corresponding information in court. Such a remedy must, of course, be
effective and therefore be compatible with the features of victim offender
mediation and of criminal and civil law.
9.3.2 Compatibility with Features of Victim Offender Mediation
The guiding principles for victim offender mediation follow from the
Council of Europe Recommendation and the United Nations Basic
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Principles.578 The relevant standards are the acknowledgement of basic facts,
the free and voluntary consent to participate, and the right to receive
sufficient information prior to the mediation. These characteristics have
various implications for victims and offenders, and for their role in
mediation. In the first place, the acknowledgement of basic facts contributes
to mutual consensus on the main issue of the mediation, the crime, and
enables offenders to accept and act on their responsibilities towards the
victim. Secondly, the requirement that the parties should decide to take part
in mediation voluntarily and free of pressure presupposes that their consent
to participate implies that they intend to commit themselves to contributing
to the success of the procedure. This also follows from the fact that victims
and offenders are free to withdraw from mediation at any time. The
requirement pertaining to the parties’ right to information points to their
awareness of their roles in the process. The offender ought to be conscious of
the victim’s vulnerable position and act accordingly. Additionally, the
information provided enables them to make a carefully considered decision
about their participation.
It follows that victims and offenders taking part in victim offender
mediation are presupposed to make a conscious decision to participate and
consequently intend to contribute to the success of the procedure. As a
result, a violation of these requirements implies that their commitment can
no longer be guaranteed.
If the offender commits another crime during the mediation or divulges
information about other crimes, this behaviour may understandably harm
the victim and frustrate the mediation process. Such behaviour – an
intentional disruption of the procedure – does not correspond to the
implications of the mediation features discussed above, but rather violates
these requirements; offenders that consciously cause harm to the victim do
not show that they acknowledge the victim’s position or intend to contribute
to the mediation’s success.
Offenders should also accept and act on their responsibilities. The
acknowledgement of basic facts is the most significant manifestation in this
regard. The withdrawal of that acknowledgement after the mediation, as
well as of other confessional statements, is inconsistent with this and thus
violates the nature of mediation.
The same goes for an intentional implementation failure of the mediation
agreement. The observance of the mediation requirements implies that
offenders commit themselves to contributing to the success of the procedure.
This includes compliance with the mediation agreement. Failing to fulfil the
resulting obligations violates the essence of mediation, especially since
offenders can withdraw from the process at any time, and consequently do
not have to consent to unreasonable demands of the victim.
578 See Chapters Three and Four.
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As the main features of victim offender mediation are violated by the
identified frictions, making exceptions to the principle of confidentiality in
these situations will not subvert the mediation procedure itself.
9.3.3 Compatibility with Features of Criminal and Civil Law
The relevant features of criminal and civil law mainly follow from the right
to fair proceedings. For exceptions to the confidentiality rule to offer an
effective remedy, these features must be observed when mediation
information is disclosed in court. Otherwise, it will be inadmissible and the
court will be unable to consider it. The main relevant characteristics of
criminal law are the right against self incrimination, the presumption of
innocence, and various procedural rights that follow from the right to
adversarial proceedings. Regarding civil law, the most important
characteristics are also the right to adversarial proceedings and the ensuing
procedural requirements. Disclosure of information to which the exceptions
could apply should comply with these essential features to the extent
necessary.
As for criminal law,579 none of the relevant features is inconsistent with the
admissibility of mediation information in court. Prior to mediation,
offenders should be informed about the implications of taking part, such as
the scope of the confidentiality principle. The parties will then be aware
beforehand what information is open to disclosure, the confidentiality rule
notwithstanding. Offenders will know that some information they share
during a mediation – for example, about another crime – can be revealed
afterwards. The use of such information in criminal proceedings therefore
does not violate the right against self incrimination; the offender knows in
advance that particular behaviour or specific information may be open to
disclosure after the mediation has ended. The confidential environment does
not alter this. So as not to infringe the presumption of innocence, the
participation of an offender in mediation must not be regarded as an
admission of guilt in subsequent proceedings; the offender’s guilt must be
established by the court on the basis of evidence produced by the
prosecution or the defence.580 Offenders are therefore free to withdraw their
acknowledgement of the basic facts and other confessional statements made
in the context of mediation. In this way, the presumptio innocentiae is
observed, even if the other mediation participants submit confessional
579 The assessment of compatibility with criminal law only applies to the first and second
modalities of victim offender mediation, since the third modality takes place after the
conviction and sentencing of the offender, and is thus not followed by criminal
proceedings.
580 Unless the jurisdiction involved allows plea bargaining and the offender pleads guilty.
Then, however, the decision to do so should be made by the offender of his own
volition, and not be deduced from the offender’s participation in victim offender
mediation.
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statements. Nor does the right to adversarial proceedings conflict with
submitting mediation information, as long as the necessary procedural
requirements are observed, such as the right of the defence to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
If victim offender mediation is followed by civil litigation,581 mediation
information may be relevant to the parties to substantiate their claims, and
the relevant features of civil law should be observed for such information to
be admissible. The main characteristic in this respect is the right to
adversarial proceedings, which encompasses various procedural safeguards
that should be observed in the course of taking evidence. For example, the
parties in civil proceedings should have equal opportunities to submit their
claims and furnish proof. They should also be enabled to react to each
other’s claims and assertions.
It follows that the essential features of criminal and civil law do not clash
with the use of mediation information in court. Thus far, making exceptions
to the principle of confidentiality can therefore be considered a sufficient
remedy.
9.3.4 Similarities to Exceptions to the Use and Admissibility of
Information
The use and admissibility of information in criminal and civil law is in some
cases restricted. Observing the confidentiality of all mediation information is
a similar limitation, since it also prohibits the use of information that might
be relevant to judicial proceedings. Similarities between the reasons for the
existing limitations and the proposed exceptions to the principle of
confidentiality could therefore be considered an incentive not to allow
disclosure.
The limitations pertaining to criminal law are the restricted use of coercive
powers, the privilege to refuse to testify, and the exclusionary rule. The
privilege to refuse to testify and the exclusionary rule are also recognised in
civil law. Additionally, in civil law the conclusive force of the testimony of
party witnesses is limited.
These restrictions do not stand in the way of making exceptions to the
principle of confidentiality. Since communication in mediation is voluntary,
the restriction pertaining to the coercive powers does not apply; coercive
powers are by definition exerted against the will of the subject. The same
goes for the exclusionary rule, because the disclosure of the mediation
information concerned does not violate essential features of criminal or civil
law (see above), nor is it otherwise obtained illegally. The remaining
581 Such civil proceedings are most likely to be initiated by the victim to sue the offender
for damages. Civil litigation can be initiated after all three types of victim offender
mediation, but will generally follow a failed diversionary mediation, or a mediation that
was part of regular court proceedings (provided that neither the mediation nor the
criminal court settled damages).
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limitations are irrelevant here, since they concern the question who can
submit information in court,582 instead of what information is admissible,
which is the central question here.
In conclusion, the existing restrictions to the use of information in judicial
proceedings do not give cause to refrain from making exceptions to the
principle of confidentiality.
9.3.5 Procedural Position of the Mediation Participants
Making exceptions to the principle of confidentiality aims at offering a
remedy for the harm that has been caused by the three situations that justify
making an exception. For the mediation participants to perceive this remedy
as effective, they should be able to submit the information concerned in
court. Apart from the fact that this information should therefore be
admissible in subsequent judicial proceedings (see above), the mediation
participants should also be able to actually submit it in such proceedings.
Breaching mediation confidentiality in particular situations would be
pointless if the mediation participants could not put the information
concerned to good use. The participants have different positions in judicial
proceedings (whether criminal or civil), and their opportunities to present
information diverge accordingly.
In criminal proceedings, the victim can facilitate the prosecution of the
offender, join the proceedings as the injured party, make a victim impact
statement,583 or appear as a witness. Appearing as a witness is the most
important position in this context, since it offers the victim the opportunity
to make a sworn statement about the mediation information that is open to
disclosure. Witnesses in criminal law are legally obliged to appear and to
testify. As a result, the victim currently cannot refuse to answer questions
about the mediation, even if these are outside the scope of the proposed
exceptions. A solution should therefore be sought to enable the victim and
the other participants to observe mediation confidentiality to the extent
necessary, despite this statutory duty (see Section 9.3.6).
Witnesses can report on facts and circumstances that they observed or
experienced themselves. Consequently, the victim can generally furnish
proof that the offender committed another crime during the mediation. The
same goes for information about the implementation failure exception, as far
as these matters concern sensory perceptions of the victim. Other out of
court statements that are reproduced by victims in their testimony may be
considered hearsay evidence. This holds true for information about other
crimes the offender divulges during the mediation, confessional statements
582 See Section 9.3.5.
583 This statement is of special importance if plea bargaining is involved, because it enables
victims to state their experiences and views at the sentencing stage.
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of the offender, and information regarding an intentional implementation
failure that cannot be regarded as non hearsay evidence.584 Hearsay
evidence is in principle inadmissible in common law countries and in lay
procedures in civil law countries. However, there are many exceptions. One
of these regards confessions, which in this context are taken to mean any
statement that may be adverse to the person who made it. As a result,
confessional statements that the offender made during the mediation as well
as information about other crimes can be categorised as such. Such
information is therefore admissible despite the hearsay rule. The remaining
hearsay information, namely that regarding an implementation failure,
remains inadmissible, but if the original statements concerned were made by
the mediator or the professional caregiver, they can be summoned as
witnesses. If the offender made the original statement, he or she can also be
heard, but may refuse to make a statement by invoking the right to remain
silent. Nevertheless, since only part of the implementation failure
information will be considered hearsay, and part of that category may be
provided directly by the mediator and the professional caregiver, the victim
has a reasonable opportunity to disclose this info
The mediator and the professional caregiver can join criminal proceedings
as witnesses and as experts. Due to the nature of their involvement in
mediation, it is most likely that they are requested to give testimony. In that
capacity, they are able to furnish mediation information in court. Due to
their guiding and assisting role during the process, they should, however,
exercise restraint if the victim decides not to submit information pertaining
to the exceptions. The statutory duty to give testimony also applies to the
mediator and the professional caregiver, unless – in the case of the
professional caregiver – a privilege to refuse to testify has been awarded on
professional grounds. The decision to make a statement is then left to the
discretion of the professional caregiver.585
In a criminal trial, offenders stand accused. Consequently, they have
certain powers, which emanate from the fair trial requirements, such as the
right to remain silent and the right to speak. Offenders can choose whether
to make a statement in criminal court, but cannot be obliged to do so. If
offenders exercise their right to remain silent, they logically observe
confidentiality. Furthermore, the right to speak gives offenders the
opportunity to present the information they want. In the first place, the
offender is allowed to react to the victim’s claim that an exception occurred.
The fair trial requirements dictate that the offender should be permitted to
rebut the victim’s claim with any mediation information he considers
necessary, even if this information is outside the scope of the exceptions.
Offenders can also make a statement of their own accord. They are allowed
to disclose mediation information pertaining to the exceptions, although this
584 For examples of these categories, see Chapter 8.2.1.
585 The assessment the professional caregiver should make was discussed in Chapter 8.3,
with regard to both criminal law and civil law.
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is unlikely since these situations may conceivably have an adverse effect on
their case. Additionally, offenders should be allowed to disclose other
mediation information if it demonstrably benefits their position in court, for
instance, information that may lead to a reduced sentence, or that has
evidential value.586
Civil proceedings that follow a victim offender mediation are most likely to
be initiated by the victim, who sues the offender for damages. The victim
then becomes the plaintiff. As a party in civil litigation, victims are
responsible for furnishing proof of their claims. They may need mediation
information to do so. Parties in civil proceedings can give testimony
themselves as party witnesses. Party witnesses are generally subject to the
same regulations as regular witnesses are, which implies that they have a
legal obligation to make a statement and answer the questions asked
truthfully. However, the statement of a party witness has limited conclusive
force, so as to guarantee its reliability. Since the statement of witnesses
under civil law must also pertain to their own sensory observations, the
victim can present information about other crimes and about an
implementation failure, for the same reasons as mentioned above. In
addition, civil law also recognises the concept of hearsay, but in this context
it does not oppose furnishing mediation information pertaining to the other
proposed exceptions.
In civil litigation, the mediator and the professional caregiver can be
requested to give their expert opinion, or be called as witnesses. As
witnesses, they are subject to the statutory duty to appear before the court
and to make a statement. They will generally be summoned by the parties
(the victim or the offender), and may be questioned about the contents of the
mediation. Both professionals should then be allowed to disclose
information pertaining to the proposed exceptions. If the professionals
concerned have been awarded a legal privilege to refuse to testify, they must
decide for themselves whether they will invoke their privilege.
The position of the offender in civil law mutatis mutandis resembles that of
the victim. In most cases, the offender will be the defendant. As such, the
offender can give testimony as a party witness, and offer mediation
information. An important difference with the position of offenders in
criminal law is that they can be obliged to make a statement on oath if the
victim summons them to testify, unless they risk self incrimination. As the
defendant, the offender should also be allowed to disclose mediation
information that exceeds the exceptions, either in reaction to the victim’s
claim that one of the exceptions occurred, or to denounce behaviour of the
victim that frustrated the mediation session.
It follows that the mediation participants have ample opportunity to be
heard in court and to disclose mediation information in legal proceedings.
586 For examples, see Chapter 8.4.1.
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However, it is also true that when the mediation participants act as
witnesses, they are currently unable to observe mediation confidentiality to
the extent necessary; under criminal and civil law, witnesses are obliged to
make a statement if summoned to do so. Making exceptions to the principle
of confidentiality is pointless if the secrecy of the remaining mediation
information cannot be guaranteed. This discrepancy must be resolved in
order to secure the effectiveness of the remedy of disregarding the
confidentiality rule.
9.3.6 Incorporation in Legislation
If the offender commits another crime during a mediation, provides
information about other crimes, or intentionally violates the mediation
agreement, this will have drawbacks for the victim. This also true if the
offender confesses in the context of mediation, but withdraws the statements
concerned afterwards. For these reasons, exceptions to the current scope of
mediation confidentiality are called for. Making exceptions to the
confidentiality rule in the above mentioned situations was shown to be
compatible with the essential features of penal mediation, and of criminal
and civil law. Additionally, the mediation participants can be considered to
have sufficient opportunities to submit the information concerned in court.
In most cases, they will do so as witnesses.
In criminal and civil law, witnesses are generally subject to a legal
obligation to appear and to make a statement. They may find themselves
unable to refuse to answer questions about mediation information that is
outside the scope of the proposed exceptions. Some professional caregivers
may be privileged to refuse to testify, which may lead to inequality; for
example, a probation officer who assisted the offender can under certain
circumstances invoke a privilege, while a victim services worker cannot.
Moreover, the privilege is currently scarcely awarded to mediators, who
could obviously benefit from being able to refuse to give testimony.
However, granting the privilege to these professionals may confront
mediators with a conflict of interests in view of their impartial role in
mediation. Another disadvantage of the current state of affairs is the risk
that the statutory duty to testify is misused to make mediation information
public.
As a result, the mediation participants must be allowed to keep mediation
information secret, despite the legal obligation to appear as witnesses. It
would therefore be advisable to include the principle of confidentiality in
legislation. The confidentiality of the mediation process would be legally
guaranteed, and the statutory incorporation of the confidentiality rule
would constitute an exception to the general obligation to give testimony. It
should be included in criminal law, because it would restrict one of its main
features, namely the fact finding process. Such a limitation should be
foreseeable and unequivocal. Civil legislation should also incorporate
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confidentiality; apart from the fact that both legal areas require witnesses to
make a statement, forum shopping – if the confidentiality rule would have a
legal basis under criminal law but not under civil law – should be avoided.
To ensure that the mediation participants can disclose information
pertaining to the three proposed exceptions, it is important that they are
covered by legislation too. As the identified exceptions reflect a careful
weighing of the interests involved, the mediation participants should have
the right to disclose this information.
The legal incorporation of the confidentiality principle and its exceptions
will secure the best possible approach to the level of secrecy regarding the
contents of mediation. It offers uniform regulation for all mediation
participants and an effective remedy for confidentiality frictions.
The assessment whether an exception occurred should be left to the party
that wants to submit the information concerned. In most cases, this will be
the victim. Naturally, incorporation in legislation will help the parties to
make a proper assessment, especially in combination with the
recommendation that the parties should be provided with specific
information prior to the mediation, about the available exceptions to the
principle of confidentiality and the possible consequences of disclosure. The
court in charge should determine whether advancing mediation information
is consistent with the proposed regulation of the exceptions. If mediation
information is disclosed in breach of this regulation, the most obvious
response will be to leave the information out of the official deliberations. If
the court considers it necessary or appropriate to do so, it may additionally
award damages to the injured party, or mitigate the sentence to be imposed.
In the context of civil law, the wronged party can sue for damages.
9.4 Epilogue
This study examined the principle of confidentiality that governs victim
offender mediation. The principle of confidentiality is an important
prerequisite for successful mediation in criminal cases. Participation in penal
mediation has significant benefits for victims and offenders. It affords them
a unique chance to talk to each other about the crime that has happened, and
to have a say in how issues are addressed or resolved. They can express their
personal feelings and experiences in a way that is nearly impossible in a
court setting. In this respect, the opportunities offered by victim offender
mediation have thus far not been surpassed.
Because of the advantages of victim offender mediation, it is of great
importance to carefully monitor the feasibility and tenability of the process.
The need for basic principles is generally recognised, and they have been
laid down as international guidelines. The widely supported
acknowledgement that it is necessary to provide a private environment for
penal mediation is an essential first step. To extend the potential of victim
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offender mediation for victims and offenders, further reflection on the
practical implications of this premise is needed. Maximising the
effectiveness of victim offender mediation not only depends on fulfilling its
basic principles, but also on the compatibility of the process with related
areas and principles of law.
With this in mind, this research focused on identifying concrete situations
where the observance of confidentiality would be untenable, due to its
potential consequences. The aim was to offer food for thought about the next
step in embedding victim offender mediation in the areas the process
inevitably interacts with, criminal law and civil law. In the end, it is hoped





Victim offender mediation, bemiddeling tussen de verdachte en het slachtoffer
van een strafbaar feit (verder: strafrechtelijke bemiddeling), wordt in toene
mende mate ingezet als wijze van conflictoplossing in strafrechtelijke con
text. Tijdens een bemiddeling wordt aan de verdachte en het slachtoffer de
mogelijkheid geboden om in dialoog te treden over hetgeen is voorgevallen,
onder begeleiding van een onafhankelijke en onpartijdige derde, de mediator.
De ontmoeting met de verdachte stelt het slachtoffer in staat tot uitdrukking
te brengen welke gevolgen het strafbare feit voor hem heeft gehad. De ver
dachte heeft de mogelijkheid zijn verantwoordelijkheid ten aanzien van het
gebeurde te nemen en het slachtoffer compensatie te bieden. Hoewel de
aandacht voor strafrechtelijke bemiddeling groeiende is, is er weinig aan
dacht voor de verhouding tussen bemiddeling en ‘traditionele’ juridische
procedures en daarmee voor de inbedding van dit concept in zijn juridische
context. Een onderwerp ten aanzien waarvan deze benadering bij uitstek tot
problemen leidt, is de vertrouwelijkheid van de inhoud van strafrechtelijke
bemiddeling. De wijze waarop aan dit principe uitdrukking is gegeven in
diverse internationale protocollen, laat weinig ruimte voor uitzonderingen
op dit beginsel, ondanks het feit dat dit uitgangspunt nadelige effecten voor
de betrokkenen kan hebben. Deze situatie, als verder beschreven in hoofdstuk
1, vormt de aanleiding voor dit onderzoek.
De wijze waarop aan strafrechtelijke bemiddeling op nationaal niveau is
vormgegeven, is afhankelijk van de specifieke kenmerken van de verschil
lende rechtssystemen. Grosso modo zijn er drie modaliteiten te onderschei
den, afhankelijk van het moment dat een bemiddeling plaatsvindt ten op
zichte van het strafproces; een zaak kan voor, tijdens en na een strafprocedu
re naar bemiddeling worden verwezen (zie hoofdstuk 2). In het eerste geval
legt de vervolgende instantie een aanbod tot bemiddeling voor aan het
slachtoffer en de verdachte, voordat de zaak bij de rechter wordt aange
bracht. Wanneer slachtoffer en verdachte tijdens de bemiddeling tot over
eenstemming komen, wordt de vervolging niet voortgezet en de zaak als
afgedaan beschouwd. Strafrechtelijke bemiddeling functioneert in deze ge
vallen als een vorm van buitengerechtelijke afdoening. Hieruit volgt dat met
name vergrijpen van lichte aard naar deze modaliteit worden verwezen. In
het geval de feiten zich naar hun ernst niet lenen om slechts door bemidde
ling te worden afgedaan, kunnen de verdachte en het slachtoffer tijdens de
behandeling van de zaak ter terechtzitting worden verwezen naar bemidde
ling. Een positieve uitkomst kan dan een matigend effect hebben op de straf
toemetingsbeslissing van de rechter. De derde modaliteit van bemiddeling
vindt plaats na de veroordeling van de verdachte, vaak tijdens de tenuit
voerlegging van een gevangenisstraf, en is derhalve met name gereserveerd
voor zware feiten. Deze vorm van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling kan de uit
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komst van het strafproces niet langer beïnvloeden en is daarom minder ge
richt op het bereiken van een overeenkomst.
Het toenemend gebruik van bemiddeling in strafzaken heeft geleid tot de
ontwikkeling van minimumvereisten waaraan de procedure moet voldoen.
Deze vereisten zijn geformuleerd door zowel de Raad van Europa587 als de
Verenigde Naties.588 Beide internationale protocollen bevatten richtlijnen
waar nationale bemiddelingsprocedures aan moeten voldoen (zie hoofdstuk
3). Zo dient er voorafgaand aan de bemiddeling overeenstemming te bestaan
tussen verdachte en slachtoffer over de basale feiten waar de bemiddeling
betrekking op heeft. Deelname moet zijn gebaseerd op vrijwilligheid. Met
het oog daarop dienen partijen van tevoren te worden geïnformeerd over de
implicaties van hun deelname. Verder bevatten bovengenoemde protocollen
onder andere een recht op juridische bijstand. Ook moet worden gewaar
borgd dat er geen grote ongelijkheid tussen de partijen bestaat. Daarnaast
moeten er trainingsmogelijkheden geboden worden aan mediators. Tijdens
de bemiddeling dienen mediators zich onpartijdig en onafhankelijk op te
stellen. Verder noemen de protocollen het belang van de beschikbaarheid
van bemiddeling tijdens de verschillende fasen van het strafproces, en het
belang van het feit dat beslissingen in het kader van bemiddeling zo spoedig
mogelijk worden genomen. Ook het principe waar dit onderzoek betrekking
op heeft, het vereiste van vertrouwelijkheid, is in beide internationale do
cumenten opgenomen. Op grond van de betrokken bepalingen is de inhoud
van een strafrechtelijke bemiddeling aan geheimhouding onderhevig. De
belangrijkste redenen hiervoor zijn het waarborgen van de aantrekkelijkheid
voor het slachtoffer en de verdachte om deel te nemen, en het bevorderen
van vruchtbare interactie tijdens de bemiddeling. Bovendien vereist het pri
vate karakter van bemiddeling geen publieke toegankelijkheid om redenen
van kwaliteitsbewaking vergelijkbaar met het strafproces. Beide internatio
nale documenten maken verder een voorbehoud op het vertrouwelijke ka
rakter van bemiddeling, te weten wanneer verdachte en slachtoffer overeen
komen dat bepaalde informatie openbaar mag worden gemaakt. De basis
principes van de Verenigde Naties voegen hieraan toe dat het vertrouwelijke
karakter van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling ook kan worden doorbroken wan
neer nationale wetgeving dit vereist.
De wijze waarop bovengenoemde protocollen het vertrouwelijkheidsbegin
sel hebben verwoord, is gekozen als uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek. Op
basis hiervan is onderzocht wat de houdbaarheid is van het vertrekpunt dat
alles wat wordt besproken tijdens een strafrechtelijke bemiddeling onderhe
vig is aan geheimhouding. Zijn er situaties die nopen tot het maken van
587 Recommendation R (99)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Matters Adopted by the
Committee of Ministers (15 September 1999).
588 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters, 1 26 July 2002, Res/2002/12.
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uitzonderingen? Een dergelijke benadering vereist een afweging tussen de
belangen die worden gewaarborgd door de inachtneming van het vertrou
welijkheidsbeginsel en de belangen die worden geschaad door de geheim
houding van informatie in bepaalde situaties. Om deze belangafweging
mogelijk te maken is in hoofdstuk 4 een toetsingskader ontwikkeld. Dit toet
singskader bestaat uit drie pijlers: fundamentele kenmerken van strafrechte
lijke bemiddeling zelf, en de essentialia van de concepten die zich bevinden
op het speelveld van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling, te weten straf(proces)
recht en civiel (proces)recht. Strafrechtelijke bemiddeling kan worden ge
volgd door een strafprocedure (wanneer de eerste modaliteit van mediation
niet leidt tot een overeenkomst, of in het geval van de tweede modaliteit) en
een civiele procedure (vaak handelend over een vordering tot schadever
goeding), en informatie afkomstig uit bemiddeling kan derhalve voor beide
typen procedures relevant zijn. Om die reden dienen de kenmerken van
beide rechtsgebieden in bovengenoemde belangenafweging te worden be
trokken.
De fundamentele kenmerken van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling, strafrecht
en civiel recht begrenzen de belangenafweging die in het kader van dit on
derzoek heeft plaatsgevonden. Het karakter van deze vereisten is dermate
essentieel dat zij onder alle omstandigheden dienen te worden gewaar
borgd. Indien het inachtnemen dan wel het doorbreken van het vertrouwe
lijkheidsbeginsel een van deze kenmerken schendt, vormt dit aanleiding
juist wel of niet een uitzondering te maken op het geheime karakter van de
inhoud van bemiddeling. De aspecten van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling die
in dit verband van belang zijn, betreffen de erkenning van de basale feiten,
de vrijwillige deelname aan het proces en het recht om toereikende informa
tie te ontvangen. Fundamentele kenmerken van het strafrecht betreffen het
streven naar materiële waarheidsvinding en de rechten die voortvloeien uit
het recht op een eerlijk proces, zoals neergelegd in artikel 6 EVRM en artikel
14 IVBP. Ook voor het civiele recht zijn deze bepalingen hier relevant. Daar
naast is de relatief actieve rol die aan partijen is toegekend van belang.
Op basis van bovenstaand toetsingskader zijn verscheidene situaties tegen
het licht gehouden, die, wanneer de door de internationale richtlijnen voor
gestane reikwijdte van het vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel wordt gevolgd, tot
fricties kunnen leiden die mogelijk nadelige consequenties voor de bemidde
lingsdeelnemers hebben. Nu deelname aan bemiddeling in ieder geval niet
moet leiden tot leedtoevoeging, dienen dergelijke consequenties zoveel mo
gelijk voorkomen te worden en, waar nodig, gecompenseerd. Een mogelijk
heid tot dit laatste is de deelnemers aan bemiddeling toe te staan bepaalde
informatie naar buiten te brengen en dientengevolge het vertrouwelijk
heidsprincipe ten aanzien van deze situaties te doorbreken.
Hoofdstuk 5 betreft de buitengerechtelijke openbaarmaking van bemidde
lingsinformatie en de frictie die mogelijk kan ontstaan wanneer dit de deel
nemers niet is toegestaan. In deze context is alleen de eerste pijler van het
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toetsingskader, betreffende de essentialia van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling,
relevant. Op basis van de huidige interpretatie van het vertrouwelijkheids
beginsel is het de deelnemers aan bemiddeling niet toegestaan met vrienden
en familie, de media, en overige instellingen (zoals scholen, sportclubs en
religieuze instituten) te spreken over de inhoud van de bemiddeling. Dit
betekent in de eerste plaats dat het slachtoffer en de verdachte hun ervarin
gen niet mogen delen met hun naasten. Nu een dergelijk verbod een nadelig
effect kan hebben op hun verwerkingsproces en welbevinden, en het ophef
fen van dit verbod geen noemenswaardige problemen voor de bemidde
lingsprocedure met zich brengt, verdient het aanbeveling dat het slachtoffers
en verdachten wordt toegestaan over hun ervaringen te praten met familie
en vrienden. Dit geldt echter niet voor het openbaren van bemiddelingsin
formatie aan de media. Het is onwaarschijnlijk dat een dergelijke onthulling
noodzakelijk is voor het verwerkingsproces van verdachte en slachtoffer; het
ligt eerder voor de hand dat zij handelen uit motieven met een meer nega
tieve connotatie, zoals wraak. Gezien het feit dat dergelijke drijfveren zich
niet verhouden met het doel van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling, namelijk het
bereiken van een overeenkomst met de ander op grond van de erkenning
van diens gevoelens en behoeften, past het niet om het onthullen van infor
matie op grond van dergelijke beweegredenen toe te laten. De derde catego
rie potentiële geadresseerden wordt gevormd door overige instellingen uit
de leefomgeving van verdachte en slachtoffer. Het kan in hun beider belang
zijn bemiddelingsinformatie aan deze instellingen openbaar te maken. In
deze gevallen kunnen de verdachte en het slachtoffer afspreken bepaalde
informatie naar buiten te brengen. In het geval zij geen overeenstemming
kunnen bereiken, ligt de beslissing om informatie toch te onthullen in begin
sel bij de partij die dit voornemen heeft opgevat. De mediator en de (profes
sionele) hulpverlener is het niet toegelaten met derden te spreken over de
inhoud van een bemiddeling, behoudens de situatie dat zij binnen hun eigen
organisatie hun ervaringen bespreken in het kader van kwaliteitsbewaking,
of wanneer verdachte en slachtoffer hen hiertoe verzoeken.
De overige fricties die kunnen worden veroorzaakt door het vertrouwelijk
heidsbeginsel, betreffen de juridische setting. Een uitzondering in deze con
text impliceert dat het de bemiddelingsdeelnemers is toegestaan informatie
in te brengen in een straf of civiele procedure. De doeltreffendheid van het
maken van een uitzondering hangt daarom niet alleen af van de verenig
baarheid met de essentialia van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling, maar ook van
de mogelijkheid om de desbetreffende informatie te bezigen in een gerechte
lijke procedure. Om die reden dienen ook de tweede en derde pijler van het
toetsingskader te worden betrokken in onderhavige afweging. Bovendien is
het van belang dat de bemiddelingsdeelnemers een positie in het straf en
civiele proces kunnen innemen, die hen daadwerkelijk in staat stelt informa
tie naar voren te brengen. Na het bespreken van de verenigbaarheid van het
maken van een uitzondering voor de afzonderlijke fricties met de essentialia
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van de betrokken concepten in de hoofdstukken 6 en 7, zijn dan ook de posi
ties van de verschillende bemiddelingsdeelnemers tijdens het straf en civie
le proces besproken in hoofdstuk 8.
Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt een tweetal situaties die gerelateerd zijn aan de positie
van de verdachte. Het betreft de mogelijkheid dat de verdachte zich tijdens
de bemiddeling schuldig maakt aan een nieuw strafbaar feit ten opzichte
van het slachtoffer, of informatie over andere strafbare feiten onthult. Gezien
de huidige interpretatie die aan het vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel wordt gege
ven mag het slachtoffer dergelijke informatie niet openbaar maken, terwijl
deze om begrijpelijke redenen een negatief effect op zijn welbevinden kan
hebben. Daarnaast wordt de situatie besproken dat de verdachte tijdens de
bemiddeling een bekentenis aflegt of dat de erkenning van de basale feiten
een dergelijke verklaring inhoudt, maar deze tijdens de behandeling van de
zaak ter terechtzitting herroept. Gezien het vertrouwelijke karakter van de
inhoud van bemiddeling mag het slachtoffer dan niet naar buiten brengen
dat de verdachte in de context van bemiddeling reeds heeft bekend. Ook dit
kan voor het slachtoffer leiden tot gevoelens van onbegrip en frustratie.
Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt de situatie dat de verdachte opzettelijk het imple
menteren van een bemiddelingsovereenkomst frustreert. Indien de redenen
hiervoor terug te voeren zijn op de communicatie tijdens de bemiddeling,
mogen deze niet openbaar worden gemaakt. Het vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel
heeft bovendien tot inspiratie gediend voor een bepaling in bovengenoemd
protocol van de Verenigde Naties, dat stelt dat het niet nakomen van de
overeenkomst niet dient te leiden tot een zwaardere straf. Dit betekent dat
het voor het slachtoffer op dit moment onmogelijk lijkt een mislukking van
de overeenkomst in de rechtszaal aan de kaak te stellen. Gezien het feit dat
het nakomen van de bemiddelingsovereenkomst door de verdachte kan
worden gezien als de ultieme erkenning van het slachtoffer en diens behoef
ten, kan het frustreren hiervan een tegengesteld effect hebben en leiden tot
secundaire victimisatie.
De raadzaamheid van het doorbreken van het vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel in
bovengenoemde situaties hangt in de eerste plaats af van de verenigbaar
heid hiervan met de essentialia van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling. Uit de be
langrijkste kenmerken (erkenning van basale feite, vrijwillige deelname en
recht op informatie) volgt dat verdachte en slachtoffer worden veronder
steld bewust de keuze te maken om deel te nemen. Dit impliceert derhalve
dat zij zich verbinden de procedure tot een goed einde te brengen, en zich
daarbij bewust zijn van hun rol binnen het proces en de positie van de an
der.
Het plegen van een nieuw strafbaar feit tijdens de bemiddeling – of het
onthullen van informatie over toekomstige of eerder begane strafbare feiten
– lijkt echter niet te stroken met dit uitgangspunt noch met de veronderstel
ling dat de verdachte het slachtoffer tijdens een bemiddeling erkent en res
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pecteert, en voornemens is bij te dragen aan het bereiken van een overeen
komst. Het intrekken van een in de context van bemiddeling afgelegde be
kentenis leidt tot eenzelfde conclusie. Nu bemiddeling niet kan slagen zon
der dat de verdachte zijn verantwoordelijkheid neemt ten opzichte van het
slachtoffer en het strafbare feit, staat het intrekken van een bekentenis die
besloten ligt in de erkenning van de basale feiten of die daarbuiten ligt, op
nieuw haaks op de grondslagen van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling. Ook een
opzettelijke weigering om de overeenkomst na te komen is hiermee in strijd.
Met de bewuste keuze bij te dragen aan het slagen van een bemiddeling
verbindt de verdachte zich immers ook aan het vervullen van de daaruit
voortvloeiende afspraken. De bemiddelingsessentialia verzetten zich der
halve niet tegen het maken van een uitzondering in de hier aangeduide situ
aties, nu deze alle een schending van fundamentele beginselen van bemid
deling inhouden.
De tweede stap in dit verband betreft de verenigbaarheid van het maken van
een uitzondering met de essentialia van strafrecht en civiel recht, en daar
mee het vaststellen van de toelaatbaarheid van de betreffende informatie in
een juridische procedure. Deze essentialia verzetten zich niet tegen het
doorbreken van de vertrouwelijkheid in bovengenoemde situaties. Gezien
het feit dat het recht op informatie waarborgt dat de verdachte van tevoren
op de hoogte is van het bereik van het vertrouwelijke karakter van bemidde
ling, inclusief welke informatie onder omstandigheden mogelijk naar buiten
mag worden gebracht, wordt het strafrechtelijke verbod van zelfincriminatie
niet geschonden door het maken van een uitzondering. Hetzelfde geldt voor
de onschuldspresumptie: hoewel deze vereist dat de schuld van de verdach
te slechts wordt vastgesteld door de rechter, en de verdachte in dat kader
een eerder afgelegde bekentenis in een later stadium mag intrekken, verzet
de onschuldspresumptie zich niet tegen het bekendmaken van dergelijke
verklaringen door het slachtoffer. Tot slot brengt het recht op een procedure
op tegenspraak mee dat bepaalde procedurele vereisten bij het aanvoeren
van informatie dienen te worden gerespecteerd. Deze laatste opmerking is
ook van belang voor het civiele recht. Geen van de civielrechtelijke essentia
lia verzet zich tegen het gebruik van de betreffende bemiddelingsinformatie
in een civiele procedure, zolang aan de uit het recht op tegenspraak voort
vloeiende vereisten wordt voldaan.
Naast de verenigbaarheid met bovenstaande fundamentele kenmerken is
tevens bekeken of de bestaande uitzonderingen op het gebruik van informa
tie in het strafrecht (wettelijke grenzen aan inzet van dwangmiddelen, ver
schoningsrecht, bewijsuitsluiting) en civiele recht (verschoningsrecht, be
perkte bewijskracht partijgetuigenverklaring, bewijsuitsluiting) aanleiding
geven om van het maken van uitzonderingen op het vertrouwelijkheidsbe
ginsel af te zien. Dit is ten aanzien van geen van de drie fricties het geval.
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Het laatste aspect dat bepalend is voor het beoordelen van de doeltreffend
heid van het doorbreken van het vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel betreft de
daadwerkelijke mogelijkheden van de bemiddelingsdeelnemers om zich uit
te spreken of anderszins informatie aan te voeren tijdens een juridische pro
cedure (zie hoofdstuk 8).
Afhankelijk van het geldende nationale recht kan het slachtoffer in het ka
der van het strafproces de vervolging van de verdachte initiëren, zich voe
gen als benadeelde partij, een victim impact statement maken en als getuige
optreden. In deze laatste hoedanigheid kan het slachtoffer een verklaring
onder ede afleggen over hetgeen tijdens de bemiddeling is voorgevallen. In
dat geval heeft het slachtoffer de mogelijkheid over alle drie de fricties (te
weten verdere strafbare feiten, een bekentenis, of een opzettelijke weigering
aan de overeenkomst te voldoen) informatie naar voren te brengen. Eventue
le beperkingen die voorvloeien uit het wisselende gewicht dat nationaal
recht toekent aan verklaringen ‘van horen zeggen’ (hearsay evidence), limite
ren deze mogelijkheden voor het slachtoffer niet noemenswaardig. Ditzelfde
geldt voor de mediator en de hulpverleners die partijen mogelijk ondersteu
nen tijdens de bemiddeling. Het is ook mogelijk dat deze bemiddelingsdeel
nemers worden aangezocht als expert. Echter, gezien hun directe betrok
kenheid bij de voorafgaande bemiddeling is het meer waarschijnlijk dat zij
als getuige worden gehoord. De verdachte heeft, op basis van de rechten die
voortvloeien uit het recht op een eerlijk proces, tijdens het strafproces de
mogelijkheid zich te beroepen op zijn zwijgrecht. Daarnaast heeft hij het
recht zichzelf te verdedigen en een verklaring af te leggen. Op basis hiervan
kan de verdachte de bewering van het slachtoffer dat een van de uitzonde
ringen zich heeft voorgedaan weerspreken, ook wanneer in dit kader infor
matie wordt aangevoerd die buiten het bestek van de voorziene uitzonde
ringssituaties ligt. Dergelijke informatie mag de verdachte ook uit eigen
beweging naar voren brengen, wanneer dit hem aantoonbare procesrechte
lijke voordelen oplevert.
In een civiele procedure die volgt op een strafrechtelijke bemiddeling, zul
len het slachtoffer en de verdachte in de regel als procespartijen fungeren.
Een van de mogelijkheden die hen dan ter beschikking staat om de uitge
zonderde bemiddelingsinformatie naar voren te brengen, is het afleggen van
een verklaring als partijgetuige. De status van partijgetuige brengt echter
met zich dat zij in veel gevallen aanvullend bewijs nodig hebben om hun
verklaring te ondersteunen. Evenals in de strafprocedure moet het de ver
dachte ook in de civiele procedure worden toegestaan zich te verweren te
gen beweringen van het slachtoffer met informatie die buiten het bestek van
de uitzonderingen ligt. De verdachte mag dergelijke informatie ook uit eigen
beweging aanvoeren wanneer dit procesrechtelijke voordelen met zich
brengt. De mediator en de hulpverlener kunnen ook tijdens een civiele pro
cedure worden aangezocht als getuige en als expert.
Op grond van het bovenstaande blijkt dat de bemiddelingsdeelnemers af
doende mogelijkheden hebben om informatie naar voren te brengen tijdens
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een juridische procedure van strafrechtelijke of civielrechtelijke aard, en
derhalve in staat zijn om informatie betreffende de uitzonderingssituaties
aan te voeren. Met name de positie van getuige is in dit verband van belang.
In dit verband rijst echter een knelpunt. In het overgrote deel van de landen
zijn getuigen in het straf en civiele recht wettelijk verplicht te verschijnen en
gestelde vragen te beantwoorden. Dit betekent dat bemiddelingsdeelnemers
die optreden als getuige niet kunnen weigeren om vragen naar de inhoud
van een bemiddeling, die het bestek van de uitzonderingssituaties te buiten
gaan, te beantwoorden. Dit brengt het risico met zich dat het uitgangspunt
van het vertrouwelijke karakter van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling in gevaar
wordt gebracht, en ondergraaft de betekenis van dit beginsel. Ditzelfde geldt
voor het nut van het maken van uitzonderingen hierop. Om tegenwicht te
bieden aan deze wettelijke verplichting verdient het daarom aanbeveling het
vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel wettelijk te verankeren. Het zou dan een uitzon
dering vormen op de algemene verplichting voor getuigen om een verkla
ring af te leggen. In aanvulling hierop zouden tevens de drie voorgestelde
uitzonderingen op het vertrouwelijke karakter van bemiddeling in wetge
ving moeten worden gecodificeerd, teneinde de mogelijkheid voor de be
middelingsdeelnemers om deze informatie te openbaren te garanderen. Op
deze wijze wordt een uniforme regeling geboden, die verzekert dat het ver
trouwelijkheidsbeginsel wordt gerespecteerd, terwijl tevens wordt gewaar
borgd dat dit beginsel kan worden doorbroken voor zover dit noodzakelijk
is. De beslissing om de vertrouwelijkheid te doorbreken rust in beginsel bij
de partij die van mening is dat zich een uitzonderingssituatie heeft voorge
daan. Mocht de rechter vervolgens van oordeel zijn dat de desbetreffende
informatie ten onrechte naar voren is gebracht, dan dient deze informatie
verder buiten beschouwing te worden gelaten. Onder omstandigheden kan
aanvullend een schadevergoeding worden toegekend aan de door de be
kendmaking benadeelde partij.
In hoofdstuk 9 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit onderzoek op
een rijtje gezet. In dit onderzoek is getracht de wenselijke reikwijdte van het
vertrouwelijkheidsbeginsel in de context van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling af
te bakenen. Het belang van vertrouwelijkheid van bemiddelingsinformatie
wordt onderkend, en om die reden wordt in dit boek dan ook niet bepleit
om dit beginsel te verlaten. Wel zijn enkele uitzonderingssituaties geïdentifi
ceerd, waarin het gerechtvaardigd is het geheime karakter van de inhoud
van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling te doorbreken. Om vast te kunnen stellen of
deze situaties inderdaad nopen tot het maken van een uitzondering, en of
dit daadwerkelijk compensatie biedt voor de veroorzaakte nadelen, is een
toetsingskader ontwikkeld. Op basis hiervan is betoogd dat de verdachte en
het slachtoffer in de eerste plaats in staat moeten worden gesteld bemidde
lingsinformatie te delen met bepaalde categorieën buitengerechtelijke der
den. Daarnaast is betoogd dat het bemiddelingsdeelnemers moet worden
toegestaan informatie betreffende verdere strafbaar feiten, een bekentenis of
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een opzettelijke niet nakoming van de bemiddelingsovereenkomst openbaar
te maken. Voor een optimale werking van de betoogde reikwijdte van het
vertrouwelijkheidsprincipe is het van belang dat dit beginsel en de voorge
stelde uitzonderingen wettelijk worden verankerd. Daarnaast dienen de
bemiddelingsdeelnemers afdoende te worden geïnformeerd over het bereik
van het vertrouwelijke karakter van strafrechtelijke bemiddeling vooraf
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